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We went to Atlanta and had meetings with all kinds of lawyers, 
but they looked like they were afraid to take our case. Tulane 
took it, and they’re doing a good job. If they weren’t, the 
Governor wouldn’t be so worried about them. 
—Emelda West, St. James Citizens for Jobs & the 
Environment1 
If Shintech is defeated, I’ll just know that I’ll have to do a 
better job next time of getting people out of the way. 
—Louisiana Governor Murphy J. “Mike” Foster, Jr.2 
Widespread advocacy campaigns by professors and students 
are beyond the legal parameters of helping indigent people. 
—Pascal F. Calogero, Jr., Chief Justice, Louisiana 
Supreme Court3 
 
 1. Melba Newsome, Slaying Goliath , AMICUS J., Spring 1998, at 12-13. 
 2. Meeting with Murphy J. “Mike” Foster, Jr., Governor, State of Louisiana, in Baton 
Rouge, La. (Aug. 13, 1980); see Joe Gyan, Jr., “Outlaw” Leader Leaving La., ADVOCATE  
(Baton Rouge, La.), May 15, 1999, at 1B.  
 3. James Varney, Justice Calogero Seeking 3rd Term, T IMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, 
La.), Aug. 7, 1998, at A2. 
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Legal representation is not available to most Americans who have 
legal problems. A 1992 American Bar Association study, for 
example, found that each year approximately half of all low-income 
and moderate-income households face legal problems and that 71% 
and 61% of these households’ legal needs, respectfully, are never 
addressed by the civil justice system.4 The number of lawyers 
working for the needy declined by about one-third since 1980,5 with 
fewer than 20% of America’s lawyers performing any pro bono legal 
services.6 The supply of this limited, free work is usually restricted to 
routine legal matters and often “goes to friends, relatives, and 
organizations likely to attract paying clients.”7 Former President 
Jimmy Carter observed that “[n]inety percent of our lawyers serve ten 
percent of our people. We are over-lawyered and under-
represented.”8 
When people require assistance to advance public interests, rather 
than private interests, the lack of legal representation is even more 
 
 4. A.B.A. CONSORTIUM ON LEGAL SERVICES AND THE PUBLIC, LEGAL NEEDS AND 
CIVIL JUSTICE: A SURVEY OF AMERICANS 15 (1994). In 1991, 85% to 92% of low-income 
residents in Louisiana with civil legal needs were unable to receive assistance from an attorney. 
William P. Quigley, The Unmet Civil Legal Needs of the Poor in Louisiana, 40 LA. BAR J. 477 
(1993). See also  Talbot D’Alemberte, Tributaries of Justice: The Search for Full Access, FLA. 
BAR J., Apr. 1999, at 12, 27 n.19 (reporting that only 19% of low-income individuals with legal 
needs were represented by lawyers in Florida); Karen A. Lash et al., Equal Access to Justice: 
Pursuing Solutions Beyond the Legal Profession, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 489 & n.1 (1998) 
(observing that only one-fourth of poor California families with civil legal problems receive full 
or partial legal assistance). 
 5. Luke Cole, The Crisis and Opportunity in Public Interest Law: A Challenge to Law 
Students to be Rebellious Lawyers in the ’90s, 4 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 2 (1994). 
 6. Rosalind Resnick, Looking at Alternative Services; The Lawyer/Non-Lawyer Wall 
Continues to Erode, NAT’L L.J., June 10, 1991, at 1. Lawyers at the nation’s 100 largest law 
firms dedicated over one-third less time to pro bono work in 1999 than in 1992. John Turrettini 
& Keith Cunningham, The Way We Were, AM. LAW., July 2000, at 96. Only nineteen of the 
largest 100 firms averaged the fifty hours or more of annual pro bono work recommended by 
the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Bruce Buckley, The Do-Good Law Firms, 
NAT’L JURIST, Nov-Dec. 2000, at 31, 32 (citing the American Lawyer survey); see also Not Too 
Much to Brag About, AM. LAW., July 2000, at 161. 
 7. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD ,  JR. & DEBORAH L. RHODE, THE LEGAL PROFESSION: 
RESPONSIBILITY AND REGULATION 469 (3d ed. 1994). 
 8. Jimmy Carter, Remarks at the 100th Anniversary Luncheon of the Los Angeles 
County Bar Association, in PUBLIC PAPERS 834, 836 (1978). Supreme Court Justice Sandra 
Day O’Connor lamented: “There has probably never been a wider gulf between the need for 
legal services and the availability of legal services” than exists today. William J. Dean, 
Challenge to Law Firms, NAT’L L.J., Oct. 2, 1995, at 3 (quoting Justice O’Connor’s 1991 
address to the ABA). 
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severe—less than .001% of lawyers in the legal profession are public 
interest lawyers.9 “Although recent data are unavailable, the best 
available estimates suggest that the number of full-time public 
interest lawyers is less than one attorney for every 240,000 
Americans.”10 Citizens advancing issues of public concern often have 
no choice but to turn for free assistance from law school professors or 
one of the nation’s law school clinics.11 
Legal needs remain unsatisfied in spite of ethical rules 
commanding that “[e]very lawyer, regardless of professional 
prominence or work load, has a responsibility to provide legal 
services to those unable to pay.”12 Many members of the legal 
profession have called for transforming this responsibility into a 
mandatory ethical requirement for all members of the bar.13 However, 
no state currently mandates pro bono service and only Florida 
requires all members of the bar to report annually the number of 
hours of pro bono services performed.14 
 
 9. Debra S. Katz & Lynne Bernabei, Practicing Public Interest Law in a Private Public 
Interest Law Firm: The Ideal Setting to Challenge the Power,  96 W. VA. L. REV. 293, 300 
(1993-94). 
 10. Deborah L. Rhode, The Professional Responsibilities of Professional Schools, 49 J. 
LEGAL EDUC. 24, 36 n.49 (Mar. 1999). 
 11. See, e.g., Hope Babcock, Environmental Justice Clinics: Visible Models of Justice, 14 
STAN. ENVTL. L.J.  3, 35 (1995) (observing that “without question” there was a need for a law 
clinic to address environmental justice issues); Joan C. Dubin, Clinical Design for Social 
Justice Imperatives, 51 SMU L. REV. 1461, 1475, 1505 (1998) (arguing that the need for 
clinical programs to address unmet legal needs has scarcely been greater). Kevin R. Johnson & 
Amanda Perez, Clinical Legal Education and the U.C. Davis Immigration Law Clinic: Putting 
Theory Into Practice and Practice Into Theory, 51 SMU L. REV. 1423, 1429 (1998) (noting the 
lengths to which clients must go to find and meet with law clinic attorneys). Supreme Court 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor advocated mandatory clinical legal education for all law students 
to help meet the country’s severe legal services shortage. Dubin, supra , at 1475 n.73 (quoting 
Justice O’Connor’s 1991 address to the ABA). 
 12. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 6.1 cmt. 1 (1999). 
 13. See, e.g., Benjamin L. Cardin & Robert J. Rhudy, Expanding Pro Bono Legal 
Assistance in Civil Cases to Maryland’s Poor,  49  MD. L. REV. 1 (1990) (discussing a 
recommendation of the Advisory Council of the Maryland Legal Services Corporation, 
supported by the Maryland Attorney General, for a court rule establishing mandatory pro bono 
service by all attorneys to assist low-income persons in civil matters); Tigran W. Eldred & 
Thomas Schoenherr, The Lawyer’s Duty of Public Service: More Than Charity?, 96 W. VA. L. 
REV. 367, 399 (1993-94); Steven Lubet & Cathryn Stewart, A “Public Assets” Theory of 
Lawyers’ Pro Bono Obligations,  145 U. PA. L. REV. 1245, 1246-47 (1997). 
 14. See FL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.6.1(d) (1999). Louisiana has a voluntary pro 
bono reporting program that documented fewer than 100,000 hours of pro bono services to 
Louisiana residents during 1998. Access to Justice Program Seeking Donations from Bar 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol4/iss1/5
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While some form of mandatory pro bono assistance appears 
necessary, this Article does not advocate for such a requirement. 
Instead, this Article argues for more modest requirements: simply, 
where members of the bar, and in particular law schools, have 
voluntarily stepped in to address unmet legal needs and help fulfill 
the responsibility of the legal profession, society ought not interfere. 
Moreover, members of the legal profession, as a matter of legal 
ethics, may not interfere. This freedom from interference is 
particularly crucial where such volunteer efforts are not taxpayer-
funded and where denial of pro bono services effectively deprives 
needy individuals and community groups of legal representation in 
matters that may significantly affect their health and welfare. 
Part I of this Article begins by chronicling recent events involving 
the efforts of a lower-income minority community in Louisiana to 
obtain free legal representation to oppose the construction of a 
petrochemical plant. Part II describes the backlash that ensued when 
the Tulane Environmental Law Clinic agreed to provide 
representation to the community and began raising environmental 
discrimination claims. Part II further recounts efforts by the 
Louisiana governor, business interests, members of the legal 
profession, and the Louisiana Supreme Court to deny access to legal 
representation for individuals and community groups. Part III 
documents the harm that resulted from this denial of access to legal 
representation by law clinic students. Finally, this Article analyzes 
and rebuts the justifications given for this denial and similar efforts to 
interfere with attempts by other law school clinics and law professors 
to provide free legal assistance. This Article argues that we will 
realize our commitment to equal justice under the law only when we 
adopt and enforce specified measures to curtail such denials of legal 
representation. 
The significance of the Tulane story set forth below is not simply 
that this community found it so difficult to locate members of the 
 
Members, BAR BRIEFS (New Orleans, La.), May 1999, at 1. In contrast, five of the eight Tulane 
Law School clinics alone provided over 65,000 hours in free legal assistance during 1997. See 
infra note 315 and accompanying text (stating that the Tulane Environmental Law Clinic 
provided 25,000 hours); Memorandum from Jane Johnson, Tulane Law Clinic, to Monte 
Mollere, Louisiana Bar Association (Nov. 17, 1998) (on file with author) (citing statistic that 
Tulane civil, criminal, immigration and juvenile justice clinics donated over 43,000 hours). 
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legal profession willing to donate their time to ensure that the 
community’s legal interests were heard. The statistics noted above 
demonstrate the difficulty of obtaining the services of scarce public 
interest lawyers. What is significant about this story is the hostility 
from certain public officials, business interests, lawyers, and the 
judiciary to this community’s efforts to obtain legal assistance from 
law students and professors. These hostile reactions speak negatively 
about the commitment of society and the legal profession to equal 
access to justice. These negative reactions also highlight the need for 
stronger measures to deter interference in the provision of free legal 
services to needy individuals and community groups. 
I. THE SHINTECH PROPOSAL AND AN APPEAL FOR FREE LEGAL 
ASSISTANCE 
In the fall of 1996, a group of Louisiana residents approached the 
Tulane Environmental Law Clinic (Tulane Clinic or Clinic) seeking 
legal assistance to challenge the proposed siting of a large chemical 
plant in their community. To the Clinic, it appeared, at first, as just 
another request, albeit a large one, for the type of free legal services 
the Clinic had provided to Louisiana residents for the previous seven 
years. However, when the Clinic slowed the plant’s regulatory 
approval, the governor of Louisiana, certain business groups, 
prominent members of Louisiana’s bar, and the Louisiana Supreme 
Court viewed the Clinic’s advocacy as intolerable and as an abuse of 
the free legal services provided by the state’s law clinics. 
A. “Enough is Enough” 
Convent is a lower-income, rural, 84% African American 
community along the Mississippi River in St. James Parish, 
Louisiana.15 Located in the eighty-five-mile area commonly referred 
 
 15. See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY ,  TITLE VI ADMINISTRATIVE 
COMPLAINT RE:  LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY PERMIT FOR 
PROPOSED SHINTECH FACILITY : SUMMARY DOCUMENTATION OF DRAFT REVISED 
DEMOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS, Attachment 3 (Apr. 1998) (on file with author) (citing statistics 
showing 83.7% of the 3,165 residents within a three-mile radius of the center of the proposed 
facility are African American). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol4/iss1/5
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to as “Cancer Alley” or the “Chemical Corridor,” Convent is a highly 
toxic community even by Louisiana and Chemical Corridor 
standards. In 1995 industrial facilities in the Convent area emitted 
251,179 pounds of toxic air pollution per square mile: over sixty-
seven times the amount per square mile emitted for the rest of the 
parish, the third most polluted parish in the state; ninety-three times 
more than the amount emitted per square mile for the highly-polluted 
Chemical Corridor; 129 times more than the average for Louisiana, 
described as easily the most polluted state in America on a square 
mile or per capita basis; and 658 times more than the U.S. average.16 
A person could spend half a day in Convent and be exposed to almost 
as much toxic air pollution as the average American breathes in a 
year. 
Unfortunately, industrial development has not resulted in a 
noticeable economic improvement for many Convent residents. The 
median annual income for the Convent area is only $11,476, 
compared to a median income for the parish of $23,000 and a 
national average of $30,000.17 Almost half of the households in 
Convent have incomes less than $15,000 per year, less than 50% of 
the children graduate from high school, and unemployment runs as 
high as 60%.18 Convent is a classic example of a local community 
 
 16. Charles A. Flanagan, Convent Area School and Toxic Release Inventory Sites With 
1995 Total Air Emissions (1998) (on file with author) (explaining an analysis based on 1995 
U.S. EPA Toxics Release Inventory data for 50-square mile Convent area). See also FROM 
PLANTATIONS TO PLANTS:  REPORT OF THE EMERGENCY NATIONAL COMMISSION ON 
ENVIRONMENTAL AND ECONOMIC JUSTICE IN ST. JAMES PARISH , LOUISIANA 7, 9 (Sept. 15, 
1998) (including a map by Charles A. Flanagan); LOUISIANA DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, 
T OXICS RELEASE INVENTORY 1996, 31 (1998); Coddling Polluters, GAMBIT WKLY. (New 
Orleans, La.), July 28, 1998, at 7 (“[I]f pollution figures are analyzed by square mile or per 
capita, then [Louisiana is] easily the most polluted state in America”); Chris Gray, Louisiana Is 
Nation’s No. 2 Polluter, T IMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), June 19, 1998, at A2 (explaining 
an analysis based on 1995 U.S. EPA Toxic Release Inventory data for a fifty-square mile 
Convent area). 
 17. Amended Complaint Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, Re: Louisiana Dep’t of 
Environmental Quality/Permit for Proposed Shintech Facility (July 16, 1997), No. 04R-97-R6, 
at 2 n.8 (on file with author) (using 1990 census data for the area within four miles of the 
proposed Shintech site). 
 18. Alexander Cockburn, Environmental Justice Is Put to the Test, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 28, 
1997, at B8 (“[L]ess than 50% of the children graduate from high school, more than 60% of the 
residents are unemployed . . ..”); Deborah Mathis, Environmental Hazards Make Small Town 
Hellish Place to Live, GANNETT NEWS SERVICE , June 1, 1999 (“In Convent, there is little good 
to show for the proliferation of industrial neighbors. More than 60 percent of the residents live 
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suffering the burdens of industrial pollution while the economic 
benefits of the industry flow outside the community to non-resident 
employees and distant corporate officers and shareholders. 
Residents of Convent, therefore, had reason to be skeptical when 
word leaked in the summer of 1996 that a Japanese chemical 
company, Shintech, was planning to build a massive $700 million 
chemical manufacturing plant in their community. While apparent 
that state and local officials had encouraged this plan for quite some 
time, the news was met with concern by many local residents.19 The 
residents heard promises, as they had many times before, that the 
plant would bring jobs and economic development. As they learned 
more about the proposed plant, the residents became worried about 
potential threats to their families’ health.20 Shintech proposed to 
manufacture polyvinyl chloride (PVC) using a process that would 
release almost three million pounds of air pollution per year, 
including 693,200 pounds per year of toxic air pollution from 
carcinogenic chemicals such as dioxin, ethylene dichloride, and vinyl 
chloride.21 
The additional possibility of accidental releases of toxic chemicals 
caused concern, with two elementary schools and Head Start centers 
within approximately one mile of the proposed Shintech site.22 A 
study found that within a ten-mile radius of two similar vinyl 
production facilities in Lake Charles, Louisiana, residents are 
exposed to an increased risk of serious health consequences and even 
 
below the poverty line. Unemployment is chronic.”); Newsome, supra  note 1, at 12-13 
(“Unemployment there is a staggering 62 percent; 50 percent of the adult residents lack a high 
school diploma; half of all people live below the poverty line.”). 
 19. See Howard Castay, New Company and More Jobs for St. James Parish , ENTERPRISE 
(Vacherie, La.), Aug. 14, 1996; Leonard Gray, New Plastics Plant Plans More Industry for 
Convent, L’OBSERVATEUR (LaPlace, La.), Aug. 17, 1996, at 1. 
 20. See Newsome, supra note 1, at 12. 
 21. Public Notice, Louisiana Dept. of Environmental Quality, Air Quality Division, 
Request for Public Comment and Notification of a Public Hearing on a Proposed Air Pollution 
Source, St. James Chemical Production Complex, Shintech Inc. and Its Affiliates, Convent, St. 
James Parish, Louisiana, ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.), Nov. 7, 1996, at 10C; see Jim 
Morris, In Strictest Confidence: The Chemical Industry’s Secrets, HOUSTON CHRON., July 26, 
1998, at A1 (discussing the environmental problems caused by the production of vinyl chloride 
and ethylene dichloride in Louisiana and Texas). 
 22. Letter from Lisa Lavie, Tulane Environmental Law Clinic, to Carol Browner, 
Administrator, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (Aug. 27, 1997) (on file with author); 
see also Flanagan, supra note 16. 
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death should a significant chemical accident occur.23 Shintech 
acknowledged that even a relatively small spill of one-hundred 
pounds of chlorine could harm residents one mile away; a larger 
release of 1,600 pounds of chlorine could harm populations over ten 
miles away.24 
During the period from 1994 to 1997, 141 emergency releases of 
toxic chemicals were reported in the Convent area, an average of 
three per month and a 500% increase in the average number of 
accidental releases since 1993.25 However, local residents were rarely 
warned of the releases, and even when notified, it was usually long 
after the release occurred. Shintech’s method for dealing with such 
releases consisted of a program, taught to area children through the 
distribution of free coloring books, that the chemical industry calls 
“Shelter In Place.” Critics refer to program as “Duck & Cover”—
covering your mouth and nose with a wet cloth and hiding indoors 
until told it is safe to leave.26 
Dismissive attitudes by state officials regarding the need to 
closely review the Shintech proposal compounded the residents’ 
fears. From the available evidence, the Louisiana Department of 
Environmental Quality (DEQ) was making approval quite easy for 
Shintech. As Louisiana Governor Murphy J. “Mike” Foster, Jr. told 
one reporter: “The DEQ’s job is to go out and make it as easy as they 
can within the law.”27 The DEQ’s three proposed air permits were 
issued the same day the agency received Shintech’s thirty-four page 
single-spaced analysis, with twenty-eight technical appendices, of the 
likely environmental and social impacts of the project.28 The 
 
 23. FROM PLANTATIONS TO PLANTS, supra  note 16, at 15 (citing CALCASIEU PARISH 
OFFICE OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, EHSs COMMONLY FOUND IN CALCASIEU PARISH 
(Revised Apr. 26, 1996)). 
 24. Id. at 16 (citing Shintech Corp., Supplemental Air Permits Application (Jan. 1997), 
and U.S. EPA, T ECHNICAL GUIDANCE FOR HAZARDS ANALYSIS (Dec. 1987)). 
 25. Letter from Lisa Lavie Jordan & Robert R. Kuehn, Tulane Environmental Law Clinic, 
to Ann E. Goode and Mary O’Lone, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (May 26, 1998) 
(on file with author) (citing an analysis prepared by INFORM of potential impacts of accidental 
releases in Convent). 
 26. See FROM PLANTATIONS TO PLANTS, supra  note 16, at 17; Dr. Fred Millar, Fact Sheet: 
Shelter in Place—Duck & Cover for the New Milenium [sic]? (1998) (on file with author). 
 27. Lolis Eric Elie, A Call From the Governor, T IMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), 
Sept. 4, 1998, at B1 . 
 28. See SHINTECH INC. AND ITS AFFILIATES, ST. JAMES PARISH , LOUISIANA, ANALYSIS 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Louisiana Constitution mandates that the DEQ review a permit 
applicant’s impact statement and determine whether the proposed 
project minimizes adverse environmental effects by considering 
alternate projects, alternate sites, and mitigation measures.29 This 
mandatory review was clearly impossible for the DEQ to accomplish 
in less than a day. 
Additionally, Governor Foster went to great lengths to persuade 
Shintech to locate in Convent, pledging to Shintech’s president “to 
bring [his] project to a speedy, profitable and mutually beneficial 
fruition.”30 Unbeknownst to local residents, Governor Foster’s liaison 
on the Shintech project instructed his agency staff “to be sure to do 
everything we can to prevent [environmentalists and local residents] 
from tying up the permit application process.”31 Meanwhile, in 
November and December of 1996, while the DEQ was considering 
Shintech’s applications for environmental permits, Shintech, its 
lobbying firm, and its public relations firm gave $5,000 each, the 
maximum contribution allowed under Louisiana law, to Governor 
Foster’s reelection campaign.32  
 
OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS T AKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN SITING AND DESIGNING THE 
NEW FACILITY (Nov. 7, 1996) (on file with author); Public Notice, Louisiana Dept. of 
Environmental Quality, supra note 21. 
 29. Save Ourselves, Inc. v. La. Envtl. Control Comm’n, 452 So. 2d 1152, 1156 (La. 
1984). “[T]he [DEQ’s] role as the representative of the public interest does not permit it to act 
as an umpire passively calling balls and strikes for adversaries appearing before it; the rights of 
the public must receive active and affirmative protection at the hands of the [DEQ].” Id.  
 30. Letter from Gov. M.J. “Mike” Foster, Jr., to Chirhiro Kanagawa, President, Shintech, 
Inc. (Feb. 13, 1996) (on file with author); see also  Letter from Gov. M.J. “Mike” Foster, Jr., to 
Chirhiro Kanagawa, President, Shin-Etsu Chemical Co., Ltd. (May 6, 1996) (on file with 
author) (“[I]f there is any thing you feel the Office of the Governor can do to help Shintech or 
Shin-Etsu, please do not hesitate to contact me directly.”). Governor Foster’s strong pledge of 
support continued after local residents challengend the company’s permit applications. See 
Letter from Gov. M.J. “Mike” Foster, Jr., to Chirhiro Kanagawa, President, Shin-Etsu Chemical 
Co., Ltd. (Mar. 21, 1997) (on file with author) (“From the state of Louisiana’s perspective, 
environmental permitting continues to proceed smoothly . . . . So please allow me to once more 
pledge the full support and cooperation of my entire administration. Again, if there is anything 
you feel my office can do to be of assistance to Shintech or Shin-Etsu, please let me know.”). 
 31. Memorandum from Kevin P. Reilly, Sr., Louisiana Department of Economic 
Development, to Harold Price, Louisiana Department of Economic Development (Nov. 15, 
1996) (on file with author). 
 32. Ken Silverstein & Alexander Cockburn, The Chemical Plant That Could Break 
Tulane, COUNTERPUNCH , July 16-31, 1997, at 4. A financial statement by Governor Foster 
revealed that in 1997 he made over $50,000 in dividends from Merrill Lynch, the largest U.S. 
shareholder in Shintech’s parent company. Dan Nicolai, Foster, Shintech, People’s Will, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol4/iss1/5
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When local residents met with Governor Foster and tried to 
explain their position, he dismissed their concerns by joking that his 
youthful exposure to mosquito spraying was probably responsible for 
his present lack of hair.33 Governor Foster later derided the residents 
as a “bunch of housewives” who had no business making public 
policy.34 Governor Foster’s special counsel and deputy chief of staff 
bragged that the Shintech permits were “expected to breeze through” 
the approval process.35 
As for oversight of polluting facilities once built, Governor Foster 
declared: “I believe DEQ should not be policemen.”36 Governor 
Foster’s position was evidenced by news that pollution citations and 
fines in Louisiana dropped to a ten-year low and toxic pollution 
emissions increased by eight million pounds during Governor 
Foster’s first full year in office.37 Community concerns about lax 
oversight were reinforced upon learning that the DEQ, at Shintech’s 
request, suppressed reports that the proposed site of the plant 
contained contaminated soil and groundwater.38 Shintech had a 
reason for suppressing such information from the local residents: 
“[P]remature disclosure . . . could have a detrimental effect on both 
 
ADVOCATE  (Baton Rouge, La.), Feb. 23, 1998, at B6 (analyzing Governor Foster’s financial 
stake in the Shintech dispute). 
 33. Christi Daugherty, Economic Development or Environmental Racism , GRIS GRIS 
(Baton Rouge, La.), Apr. 19, 1997, at 16. 
 34. John McQuaid, Burdens on the Horizon, T IMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), May 
21, 2000, at J-5. Governor Foster stated: “This [action by local female residents] is a great way 
to stop development, but that is not good public policy. If you want a bunch of housewives 
making public policy, that is a good approach.” Id. 
 35. Ken Grisson, ‘No Hidden Agendas’ in Gov. Foster’s Plans, EUNICE NEWS (Eunice, 
La.), Dec. 14, 1997, at 1A (interviewing Terry Ryder, Special Counsel and Deputy Chief of 
Staff). Similarly, Governor Foster’s liaison on Shintech permitting matters told the DEQ at the 
initial Shintech public hearing: “We hope that this permit will be issued and approved rather 
quickly so that we can get on with construction of this plant.” Videotape: Kevin P. Reilly, Sr., 
Secretary, Louisiana Department of Economic Development, Remarks at the DEQ’s Public 
Hearing on Proposed Shintech Air Permits (Dec. 9, 1996) (on file with author). 
 36. Joe Macaluso, Where Does Foster Stand?, ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.), Jan. 7, 
1997, at 16C; see also  Ed Anderson, 2 Appointees Criticized; 1 a Surprise, TIMES-PICAYUNE 
(New Orleans, La.), Jan. 6, 1996, at A1 (quoting Governor Foster as saying DEQ will not work 
as a “policeman or adversary” to polluters). 
 37. Christi Daugherty, A Fine Mess, GAMBIT WKLY. (New Orleans, La.), July 14, 1998, at 
19; Manuel Roig-Franzia, Pollution Penalties Lowest in 10 Years, T IMES-PICAYUNE (New 
Orleans, La.), June 12, 1998, at A1. 
 38. See Chris Gray, Contamination Was Kept Quiet, Opponents Say, T IMES-PICAYUNE 
(New Orleans, La.), Feb. 19, 1998, at A9. 
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the purchase price and community relations.”39 
When it comes to jobs, chemical plants in Louisiana historically 
have not hired local residents.40 A poll of Convent-area residents 
found that 63% believed that businesses who build in minority areas 
rarely keep promises about providing jobs to local residents.41 In the 
nearby community of St. Gabriel, only 8.7% of almost 1,900 
permanent jobs at ten local chemical plants were filled by local 
residents.42 Likewise, Shintech refused to commit to hire local 
residents.43 
A spokesperson for the Louisiana Chemical Association pointed 
out that 99% of chemical plant systems are now computer controlled 
and that chemical plant operators must have computer knowledge and 
a good grasp of physics and chemistry.44 Not surprisingly, given 
Shintech’s stated job requirements and the low education level of 
most Convent residents, the staff director of the state agency 
promoting the plant acknowledged that “very few” of the 165 new 
 
 39. Letter from Jeffrey S. Heaton, Vice President, CK Associates, Inc., to Dale Givens, 
Secretary, Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (Aug. 12, 1996) (on file with 
author). 
 40. FROM PLANTATIONS TO PLANTS, supra  note 16, at 22. 
 41. Chris Gray, Shintech Foes Live Closest to Site, Poll Says, T IMES-PICAYUNE (New 
Orleans, La.), Jan. 18, 1998, at A1 (presenting results of an independent newspaper poll 
covering every household in the Convent area that had a telephone and was willing to 
part icipate). 
 42. EAST IBERVILLE PARISH & TOWN OF ST. GABRIEL EMPLOYMENT SURVEY (Sept. 
1995) (on file with author); FROM PLANTATIONS TO PLANTS, supra  note 16, at 22-23 (citing 
same survey).  
 Two St. James Parish Councilmen also expressed the view that local residents do not 
benefit from chemical plant hiring. “I see very few people from my [Convent] district getting 
the good jobs at these industries. What seems to be happening is companies are hiring away 
from other industries in other parts of the parish, and these people who need the jobs are not 
getting them.” ST. JAMES PARISH COUNCIL, OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE ST. JAMES PARISH 
COUNCIL 33 (Feb. 11, 1998) (remarks of Councilman Ralph Patin, Jr.) (on file with author). 
Councilman Elton Aubert remarked: “Those people who need the jobs are not getting them, and 
I feel we need to address this. The highest rate of poverty is in [Convent]. Industry is moving 
in, but the plight of these people is not improving.” ST. JAMES PARISH COUNCIL, OFFICIAL 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ST. JAMES PARISH COUNCIL 28 (Feb. 4, 1998) (on file with author). 
 43. See Shintech Inc., Environmental Economic Development Program Agreement (n.d.) 
(“Shintech will provide equal opportunity to qualified citizens of St. James Parish to compete 
for employment with Shintech at its new facility consistent with its staffing needs.”) (on file 
with author). 
 44. Tom Guarisco, La. Chemical Industry Finds Qualified Applicants Rare, ADVOCATE 
(Baton Rouge, La.), Jan. 25, 1998, at 1A (quoting Bettsie Baker, Louisiana Chemical 
Association).  
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permanent jobs created by Shintech would go to local residents.45 
Information that the state promised Shintech $130 million in 
assistance if the plant located in Louisiana, a taxpayer-financed 
subsidy of almost $800,000 per permanent job created, further 
dampened hopes that Shintech would aid the long-term economic 
development of Convent.46 This subsidy, which amounted to over 
$4,500 from each resident of the Parish, was offered to a company 
that realized an annual after-tax profit at its PVC production facility 
in Texas of $750,000 per employee.47 
In return, the state did not ask Shintech to commit to hire any St. 
James Parish or Louisiana residents, or use any Parish or Louisiana 
contractors or suppliers.48 The planned subsidy would exempt 
approximately $27 million in property taxes that Shintech would 
otherwise have to pay over a ten-year period to fund St. James 
Parish’s public schools.49 The head of the Louisiana Department of 
Economic Development, the state agency promoting Shintech and 
administering the subsidy, previously described the tax break 
program offered to Shintech as “essentially useless” in promoting 
local economic development.50 
Alarmed by these facts, local residents joined together and formed 
a new community organization, the St. James Citizens for Jobs and 
 
 45. E-mail from Paul Adams, Louisiana Department of Economic Development, to Kevin 
Reilly, Secretary, Louisiana Department of Economic Development (Mar. 24, 1997, 03:49:06 
CST) (on file with author) (“[T]he numbers in the Greenpeace material, you sent me, are 
essentially correct. . . [T]he comment about very few of the 165 jobs going to local residents 
because of technical training required, may be correct.”). As the Job Service Office manager for 
St. James Parish put it: “When we take applications for one of these large plants, we get a lot of 
applications from people with no education beyond high school, very little if any work 
experience, and that just won’t cut it.” Vicki Ferstel, Industrial Revolution: Jobs May Bring 
Prosperity But Cost Culture, ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.), Oct. 26, 1997, at 1A. 
 46. E-mail from Paul Adams to Kevin Reilly, supra  note 45. 
 47. See STANDARD & POOR’S REGISTER OF CORPORATIONS (1998); Shin-Etsu Chemical 
Posts Record Group Earnings, JIJI PRESS T ICKER SERVICE (May 15, 1998); LA. ENVTL. 
ACTION NETWORK , T HE MYTH OF SELLING FALSE HOPES TO LOCAL RESIDENTS (1998) (on file 
with author).  
 48. Gray, supra note 41; Shintech Inc., supra  note 43. 
 49. See LOUISIANA COALITION FOR T AX JUSTICE ,  TAX BREAKS AVAILABLE TO 
SHINTECH’S PROPOSED PLANT (n.d.) (on file with author). 
 50. See Ed Anderson, Tax Breaks Useless, Panel Told , ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.), 
Mar. 2, 1994, at B8 (reporting the testimony of Kevin Reilly, Secretary, Louisiana Department 
of Economic Development, before the Louisiana Joint Legislative Committee on the Budget). 
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the Environment, and decided to oppose the siting of the plant in 
Convent.51 Under the banner “Enough is Enough,” the residents 
maintained that they were already bearing far more than their fair 
share of toxic pollution resulting from industrial development. Rather 
than merely urging “not in my backyard,” the residents argued that 
their backyard was already full and questioned whether it was fair to 
place such a hazard in anyone’s backyard. 
The citizens’ group knew that their opposition promised to be a 
David versus Goliath struggle. Not only was Shintech a $6 billion, 
multi-national corporation with a team of lawyers, engineers, 
lobbyists, and public relations specialists,52 but Governor Foster and, 
ultimately, the entire executive branch of state government were 
prepared to push Shintech’s permit applications swiftly along. 
Further, the state’s powerful petrochemical and other business 
interests stood ready to lend their support to Shintech, and parish 
officials were eager to help Shintech win over local residents.53 
The complexity of the project was equally overwhelming. 
Shintech’s air permit applications alone were in excess of seven 
hundred pages and were composed of detailed charts and highly 
technical data.54 The next year promised additional voluminous, 
technical applications for water pollution, hazardous waste, coastal 
use, and wetlands permits. Faced with such an enormous task, local 
residents turned to state environmental organizations who were quick 
 
 51. See Ziba Kashef, Saving Our Backyard , ESSENCE , Sept. 1999, at 160; Newsome, 
supra note 1, at 12. 
 52. Shintech, with annual sales of almost $1 billion, is a wholly-owned subsidiary of 
Shin-Etsu Chemical Co., a Japanese chemical company with $6 billion in annual revenues. 
STANDARD &  POOR’S REGISTER OF CORPORATIONS (1999); T HE MAJOR COMPANIES 
DATABASE , 1999, LEXIS, Financial Library, Company File; Shin-Etsu Chemical, Financial 
Summary (Consolidated), at http://www.shinetsu.co.jp/english/profile/consols/consols.html 
(last visited Mar. 1, 2000). 
 53. See Leah Bankston, Economic Development or Environmental Racism , GRIS GRIS 
(Baton Rouge, La.), Jan. 1998, at 17 (reporting that parish president secretly compiled dossiers 
for Shintech detailing the race, sex, and attitudes of eighteen parish officials whose approval 
was needed by Shintech in order to build the plant); Daugherty, supra note 33, at 17 (noting 
that the parish economic development office, using public funds, anonymously mailed a pro-
Shintech flyer to more than 400 parish residents); Ron Nixon, Toxic Gumbo, S. EXPOSURE, 
Summer-Fall 1998, at 11, 14 (same); Vicki Ferstel, Shintech Plans Draw Environmentalist Suit, 
ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.), June 14, 1997, at 1B (quoting parish official as admitting he 
destroyed documents profiling parish officials after he provided the document to Shintech). 
 54. Amended Complaint Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, supra  note 17, at 5. 
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to point out that many of the issues were legal in nature. They 
stressed that local residents needed to find legal assistance if their 
voice was to be heard in the numerous upcoming permit proceedings. 
B. The Tulane Environmental Law Clinic Provides Legal Assistance 
Facing Shintech and a determined governor, the residents of 
Convent turned to the only legal help they could afford—free law 
students at Tulane University.55 
All fifty states, as well as the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, 
and most federal courts, have rules that allow law students to practice 
law under the supervision of licensed attorneys.56 In Louisiana, 
Loyola Law School, Southern Law School, and Tulane Law School 
have law school clinical programs, with only Tulane offering services 
in environmental law.57 Like most law school clinics, the Tulane 
Clinic is a small operation that provides free legal assistance to needy 
individuals and community groups that otherwise cannot afford the 
assistance of the private bar.58 Student attorneys at the Clinic are long 
on enthusiasm and idealism but short on experience. The Clinic does 
not have a team of scientists, engineers, or public relations specialists 
at its disposal and does not have money to fund typical legal expenses 
such as filing fees, depositions, and the like. The Clinic is hardly the 
kind of legal representation one would hire if one had a choice of 
attorneys. 
Limited resources restricted the Clinic to filing legal challenges to 
fewer than ten out of the more than 1,500 environmental permits 
 
 55. CBS Evening News: Tulane University Law Students Help Poor People of Convent, 
Louisiana, Keep Out Another Chemical Plant (CBS television broadcast, Oct. 19, 1998) (on file 
with author). 
 56. Frank G. Avellone, The State of State Student Practice: Proposals for Reforming 
Ohio’s Legal Internship Rule, 17 OHIO. N.U. L. REV. 13 (1990) (citing ABA, SECTION OF 
LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR AND THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF BAR 
EXAMINERS, COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO BAR ADMISSIONS REQUIREMENTS 46-48 (1990)); see 
also  David F. Chavkin, Am I My Client’s Lawyer?: Role Definition and the Clinical Supervisor, 
51 SMU L. REV. 1507, app. A (1998) (listing student practice rules). 
 57. Resolution Amending Rule XX, at 1 n.1 (La. Mar. 22, 1999) (Johnson, J., dissenting), 
reprinted in  74 T UL. L. REV. 285, 297 (1999). 
 58. See Tulane Environmental Law Clinic, at http://www.law.tulane.edu/programs/ 
environmental/envirolaw/clinic.html (last visited Oct. 13, 1999); Susan Hansen, Backlash on 
the Bayou, AM. LAW. Jan.-Feb. 1998, at 50, 53-54. 
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issued annually in Louisiana.59 After reviewing Shintech’s air permit 
applications and considering the other permits and legal proceedings 
that would likely be involved, the Clinic informed Convent residents 
that the matter might be more than the Clinic could handle and 
recommended that the residents get help elsewhere.60 After 
unsuccessfully seeking the assistance of national environmental and 
civil rights organizations, the local residents came back to the Clinic 
pleading that, without the students’ help, they would go 
unrepresented.61 Fearing that the residents’ concerns would go 
unaddressed, the Clinic’s independent legal advisory board, after 
further deliberations, unanimously approved the Clinic’s 
representation of the citizens’ group.62 
Thereafter, the Clinic students represented the citizens in a series 
of public hearings on proposed permits63 and asserted rights to 
adjudicatory hearings and impartial agency decision makers.64 When 
these efforts proved unsuccessful, the Clinic filed lawsuits, on behalf 
 
 59. Response of Tulane Law Clinic to Allegations Regarding Tulane Environmental Law 
Clinic in Business Organizations’ March 12th Letter and Supplemental Comments, attachment 
to letter from Edward F. Sherman, Dean, Tulane Law School, to Pascal F. Calogero, Jr., Chief 
Justice, Louisiana Supreme Court (Apr. 14, 1998) (on file with author). 
 60. Hansen, supra note 58, at 53. 
 61. Id.; Newsome, supra  note 1, at 15 (“When the SJCJE began pursuing the issue, no 
legal group would touch it except the students at Tulane’s Environmental Law Clinic.”). As one 
local resident explained, “We went to Atlanta and had meetings with all kinds of lawyers, but 
they looked like they were afraid to take our case. . . . Tulane took it, and they’re doing a good 
job. If they weren’t, the governor wouldn’t be so worried about them.” Id. (quoting Emelda 
West, member, St. James Citizens for Jobs and the Environment). 
 62. See Hansen, supra note 58, at 53; Marsha Shuler, Official Defends Tulane, ADVOCATE 
(Baton Rouge, La.), July 25, 1997, at 1A. 
 63. See Comments of St. James Citizens for Jobs and the Environment et al. in Opposition 
to the Permit Application by Shintech, Inc. and Its Affiliates for a Polyvinyl Chloride 
Production Complex in Convent, Louisiana—Review No. 16803 (DEQ Jan. 23, 1997) 
(comments on proposed air pollution permit applications); Comments of St. James Citizens for 
Jobs and the Environment et al. in Opposition to the Permit Application by Shintech, Inc. and 
Its Affiliates for a Polyvinyl Chloride Production Complex in Convent, Louisiana—Reference 
No. LA0102733 (DEQ Mar. 10, 1997) (comments on proposed water pollution discharge 
permit application); Comments to the Department of the Army Corps of Engineers New 
Orleans District on the Sh intech, Inc., Permit Application # SE (Mississippi River) 1610 
Submitted on Behalf of St. James Citizens for Jobs and the Environment et al. (U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers (New Orleans) (Dec. 19, 1996)) (comments on proposed federal wetlands 
permit). 
 64. See Motion to Recuse DEQ Officials, In re Shintech, Inc. and Its Affiliates (DEQ May 
1997 & Mar. 1998); Request for Adjudicatory Hearing, In re Shintech, Inc. and Its Affiliates 
(DEQ June 1997 & Feb. 1998). 
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of a coalition of affected community organizations, challenging: air 
pollution, water pollution, and coastal zone permits; denials of access 
to public records; and the failure of biased agency officials to recuse 
themselves from the decision-making process.65 The Clinic students 
also filed a petition asking the U.S. Environmetnal Protection Agency 
(EPA) to review and veto the state’s proposed air pollution permits 
for the facility, a process set forth under the federal Clean Air Act.66 
After hearing local residents repeatedly complain of unequal 
exposure to environmental pollution and witnessing the state’s hostile 
attitude toward environmental discrimination concerns, the Clinic 
filed a civil rights complaint with the EPA in July, 1997. The 
complaint alleged that the state’s actions in issuing permits to the 
plant violated the residents’ rights under Title VI of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964.67 
 
 65. See Motion for Appeal, In re Shintech, Inc. and Its Affiliates Part 70 Permits and 
Prevention of Significant Deterioration Permit (19th La. Dist. Ct. June 27, 1997) (No. 442,230) 
(appeal of state air pollution permits); Motion for Appeal, In re Shintech Inc and Its Affiliates 
LPDES Permit LA0102733 (19th La. Dist. Ct. July 7, 1997) (No. 442,229) (appeal of state 
water pollution discharge permit); Petition for Judicial Review and Injunctive Relief, St. James 
Citizens for Jobs and the Env’t v. Hymel (23rd La. Dist. Ct. June 13, 1997) (No. 24607) (appeal 
of parish coastal use permit); Petition for Declaratory Judgment, Injunction, and Writ of 
Mandamus, St. James Parish Citizens for Jobs and the Env’t v. Hymel (23rd La. Dist. Ct. Aug. 
8, 1997) (No. 24722) (lawsuit against St. James Parish under Louisiana Public Records Law); 
Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Writ of Mandamus, St. James Citizens for Jobs and the 
Environment (19th La. Dist. Ct. Apr. 7, 1998) (No. 448816) (lawsuit against DEQ under 
Louisiana Public Records Law); Application for Supervisory Writs of Review and Relief from 
the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality and Request for Expedited Consideration 
and Stay of Proceedings, In re Shintech Inc. and Its Affiliates (19th La. Dist. Ct. Apr. 13, 1998) 
(No. 448928) (alleging bias by DEQ officials). 
 66. Petition Under Title V of the Clean Air Act, In re Shintech, Inc. and Its Affiliates’ 
Polyvinyl Chloride Prod. Facility (EPA May 22, 1997). The Clinic also filed a petition asking 
the EPA to review the state’s Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) permit under the 
federal Clean Air Act. In re Shintech, Inc. and Its Affiliates, Prevention of Significant 
Deterioration Permit PSD-LA604 (EPA 1997). 
 67. Amended Complaint Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, supra  note 17. Local 
residents first raised environmental justice concerns one year earlier during informal meetings 
about the proposed plant. See Memorandum from Janice F. Dickerson, Community-Industry 
Relations Coordinator, Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality, to James J. Friloux, 
Ombudsman, Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (Aug. 16, 1996) (on file with 
author) (summarizing a community meeting on the Shintech proposal and noting that “[s]everal 
environmental justice issues were raised in questions from the audience.”).  
 The Center for Constitutional Rights filed an Americans With Disabilities Act case against 
Governor Foster and the DEQ on behalf of Convent residents with respiratory disabilities. See 
Amended Complaint—Class Action, Lewis v. Foster (E.D. La., filed Aug. 20, 1998) (No. 98-
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These legal efforts were largely successful, illustrating the extent 
of the flaws in the state’s permitting process. In September, 1997 the 
EPA granted the citizens’ petition under Title V of the Clean Air Act 
and vetoed Shintech’s air pollution permits, identifying fifty technical 
deficiencies.68 The EPA’s action marked the first time the agency 
granted a citizen’s petition.69 In addition, state judges: held that the 
citizens’ allegations of unlawful bias in the state’s permitting process 
were sufficient to justify an evidentiary hearing;70 refused Shintech’s 
request to dismiss the lawsuit alleging that the coastal use permits 
were issued illegally;71 found that the state’s issuance of the water 
permits would affect a taking of the adjacent residents’ property to 
which they were entitled to compensation;72 and forced the Parish to 
reduce its charges for access to public documents relating to the 
proposed plant.73 Finally, in the action that most angered Governor 
Foster and business interests, the EPA accepted the citizens’ Title VI 
civil rights complaint for investigation, making the Shintech 
permitting dispute the agency’s test case for implementing its new 
 
1563); see also  Suit Against Shintech Claims Plant Would Hurt the Disabled, ADVOCATE 
(Baton Rouge, La.), Aug. 22, 1998, at 5B.  
 68. Order Partially Granting and Partially Denying Petitions for Object ion to Permits, In 
re Shintech Inc. and Its Affiliates’ Polyvinyl Chloride Prod. Facility, Permits Nos. 2466-VO, 
2467-VO, 2468-VO (EPA Sept. 10, 1997); see also  Maria Giordano & Bob Warren, EPA 
Rejects Permit for Shintech Plant, T IMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), Sept. 11, 1997, at A1. 
 69. First Citizen Petition Under Title V Granted to Block Construction of Industrial 
Facility, 28 ENV’T REP. (BNA) 835 (1997). 
 70. Written Reasons for Judgment, St. James Citizens for Jobs & the Env’t v. La. Dep’t of 
Envtl. Quality, No. 448928 (19th La. Dist. Ct. Aug. 31, 1998), vacated, 734 So. 2d 772 (La. 
App. Ct. 1999) (holding that although citizen groups have the right to raise the issue of agency 
bias, there is no statutory entitlement to judical review of a bias issue until the permit is issued), 
writ denied, 746 So. 2d 601 (La. 1999); see also  Mark Schleifstein, Shintech Opponents Win 
Round, T IMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), Sept. 1, 1998, at A2.  
 71. See John McMillan, Hearing Called a Victory, ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.), Sept. 
3, 1997, at 3B.  
 72. See William Pack, Shintech Gets Permit, May Have to Pay Compensation, ADVOCATE 
(Baton Rouge, La.), Jan. 24, 1998, at 1B (reporting the court’s decision that DEQ must change 
Shintech’s water discharge permit to require reasonable compensation for damages sustained by 
plant’s neighbors). The decision was announced in court by the judge but no written order or 
judgment was ever issued in the case. 
 73. See Reasons for Judgment, St. James Parish Citizens for Jobs & the Env’t v. Hymel, 
No. 24722 (23rd La. Dist. Ct. June 17, 1999); E-mail from Thomas Milliner, Tulane 
Environmental Law Clinic, to Robert Kuehn, Former Director, Tulane Environmental Law 
Clinic (Feb. 2, 2000, 09:13:50 CST) (on file with author) (stating that, to settle the lawsuit, the 
Parish agreed to reduce copying fees from $.75 per page to $.10 per page). 
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environmental justice enforcement policy.74 
II. A BACKLASH AGAINST ACCESS TO ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 
An attorney, mindful of the professional obligations to act “with 
zeal in advocacy upon the client’s behalf” and to “take whatever 
lawful and ethical measures are required to vindicate a client’s cause 
or endeavor,”75 should view the efforts of the Tulane Clinic as 
consistent with the same level of competence and diligence required 
of any attorney. Governor Foster, however, viewed the Clinic’s 
actions as exemplifying three of the social justice issues that he most 
vehemently dislikes: civil rights, environmental regulation, and use of 
the legal system by plaintiffs’ attorneys. 
A. Governor Foster’s Hostility Toward and Threats Against Tulane 
Governor Foster’s hostility to civil rights was manifested most 
dramatically by his close association with David Duke, the former 
leader of the Ku Klux Klan and avowed racist and anti-Semite.76 In 
the 1995 campaign for Louisiana governor, Duke withdrew from the 
race and threw his support to Foster, a previously insignificant 
candidate in the race. Immediately after the endorsement, Foster’s 
support in the polls rose from just 6% or 7% to 17%. Duke credits his 
 
 74. See Vicki Ferstel, Shintech Becomes Test Case, ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.), Sept. 
12, 1997, at 1A; Hansen, supra note 58, at 52. Dr. Robert Bullard, executive director of the 
Environmental Justice Resource Center at Clark Atlanta University and an expert on 
environmental justice, described the Shintech case as “our Brown vs. the Board of Education.” 
Chris Gray, National Environmental Group Joins Shintech Fight, T IMES-PICAYUNE (New 
Orleans, La.), Mar. 22, 1998, at A34. 
 75. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 (1999). Indeed, at the time that 
the Tulane students were seeking to ensure that their clients’ legal rights were fully protected, 
attorneys for the state and Shintech were using what appeared to be every possible legal 
maneuver to deny the local residents an opportunity to present their cases. See E-mail from Lisa 
Jordan, Acting Director, Tulane Environmental Law Clinic, to Robert Kuehn, Former Director, 
Tulane Environmental Law Clinic (Feb. 29, 2000, 10:47:37 CST) (on file with author) 
(detailing efforts of DEQ and Shintech attorneys to deny the residents’ requests for an 
adjudicatory hearing and to delay or dismiss lawsuits challenging the air permits, coastal use 
permit, and refusal of the DEQ to recuse from the permitting decisions). 
 76. See B. Drummond Ayres, Jr., A Mystery in Louisiana Governor’s Race, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 11, 1999, at A14 (describing Duke as “the former Ku Klux Klan leader”); Bruce Nolan, 
Foster Paid Duke $150,000 For List, T IMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), May 21, 1999, at 
A1 (describing Duke as “the former Klansman and Nazi sympathizer”). 
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support with helping Foster make the runoff and ultimately win the 
gubernatorial election.77 
Unknown to the public until recently, Governor Foster paid Duke 
$150,000 for the exclusive rights to Duke’s mailing list of supporters 
just prior to Duke’s 1995 endorsement,78 a violation of state 
campaign ethics laws.79 The mailing list price was so grossly in 
excess of the typical campaign mailing list value that observers 
characterized the purchase as nothing more than an attempt to buy 
Duke’s support.80 Duke has referred to Foster and himself as “friends 
for a long time” and “perhaps the highest elected official in America 
who refuses to condemn and repudiate [him].”81 Governor Foster, in 
turn, repeatedly invited Duke to secret meetings at the governor’s 
mansion and Governor Foster’s home; they also met secretly at 
Duke’s home.82 
In the midst of the Duke controversy, Governor Foster insisted 
that he did not agree with “any of this [Duke’s] racial stuff,” but 
angrily described as “silly” questions from reporters concerning his 
continued refusal to renounce Duke’s bigoted beliefs.83 Consistent 
with what Duke reported that he and Governor Foster discussed 
during private meetings, Governor Foster’s first executive order, 
issued three days after taking office in 1996, banned affirmative 
action.84 Governor Foster was the only governor in the country at that 
 
 77. See Marsha Shuler, Duke Says Foster Money Helped the Racist Cause, ADVOCATE 
(Baton Rouge, La.), June 13, 1999, at 1A. 
 78. Nolan, supra note 76; Marsha Shuler & Joe Gyan, Foster, Duke Link Probed: Grand 
Jury Looks at Voter List Sale, ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.), May 21, 1999, at 1A. Foster 
defended the secret nature of the deal by saying: “It ain’t real cool to put out there that you’re 
buying something from David Duke.” Manuel Roig-Franzia, Foster Admits Hiding Duke Deal, 
T IMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), May 25, 1999, at A1. 
 79. Ayres, supra note 76; Leslie Zganjar, Ethics Board Fines Gov. Foster $20,000 for 
Duke List Payments, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Louisiana), Aug. 19, 1999. 
 80. Steve Ritea, Price Was Sky High, T IMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), May 21, 
1999, at A6. 
 81. See James Gill, Foster Tough to Unseat, T IMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), July 9, 
1999, at B7; Roig-Franzia, supra note 78; Shuler, supra note 77. 
 82. Roig-Franzia, supra note 78. 
 83. Id. 
 84. La. Exec. Order MJF 96-1, reprinted in  22 La. Reg. 76 (Feb. 20, 1996) (“Affirmative 
Action”); see James Gill, Foster’s Take on the Duke List, T IMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), 
May 26, 1999, at B7 (“Duke has said before that he had a deal whereby he would throw his 
support behind Foster, who, when elected, would return the favor by prohibiting affirmative 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol4/iss1/5
p 33 Kuehn.doc  3/22/01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2000]  Denying Access to Legal Representation 53 
 
 
time to do so. Similarly, one of the first actions at the DEQ after 
Governor Foster took office was to change the name of the agency’s 
“Environmental Justice Group” to the “Community-Industry 
Relations Group” (CIRG).85 Consistent with the name change, the 
CIRG proceeded to change its mission from aiding minority and 
lower-income communities with pollution concerns to promoting the 
virtues of petrochemical production in distressed communities.86 
Governor Foster’s attitude toward environmental regulation is 
similarly hostile. Governor Foster paid $60,000 to run an ad in the 
Wall Street Journal showing a businessman bending over backwards 
and bragging about the state’s efforts to eliminate restrictions on 
businesses.87 As Governor Foster stated in the ad, “I want to take a 
hard look at every regulation in this state to see whether it is really 
doing what it is supposed to do. Most of us in business know which 
ones are needed.”88 
Governor Foster considers environmental regulation a form of 
harassment against honest businesses89 and labeled the EPA “our 
 
action in state contracts.”). 
 In an interesting historical connection, Governor Foster’s grandfather, Murphy J. Foster, 
was governor of Louisiana from 1892 to 1900. During this eight-year term, he “was committed 
to stripping poor white people and all black people of the right to vote. He did this by enacting a 
poll tax and requiring that voters be property owners.” Lolis Eric Elie, Grandfather Not so 
Grand, T IMES-PICAYUNE, (New Orleans, La.), Jan. 10, 1996, at B1. As a result of grandfather 
Foster’s efforts, “Black-voter registration which had been 130,000 on January 1, 1897, was 
reduced to 5,320 on March 17, 1900, and 1,342 in 1904. Thus, for all practical purposes, black 
citizens were eliminated from participation in politics.” JOE GRAY T AYLOR, LOUISIANA: A 
HISTORY 144 (1984). Grandfather Foster’s “greatest legacy was his effort to make racism the 
guiding principle of Louisiana law. Foster . . . helped organize the Knights of White Camellia 
and the White League, two organizations that were committed to the violent overthrow of the 
ideals of American democracy. Elie, supra . The grandson and current governor has described 
his grandfather as a “man of courage” and “vision” whose actions must be viewed in context. 
Id. 
 85. DEQ, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN LOUISIANA: AN OVERVIEW OF THE LOUISIANA 
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY’S COMMUNITY-INDUSTRY RELATIONS PROGRAM 
(n.d.) (on file with author) (“The Environmental Justice Group [renamed the Community-
Industry Relations Group with the advent of the Foster Administration] is an unofficial group 
working under the auspices of the Office of the Secretary.”). 
 86. See Vicki Ferstel, Officials Accused of Bias, ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.), May 27, 
1997, at 1B (documenting pro-industry actions of the DEQ CIRG office). 
 87. Suz Redfearn, DED Goes Big Time With Tort Reform Ad, BATON ROUGE BUS. REP., 
Sept. 17, 1996, at 54. 
 88. Id. 
 89. A Welcome Focus on Environment, ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.), Oct. 28, 1997, at 
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only enemy” when it questioned the state’s environmental permitting 
practices.90 His administration has worked hard to undo the limited 
pro-environmental legislation passed under previous 
administrations.91 When one state legislator was critical of Governor 
Foster for his lack of efforts to protect a small community from an 
adjacent waste site, Governor Foster called on the business 
community to wage a “holy war,” or “jihad,” to defeat the legislator’s 
reelection efforts.92 
The third aspect of the Tulane Clinic’s involvement in the 
Shintech proposal that struck a raw nerve with Governor Foster was 
that the Clinic members were plaintiff’s lawyers seeking to interfere 
with business plans. Governor Foster’s dislike of plaintiff’s lawyers 
runs to the depth of his dislike of civil rights and environmental 
regulation. To Governor Foster, “the clinic was behaving like the trial 
lawyers he has fought so hard through most of his administration.”93 
He has often blamed lawyers for what, in his view, is wrong with 
society and has referred to plaintiff’s lawyers as “slimeballs,” 
 
18B (noting Foster’s earlier remark). 
 90. Ed Anderson, Foster Likes Casino Deal’s Chances in Special Session, T IMES-
PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), Mar. 1, 1998, at A10. An assistant to Louisiana Department of 
Economic Development Secretary Kevin Reilly, Governor Foster’s liaison on Shintech, 
described the EPA as “anti-industrial [and] anti-chemical.” Brian Chapman, Shintech, the State 
of Louisiana, and the Environmentalists 10, Address Before CERI International Petrochemical 
Conference (June 29-30, 1998) (on file with author). 
 91. Steve Ritea, Candidates Speak on Tort Reform, T IMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), 
Oct. 10, 1999, at A1 (stating that Foster-backed legislation restricts the availability of punitive 
damages in hazardous waste lawsuits); Toxic Legislation, GAMBIT WKLY. (New Orleans, La.), 
July 20, 1999, at 7 (noting Governor Foster backed legislation to restrict the availability of 
medical monitoring for people exposed to toxic pollution). 
 Governor Foster’s hostility toward environmental regulation could be the result of his 
investment in the oil and gas industry. A 1996 story in the Times of Acadiana reported that 
Foster invested heavily in oil and gas holdings and became independently wealthy as a result of 
oil royalties from inherited family land. See The Edwin Edwards Test, GAMBIT WKLY. (New 
Orleans, La.), Sept. 28, 1999, at 7 (reporting on the Times of Acadiana story). A former editor 
at the Times of Acadiana argued that, given the large size of Governor Foster’s oil and gas 
holdings and the relative influence of the oil and gas industry in Louisiana, Governor Foster had 
a significant potential conflict of interest when involved in matters relating to the petrochemical 
industry. Id. 
 92. Foster Calls for “Holy War” in Senate Race; Senators Endorse Jefferson, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Louisiana), Sept. 24, 1999; Steve Ritea, Foster, Incumbent Turn Senate 
Race Into “Holy War,” T IMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), Oct. 17, 1999, at A6. 
 93. Mark Schleifstein, Foster, Clinics Face Off on Rules, T IMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, 
La.), Aug. 2, 1998, at A1. 
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“renegades,” and “hogs at the trough.”94 Governor Foster has been 
criticized for singling out plaintiff trial attorneys for his attacks, while 
sparing the corporate attorneys who represent insurance companies or 
large businesses.95 Ironically, Governor Foster enrolled as a part-time 
student at Southern Law School in fall, 2000 amidst charges that the 
school bent its rules to admit him.96 
As the Tulane Clinic students raised an increasing number of legal 
objections to the Shintech permits, Governor Foster’s impatience 
grew. Once students began enjoying success in the area of 
environmental justice, Governor Foster decided it was time the Clinic 
stepped aside and allowed the plant to be built.97 On April 3, 1997 the 
EPA informed the state that the residents’ concerns about 
environmental justice should be addressed before any Shintech 
permits could be issued.98 On the same day he learned of the EPA’s 
concerns, Governor Foster called the president of Tulane University 
to complain about the Clinic’s supposed antidevelopment actions in 
the Shintech case.99 The university president told Governor Foster 
that he would ensure that the Clinic handled the case in accordance 
with its guidelines, but refused on academic freedom grounds to 
interfere with the Clinic’s actions.100 
The next month, after the Tulane Clinic filed its complaint with 
the EPA under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, Governor Foster tried 
another approach. At a closed meeting of the New Orleans Business 
Council (Business Council), Governor Foster told business leaders 
they could help him get the Tulane Clinic under control by 
 
 94. Christi Daugherty, Moore Grief for Foster, GAMBIT WKLY. (New Orleans, La.), Dec. 
7, 1999 at 12. 
 95. Id. 
 96. James Gill, Foster Gets Special Treatment At Southern, T IMES-PICAYUNE (New 
Orleans, La.), Sept. 10, 2000, at B7; Steve Ritea, School Bent Rules to Admit Governor, TIMES-
PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), Sept. 7, 2000, at A1. 
 97. As one reporter noted: “Nothing angered Foster more than claims made  [by the 
Tulane Clinic] under the rubric of ‘environmental justice.’” Schleifstein, supra  note 93. 
 98. Letter from Samuel J. Coleman, Director, EPA, Region 6, Compliance and Assurance 
Division, to J. Dale Givens, Secretary, Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (Apr. 3, 
1997) (on file with author). 
 99. Christi Daugherty, It’s Not Easy Being Green, GAMBIT WKLY. (New Orleans, La.), 
July 22, 1997, at 9; Vicki Ferstel, Issue of Bias Raised, ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.), Apr. 7, 
1997, at 1A. 
 100. Daugherty, supra note 99. 
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reconsidering their financial support for the University.101 Governor 
Foster later publicly echoed this strategy: “I am telling some of the 
alumni to think about their support [for the University].”102 
At the same meeting, business leaders were urged to write to the 
Louisiana Supreme Court demanding that the justices investigate and 
restrict the activities of the Tulane Clinic.103 Thereafter, three 
business groups sent letters to the court complaining that the Clinic 
harmed their economic interests and asked the court to restrict the 
Clinic’s activities.104 When the court ultimately granted these 
requests and imposed dramatic new restrictions on the clinics’ 
activities, Governor Foster applauded the ruling.105 
Governor Foster took his attack on the Tulane Clinic to a 
statewide television audience. He declared that the Clinic is “a law 
unto themselves” and that they are acting as “vigilantes.”106 Governor 
Foster warned: “I’m going to encourage anybody from Tulane to do 
what they can to put a stop [to the Clinic’s actions] . . . I’m going to 
look differently at Tulane from a perspective of . . . major tax breaks 
if what they’re gonna do is support a bunch of vigilantes out there 
that can make their own law.”107 The tax breaks Governor Foster 
referenced were not state subsidies but rather the same exemptions 
from taxes and the same stipends for state students who attend in-
state schools that every private college in Louisiana enjoys.108 
When asked about the Clinic students’ help to local residents who 
cannot otherwise afford attorneys, Governor Foster responded: “Tell 
[the local residents] to use their own money, not Tulane’s.”109 
Governor Foster later defended his threats against Tulane and 
repeated his suggestion that the University’s tax exempt status be 
 
 101. Id.; Ferstel, supra note 86; Silverstein & Cockburn, supra note 32. 
 102. Daugherty, supra  note 99. 
 103. Id. 
 104. See infra  notes 158-63 and accompanying text. 
 105. See infra  note 245 and accompanying text. 
 106. Louisiana: The State We’re In (Louisiana Pubic Broacasting television broadcast, July 
11, 1997) (tape of broadcast on file with author).  
 107. Id.; Hansen, supra note 58, at 55.  
 108. Chris Gray, Law Clinic Under Fire, T IMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), Aug. 3, 
1997, at A1. 
 109. Marcia Coyle, Governor v. Students in $700M Plant Case, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 8, 1997, 
at 1, 27; Louisiana: The State We’re In, supra  note 106. 
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revoked if it was going to allow law students to block businesses 
from locating in the state.110 He also described the Tulane Clinic’s 
professors and students as “outlaws” and “bullies.”111 
Later that summer, Kevin Reilly, Governor Foster’s economic 
development director and liaison on the Shintech matter, wrote to the 
president and the deans at Tulane. He complained that the Tulane 
Clinic conducted “legalistic guerrilla attacks against environmentally-
responsible industry” and was damaging the state’s economic 
development efforts.112 Reilly asked that the University request the 
Louisiana Supreme Court to review the activities of the Clinic to 
determine if it had overstepped the court’s charter.113 Reilly later 
criticized the Clinic for providing legal representation to community 
groups opposed to Shintech and claimed that the Clinic had a 
“chilling effect on the state’s economy. . . [and was] corrupting the 
legal system.”114 At a public meeting with New Orleans area 
community leaders, he referred to the Clinic as “environmental 
fascists” who use “brown shirt tactics.”115 
Reilly instructed his agency staff to “be sure [they] do everything 
[they] can to prevent [the Tulane Clinic and community groups] from 
tying up the permit application process.”116 Reilly used his office to 
 
 110. Gray, supra note 108; Marsha Shuler, Foster: Threat Against Tulane Is Appropriate, 
ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.), July 24, 1997, at 1A. 
 111. CBS Evening News, supra note 55; Law Clinics Say Rules Hurt Poor, ADVOCATE 
(Baton Rouge, La.), June 18, 1998, at 4A. Ironically, in the midst of his attack on the Tulane 
Clinic, Governor Foster preached to graduating law students that they should “care more about 
[their] service and reputation than [their] fees.” Sherry Sapp, Foster Encourages Grads to 
Guard Against Overcomplicating Law, ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.), May 31, 1997, at 9C. 
 112. Letter from Kevin P. Reilly, Sr., Secretary, Louisiana Department of Economic 
Development, to Eamon Kelly, President, Tulane University (Aug. 8, 1997) (on file with 
author). 
 113. Id. 
 114. John McMillan, Reilly Says He’s Not Hostile to Tulane, But Defends Letter, 
ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.), Aug. 16, 1997, at A12. 
 115. Memorandum from Debbie Grant, Tulane University, to Robert Kuehn (July 5, 1998) 
(on file with author) (describing remarks of Kevin P. Reilly, Sr., at a June 17, 1998, 
MetroVision meeting in New Orleans, Louisiana). 
 116. Memorandum from Kevin P. Reilly to Harold Price, supra  note 31. Reilly made a 
similar threat to use state resources against Shintech opponents one year later when it was 
revealed he was assembling dossiers: “I’m going to use every legitimate method at my 
command to defeat them.” Vicki Ferstel, Shintech’s Opponents Tracked, ADVOCATE (Baton 
Rouge, La.), Nov. 5, 1997, at 1A. Taking his boss’s command to heart, one Department of 
Economic Development employee sought to warn a parish elected official from opposing 
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develop dossiers and track the activities of the Clinic and another 
organization opposing the Shintech plant.117 Reilly even instructed 
his agency’s general counsel to investigate the tax status of one of the 
nonprofit community organizations opposing Shintech to determine 
possible violations of tax laws.118 The DEQ’s legal department aided 
Reilly’s surveillance efforts by supplying him with information on 
Tulane Clinic attorneys.119 Reilly also confirmed that he ordered his 
department attorneys to compile a list of all legal filings made by the 
Tulane Clinic.120 When Governor Foster was confronted with this 
information, he responded that he had no problem with Reilly using 
his state position and taxpayer funds to investigate groups opposed to 
the Shintech plant.121 
At a meeting at the governor’s mansion in September, 1997, 
Foster complained to the president of Tulane and the dean of Tulane 
Law School about the Clinic’s actions in the Shintech case and 
requested that they take action.122 Governor Foster’s special counsel 
also complained about the legal actions taken in the Shintech case, 
especially the Clinic’s efforts “to blaze new territory in the 
environmental justice arena here,” and expressed his desire that 
Tulane and the Louisiana Supreme Court step in and “require 
 
Shintech by telling the official that “any attack on a prospective chlorine producer was not 
going to be well received by the existing chlorine producers in the area or the chemical 
manufacturing community at large.” Chapman, supra  note 90. 
 117. Ferstel, supra note 116. 
 118. Id.; see also  Memorandum from Kevin P. Reilly, Sr., Louisiana Department of 
Economic Development, to Daryl Manning, Louisiana Department of Economic Development 
(Dec. 30, 1997) (on file with author) (requesting investigation of the Louisiana Coalition for 
Tax Justice); Memorandum from Susan Louise Dunham, Attorney, Louisiana Department of 
Economic Development, to Kevin P. Reilly, Sr., Secretary, Louisiana Department of Economic 
Development (Jan. 7, 1997) (on file with author) (concluding that the activities of the Louisiana 
Coalition for Tax Justice do not violate federal tax laws). 
 119. See Memorandum from R. Katherine Long, Office of Legal Affairs, Department of 
Environmental Quality, to Daryl Manning, General Counsel, Louisiana Department of 
Economic Development (Oct. 23, 1997) (on file with author) (transmitting seventeen pages of 
information on the Tulane Clinic “[i]n accordance with [their] telephone conversation”). 
 120. Ferstel, supra  note 116. 
 121. Ed Anderson & Chris Gray, Foster Endorses Probes of Shintech Adversaries, TIMES-
PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), Nov. 7, 1997, at A3. 
 122. Telephone interview with Dr. Eamon M. Kelly, Former President, Tulane University 
(Oct. 8, 1999); see also  Marsha Shuler, Foster, Officials of Tulane Agree to Disagree, 
ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.), Sept. 5, 1997, at 1A. 
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accountability.”123 
Other officials appointed by Governor Foster took up the 
campaign to get the Tulane Clinic to cease representation of the 
Convent residents. Members of the Louisiana Board of Regents 
(Board), appointed by the governor, proposed denying Tulane 
University access to millions of dollars from the education trust 
fund.124 The Board claimed it was their responsibility to determine 
whether Tulane University, through the Clinic’s actions in the 
Shintech case, hampered the state’s economic development plans.125 
The Board later dropped the idea of withholding money from the 
University.126 
The DEQ also followed Governor Foster’s lead and engaged in a 
series of actions designed to prevent the Tulane Clinic from 
presenting the residents’ claims to state and federal courts and 
agencies. The DEQ’s actions ranged from denying citizens access to 
public documents, hiding evidence of contamination on the proposed 
Shintech site, preventing citizens from speaking at public hearings, 
and refusing to accept or acknowledge receipt of comments filed by 
the Tulane Clinic.127 The head of the agency’s air division, which by 
 
 123. Coyle, supra note 109 (reporting remarks of Terry Ryder). 
 124. The state receives this trust fund money for settlement of claims concerning royalties 
from offshore oil leases and makes it available to all of the state’s institutions of higher 
education. Littice Bacon-Blood, Shintech Could Cost Tulane Money, T IMES-PICAYUNE (New 
Orleans, La.), Apr. 25, 1998, at C2. 
 125. Press reports indicated that Roland Toups was one of the Board members who wanted 
to link Tulane’s eligibility for state funds to the Tulane Clinic’s compliance with Governor 
Foster’s economic development agenda. See id. Toups, at the time of these remarks, was 
chairman of the board of The Chamber of Greater Baton Rouge and employed by Turner 
Industries, the third largest petrochemical plant contractor in the United States. See The 
Chamber of Greater Baton Rouge at http://www.brchamber.org/chamber/chair_let.html (last 
visited Apr. 28, 1998) (identifying Toups as Chairman of the Board and employed by Turner 
Industries, Ltd.); Turner Industries, Ltd. at http://www.turner-industries.com/companies/til.html 
(last visited Oct. 17, 1999).  
 126. See Littice Bacon-Blood, State Giving Tulane $700,000, T IMES-PICAYUNE (New 
Orleans, La.), Aug. 19, 1998, at A2; see also Leave Clinic Alone, ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, 
La.), June 4, 1998, at 13A (reporting Louisiana House of Representatives Education 
Committee’s approval of a resolution directing the Board of Regents to restrain from 
interference with the operations of the Tulane Clinic). 
 127. See Motion to Recuse DEQ Officials at 4-31, In re Shintech, Inc. and Its Affiliates 
(DEQ Mar. 6, 1998); see also Vicki Ferstel, Groups Want DEQ Officials Off Shintech Case, 
ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.), Dec. 9, 1997, at 1A; Chris Gray, State Favors Shintech Plant, 
Opponents Say, T IMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), Dec. 9, 1997, at B3. 
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law is required to ensure that the rights of the public “receive active 
and affirmative protection,”128 instructed his staff to treat the local 
residents as adversaries in the permitting process.129 
The DEQ went so far in its efforts to aid Shintech as to 
surreptitiously use an employee in the secretary’s office to organize 
local residents to support Shintech.130 Until the state began using its 
resources, such as DEQ personnel, to aid Shintech, no Convent 
resident spoke in favor of the plant at the numerous public hearings 
held on the matter.131 Despite the state’s extraordinary efforts, at the 
last public hearing on the facility’s proposed air permits attended by 
over one-hundred people, no local resident spoke in favor of the 
plant.132 The only independent public opinion poll found that a 
majority of Convent residents opposed the plant.133 
 
 128. Save Ourselves v. La. Envtl. Control Comm’n, 452 So. 2d 1152, 1157 (La. 1984). 
 129. Written Reasons for Judgment, St. James Citizens for Jobs & the Env’t v. La. Dep’t of 
Envtl. Quality, No. 448928 (19th La. Dist. Ct. Aug. 31, 1998) (“Moreover, this court recognizes 
that the DEQ in its memorandum submitted in this matter acknowledged that Assistant 
Secretary Von Bodungen instructed his staff not to meet with the Applicants and regards the 
Applicants’ position as adversarial to that of the DEQ.”). 
 130. See Motion to Recuse DEQ Officials, supra  note 127, at 17-20 (detailing actions of 
the DEQ’s Community-Industry Relations Group Coordinator); see also Ferstel, supra note 
127; Gray, supra note 127. 
 131. Telephone Interview with Pat Melacon, President, St. James Citizens for Jobs & the 
Environment (Mar. 3, 2000); see also  Department of Environmental Quality, Public Hearing 
Attendance Record Sintech [sic] Inc. and Its Affiliates (n.d.) (on file with author) (identifying 
no resident of Convent as speaking in favor of the proposed plant on the agency’s list of 
attendees at a December, 1996 public hearing). 
 132. Chris Gray, Emotions Flare at Hearing for Shintech Permits, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New 
Orleans, La.), Jan. 24, 1998, at B3; John McMillan, Group Denounces Shintech Plan, 
ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.), Jan. 24, 1998, at 3B (observing that after a Shintech 
spokesperson opened the hearing, “speaker after speaker” attacked the proposed site of the 
plant). Even a special DEQ public hearing in Convent on environmental justice failed to result 
in any substantial local support for the plant. See Mike Dunne, Foes Cite Pollution, Injustice, 
ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.), Jan. 25, 1998, at 1B (“Had the Romeville Elementary School 
been a boat Saturday, it would have capsized. One side was filed with Shintech opponents, the 
other side a small group of Shintech supporters.”); Nicolai, supra  note 32 (“At the state public 
hearing in January, 90 percent of St. James residents who spoke were against Shintech, 
including the state representative from the area.”). 
 133. Gray, supra  note 41 (publishing results of a newspaper poll finding that Convent area 
residents opposed Shintech building a plant in St. James Parish by a 52% to 38% margin; 
opposition among African Americans was even stronger). The newspaper poll also showed that, 
despite Governor Foster’s well-publicized attacks on Tulane, the local residents supported the 
Tulane Clinic’s involvement in the Shintech dispute by a 54% to 22% margin. Id. 
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B. Industry: Access to Justice That’s Bad for Business is Bad for 
Louisiana 
Industry leaders in Louisiana were not pleased with either the 
Clinic’s representation of local residents opposing the Shintech plant 
or with the allegations of environmental discrimination. The business 
community’s attack on the Clinic came on three fronts: direct 
pressure on Tulane to restrict the Clinic; efforts to encourage the state 
to pressure Tulane; and efforts to encourage the Louisiana Supreme 
Court to intervene and prevent the Clinic from providing legal 
assistance. 
Local industry’s anger at Tulane and attempts to encourage the 
University to shut down or restrict the Clinic, described as “the 
polluters’ worst enemy,”134 began long before Shintech. In the early 
1990s, the petrochemical industry complained to Tulane officials 
about the Clinic, partly in response to a request the Clinic filed on 
behalf of community groups in late 1989 to deny tax exemptions to 
industrial facilities with poor environmental records.135 
Attempts to pressure Tulane to restrict the Clinic were manifested 
not simply by complaints but also through an economic boycott by 
certain petrochemical corporations. After the Clinic filed comments 
challenging American Cyanamid Company’s waste disposal 
practices, the company wrote Tulane warning that “Cyanamid cannot 
continue to support an institution that does not support and will not 
listen to many of their benefactors.”136 DuPont Corporation, another 
Louisiana petrochemical company whose environmental practices 
were challenged by the Clinic on behalf of community groups, 
 
 134. Sheila Kaplan & Zoë Davidson, The Buying of the Bench, NATION, Jan. 26, 1998, at 
11, 15. 
 135. For example, the president of the Louisiana Chemical Association met with and wrote 
to the president of Tulane complaining about the Clinic’s legal representation activities and 
asking that the president investigate. See Letter from Dan Borne, Louisiana Chemical 
Association, to Dr. Eamon Kelly, President, Tulane University (Oct. 19, 1990) (on file with 
author); see also  Letter from Dan Borne, Louisiana Chemical Association, to Edward E. 
Sherman, Dean, Tulane Law School (Jan. 29, 1997) (on file with author) (thanking the dean for 
providing a meeting at which the association complained about the Tulane Clinic). 
 136. Letter from D.J. Romanik, Plant Manager, American Cyanamid Company, to Edwin 
Lupberger, Tulane Board of Administrators and Annual Fund Corporate Chair (Apr. 8, 1991) 
(on file with author). 
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reportedly ceased recruiting at the Tulane engineering school and 
“even instructed employees who are tulane [sic] graduates not to 
donate money to the institution.”137 Chevron reportedly curtailed its 
long-standing practice of donations to the Tulane Chemical 
Engineering Department when the Clinic served the company with a 
notice of intent to sue on behalf of Louisiana residents concerned 
about alleged violations of the federal Clean Water Act.138 Further, 
the president of the Louisiana Chemical Association stated that he 
routinely tells association members not to support Tulane University 
because of the Clinic.139 In 1990, the Port of South Louisiana, which 
played a major role in convincing Shintech to locate in Convent,140 
wrote to companies and strongly urged them not to contribute further 
to Tulane Law School because of Clinic activities, referring to the 
Clinic students as “storm troopers.”141 
While Tulane University benefits greatly from these types of 
industry donations and support,142 the extent of this business boycott 
is unknown. One prominent alumni did observe, though, that the 
Clinic’s work “has and will result in lower contributions” and to 
decisions by local business leaders to stop recruiting at Tulane.143 
 
 137. Letter from Richard D. Gonzalez, Chairman, Department of Chemical Engineering, 
Tulane University, to Dr. Eamon Kelly, President, Tulane University (July 5, 1995) (on file 
with author). DuPont was a participant in the Enterprise for the Environment (E4E) initiative 
which pledged, as one of its consensus goals, to “create decision processes that meaningfully 
involve affected stakeholders and engage all citizens in protecting the environment.” See 
Ruckelshaus, infra  note 391. 
 138. E-mail from Carl Voelcker, Assistant Director, Corporate and Foundation Relations, 
Tulane University, to Robert R. Kuehn, Director, Tulane Environmental Law Clinic (June 12, 
1998, 15:33:54 CST) (on file author). 
 139. Daugherty, supra note 99, at 9 (quoting Dan Borne, President, Louisiana Chemical 
Association). 
 140. The Port of Louisiana agreed to sell Shintech 500 acres of land needed for the facility. 
See Memorandum from R.J. Clements, Executive Director, Port of South Louisiana, to Bill 
Morris, Global Associates, Inc. (Apr. 24, 1996) (on file with author). 
 141. Letter from R.J. Clements, Executive Director, Port of South Louisiana, to B.K. 
Shackelford, Complex Manager, Triad Chemical (Apr. 9, 1990) (on file with author). 
 142. See Barbara Koeppel, Cancer Alley, Louisiana, NATION, Nov. 8, 1999, at 16, 20 
(alleging that certain departments at Tulane have “thrived” from major gifts from petrochemical 
companies). 
 143. Hansen, supra note 58, at 57 (quoting Ernest Edwards, Jr., a partner with the New 
Orleans law firm of Lemle & Kelleher). A number of Tulane alumni, some using the letterheads 
of their businesses, have written to inform the University that, because of the Clinic’s action, 
they will no longer contribute to the University or law school. See, e.g., Letter from Robert G. 
Jones & Sarah Quinn Jones, Alumni and Prudential Securities Employees, to Dr. Eamon Kelly, 
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The second strategy employed by business interests was to assist 
and encourage the state to pressure Tulane. In this regard, Louisiana 
business could not have found a better ally than Louisiana 
Department of Economic Development Secretary Kevin Reilly. 
Reilly, himself a wealthy businessman, worked hard to attract 
Shintech to Louisiana and served as Governor Foster’s liaison on the 
Shintech matter. As described above, Reilly directed his staff to do 
everything they could to prevent Tulane from delaying Shintech’s 
permit application process. Reilly also sent a letter to all department 
heads at Tulane asking that they intervene and prevent the Clinic 
from representing the Convent residents.144 When the Louisiana 
Supreme Court heard of Governor Foster’s complaint regarding the 
Clinic and called Reilly for information, he sent a list of companies 
for the Court to call regarding complaints about the Clinic.145 Reilly 
was instrumental in providing a $2.5 million unsecured state loan to a 
group led by the head of the state NAACP, whom Governor Foster 
was courting for support of Shintech.146 The money was approved by 
a Reilly-lead state economic development council the same day that 
the state NAACP leader broke his silence and blasted Shintech plant 
opponents.147 
Publicly, Shintech claimed to understand the need for minorities 
to have access to attorneys.148 However, behind the scenes, 
 
President, Tulane University (July 8, 1993) (on file with author); Letter from Philip J. Knieper, 
Jr., Engineering School Alumnus, to Dr. Eamon Kelly, President, Tulane University (May 4, 
1990) (on file with author); Letter from Thomas G. Robbins, Law School Alumnus, to Edward 
F. Sherman, Dean, Tulane Law School (Mar. 20, 1998) (on file with author). 
 144. See supra  text accompanying notes 31, 112-20. 
 145. Christi Daugherty, Life of Reilly, GAMBIT WKLY. (New Orleans, La.), Nov. 18, 1997, 
at 9. 
 146. See Marsha Shuler, Johnson, Shintech, Big Loan, ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.), 
Sept. 14, 1997, at 1A. The $2.5 million in financing was approved over the objections of the 
council’s staff and included, on Reilly’s motion, an extra $500,000 that was not sought by the 
group. Id. 
 147. Id. The timing of the approval of the funds and public criticism of plant opponents 
was called “coincidental” by the NAACP leader. Id. (quoting Ernest Johnson, President, 
Louisiana NAACP). The NAACP’s national board later unanimously voted to oppose the 
Shintech plant. NAACP National Board of Directors, Resolution Against Environmental 
Racism in Louisiana (Oct. 17, 1998) (on file with author). 
 148. John LaPlante, Shintech’s Not Trashing Tulane, ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.), July 
31, 1997, at 9B (quoting Dick Mason, Controller, Shintech, Inc., as stating that society needs 
groups to help “minorities who don’t have access to attorneys defend themselves against people 
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Shintech’s representatives encouraged Reilly’s attacks on the Clinic. 
Shintech’s public relations consultant, Tom Spradley, sent a 
memorandum to Reilly alerting him to the Clinic’s environmental 
justice claim and arguing that the petition “amounts to harassment” 
and was a “frivolous filing.”149 Likewise, Harris, Deville & 
Associates, Inc., another Shintech public relations consultant, 
prepared and sent Reilly a chronology of the Clinic’s legal filings in 
the case.150 The consultants even sent Reilly proposed “talking 
points” to read at the initial public hearing on Shintech to ensure 
Reilly followed Shintech’s public relations strategy.151 At that 
hearing, Reilly attacked Shintech’s opponents, including the Clinic, 
and paraphrased the Bible: “God forgive them, for they know not 
what they do.”152  
While Shintech was working behind the scenes to fuel the state’s 
attack on the Clinic, the company simultaneously was ensuring that 
local supporters of the plant were well represented. During the 
summer of 1997, when the EPA was investigating allegations of 
environmental discrimination, Shintech paid a law firm to represent 
some St. James Parish citizens supporting Shintech and to intervene 
in a lawsuit in defense of Shintech’s permits.153 Shintech financed 
 
who would make their lives worse . . .. In this case, however, I don’t think I’m going to make 
their lives worse.”). 
 149. Facsimile transmission from Tom Spradley, Spradley & Spradley, to Kevin Reilly, 
Louisiana Department of Economic Development (Sept. 26, 1997) (on file with author). 
Spradley & Spradley donated $5,000 to Governor Foster’s reelection campaign while the 
Shintech air permits were pending before state regulators. Silverstein & Cockburn, supra note 
32. 
 150. Facsimile transmission from Jim Harris, Harris, Deville & Associates, Inc., to Kevin 
Reilly, Louisiana Department of Economic Development (Sept. 26, 1997) (on file with author). 
Harris, Deville & Associates donated $5,000 to Foster’s reelection campaign while the Shintech 
air permits were pending before state regulators. Silverstein & Cockburn, supra note 32. 
 151. Memorandum from Jim Harris, Harris, Deville & Associates, to Kevin Reilly, 
Louisiana Department of Economic Development (Dec. 2, 1996) (on file with author). 
 152. Kevin P. Reilly, Sr., supra  note 35; see Luke 23:34 (“Father forgive them; for they 
know not what they do.”). While a state legislator, Reilly declared Louisiana “a banana 
republic” with a “lazy, stupid population” that is happy as long as they have “a pickup truck and 
two shotguns.” Peter Carlson, A Louisiana Legislator Calls His State “A Banana Republic” 
and Gets Cheers in Response, T IME , Aug, 19, 1985, at 32. 
 153. See Daugherty, supra note 145 (reporting that Shintech paid the legal bills of Nannette 
Jolivette, a lawyer with a large Lafayette, Louisiana, law firm, who was hired to represent pro-
Shintech groups); Maria Giordano, Groups Intervene to Back Shintech, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New 
Orleans, La.), Aug. 9, 1997, at B1; see also  Gloria W. Roberts et al., Shintech Deception, 
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other expenses of the local group, organized with the aid of the DEQ, 
including computers and fax machines.154 
The business interests’ final, and ultimately most effective, 
strategy against the Clinic was an appeal to the Louisiana Supreme 
Court. This plan first developed during Governor’s Foster’s May, 
1997 closed-door appearance before the Business Council.155 
Described as an “economic star chamber,” the Business Council’s 
members consist of many of the state’s most influential corporate 
executives and some of Tulane University’s biggest donors, including 
three emeritus members of Tulane’s Board of Administrators.156 
Interestingly, the proposal to ask the court to restrict the Clinic was 
reportedly made by the chief executive officer of Entergy—a large, 
New Orleans-based energy conglomerate that owned the $4 million 
property upon which Shintech proposed to build and that stood to 
make $70 million per year in electricity sales to Shintech.157 
Shortly after Governor Foster’s appearanbce before the Business 
Council, business organizations sent three letters to the Louisiana 
Supreme Court complaining about the Tulane Clinic and requesting 
that the court take action to ensure that the Clinic stopped interfering 
with business interests. The first was a one-page letter from the New 
Orleans’ area Chamber of Commerce (Chamber) complaining that 
the Clinic “faculty and students’ legal views are in direct conflict 
with business positions.”158 The Chamber did not allege any violation 
of court rules, but did ask for an investigation of the “positions and 
 
GAMBIT WKLY. (New Orleans, La.), Nov. 18, 1997, at 6. 
 Shintech also hired attorney Wilbur Reynaud, the owner of both St. James Parish 
newspapers, as its local representative in the same lawsuit. Daugherty, supra note 33. 
“Throughout the process, the newspapers have given Shintech regular front-page coverage, 
except for the DEQ hearing, which the papers did not cover. Shortly after the hearing, however, 
one of Reynaud’s papers, The News-Examiner, ran a front-page editorial excoriating those who 
attended the meeting for heckling the Shintech speakers.” Id.  
 154. Melba Newsome, Battle on the Bayou, VIBE , April, 1998, at 56.  
 155. See supra  text accompanying notes 101-04. 
 156. Cockburn, supra note 18; Daugherty, supra note 99. 
 157. James Gill, Law Clinic, Shintech and Idealism , T IMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), 
Jan. 16, 1998, at B7; Shintech’s Secret Backer, COUNTERPUNCH , Nov. 16-30, 1997, at 2. 
 158. Letter from Robert H. Gayle, Jr., President and Chief Executive Officer, The 
Chamber/New Orleans and the River Region, to Pascal F. Calogero, Jr., Chief Justice, 
Louisiana Supreme Court (July 8, 1997) (on file with author). 
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stands taken by the Tulane Law Clinic.”159 The Business Council 
followed shortly thereafter with a similar letter requesting that the 
court enforce its student practice rules to prevent the Clinic from 
using “the court rules to fight, harass and interfere with Louisiana’s 
interest to attract new business . . .” and expressed confidence that 
“the court never intended for these rules to be a source of anti-
business clinics under the auspices of a university.”160 
Five days after Governor Foster’s unsuccessful September, 1997 
meeting with Tulane officials, the Louisiana Association of Business 
and Industry (LABI) sent the third letter of request to the court.161 
Like the other business interests, LABI complained that the Clinic 
was “bad for business in Louisiana” and that “the abuses of [the 
Louisiana Law Clinic Student Practice Rule] have cost Louisiana 
industry millions of dollars.”162 LABI added criticism that “the Clinic 
has severely increased the burden on the state and its regulators.”163  
The Louisiana Chemical Association, representing petrochemical 
companies in Louisiana including Shintech, did not send a letter to 
the court, but rather publicly echoed LABI’s concern that the legal 
activities of the Clinic have “a tendency to tie DEQ up in knots 
responding to [the Clinic’s] briefs.”164 The Louisiana Chemical 
Association also objected that Clinic students “far overstate the 
 
 159. Id. 
 160. Letter from Erik F. Johnsen, Chairman, Business Council of New Orleans and the 
River Region, to Pascal F. Calogero, Jr., Chief Justice, Louisiana Supreme Court (July 16, 
1997) (on file with author). 
 161. Letter from Daniel L. Juneau, President, Louisiana Association of Business and 
Industry, to Pascal F. Calogero, Jr., Chief Justice, Louisiana Supreme Court (Sept. 9, 1997) (on 
file with author). 
 162. Id. LABI’s “evidence” that the Clinic was in violation of Rule XX consisted of a 
factually inaccurate account of a case filed some years earlier in federal court in which no party 
made any suggestion that the Clinic’s actions were improper and the seventy-page results of a 
Westlaw “Allnewsplus” electronic database search of the term “Tulane Environmental Law 
Clinic.” Id.; Letter from Robert R. Kuehn, Professor, Tulane Environmental Law Clinic, to 
Timothy F. Averill, Deputy Judicial Administrator, Louisiana Supreme Court (Dec. 23, 1997) 
(on file with author) (responding to LABI’s allegations and explaining the circumstances of the 
settlement conference in the federal court case). 
 163. Proposal to Amend and Enforce Rule XX, at 5, attachment to letter from Daniel L. 
Juneau, President, Louisiana Association of Business and Industry, to Pascal F. Calogero, Jr., 
Chief Justice, Louisiana Supreme Court (Sept. 9, 1997) (on file with author). 
 164. Gray, supra note 108 (quoting Dan Borne, Spokesman, Louisiana Chemical 
Association). 
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impact of [legislative] bills with hyperbolic testimony. [Student 
attorneys] read invidious motives into bills that just aren’t there.”165 
A final letter to the court, this time from the Chamber of Commerce 
branch in southwest Louisiana, likewise offered no evidence of any 
wrongdoing but claimed that the “Clinic’s activities had an adverse 
effect on economic growth and development not only in Baton Rouge 
and New Orleans areas but also in Southwest Louisiana.”166 In 
support of its request to restrict legal representation, the Chamber 
argued that “the legal process should not be manipulated for delay if 
delay only serves to kill a project and not to ensure that a project 
meets applicable environmental requirements.”167 
The business groups continued to justify their requests to restrict 
legal representation in later statements. LABI asserted that Louisiana 
businesses were tired of defending “lawsuit after lawsuit after 
lawsuit” and tired of the Tulane Clinic’s “Chicken Little rhetoric.”168 
LABI contended that the Clinic “is not supposed to be a public policy 
advocate . . . . They practice barratry—ambulance chasing—they stir 
up controversy, get things going, then say, ‘We’re here to save you.’ 
It’s not the way they’re supposed to work.”169 However, LABI 
offered no examples of improper law suits, and no explanation of 
why existing court and ethical rules restricting frivolous lawsuits and 
unauthorized solicitation were inadequate to police the Clinic.  
The Chamber echoed the need to “prevent ‘ambulance chasing’ by 
overzealous, inexperienced student lawyers” and lamented that the 
actions of the Clinic “have shown us just how uncertain our 
economic future can be when irresponsible acts are tolerated.”170 The 
Chamber alleged, more than once, and always without support, that 
 
 165. Id. 
 166. Letter from Joseph W. Cironi, President, The Chamber-Southwest Louisiana, to 
Pascal F. Calogero, Chief Justice, and Jeanette Theriot Knoll, Justice, Louisiana Supreme Court 
(Nov. 6, 1997) (on file with author). 
 167. Id. 
 168. Hansen, supra  note 58, at 57.  
 169. Christi Daugherty, Target: Tulane, GAMBIT WKLY. (New Orleans, La.), Oct. 13, 
1997, at 9 (quoting Dan Juneau, President, LABI); Dan Juneau, Law Clinics Need to Obey the 
Rules, L’OBSERVATEUR (LaPlace, La.), Oct. 11, 1997, at 4A. 
 170. Sam A. LeBlanc, III, Business Unfairly Portrayed in Law Clinic Flap, T IMES-
PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), June 27, 1998, at B6 (letter to editor) (describing the Clinic’s 
representation in the Shintech matter and other industry expansions). 
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the Clinic was not representing the needy but instead was 
representing national organizations with sufficient resources of their 
own.171 This allegation was repeatedly denied by the Clinic, and the 
Louisiana Supreme Court admitted finding no evidence that the 
Clinic ever represented any person or organization that could afford a 
private attorney.172 
The Chamber further sought to justify restrictions by alleging that 
the Clinic advocated controversy instead of progress and was not 
trying to protect the environment.173 The Chamber’s chief 
communications officer explained that the requested restrictions were 
justified because the Clinic’s work occasionally undermined the 
Chamber’s efforts to attract business; Shintech was a case in point.174 
The Business Council’s chairman explained: “What we are interested 
in is a fair and orderly process not disturbed and delayed, particularly 
delayed, by lawsuits [by the Clinic] that have very little merit.”175 
The desire for a court-ordered “level playing field” also was 
expressed in a June, 1998 letter in support of reelecting the Chief 
Justice of the Louisiana Supreme Court that was signed by more than 
two dozen prominent business leaders: “All ‘business’ needs or 
 
 171. Id.; see also  Richard B. Schmitt, Louisiana Shackles Law-School Clinics, WALL ST. 
J., Oct. 29, 1998, at B1 (“Business groups say the rules return the clinics to their original 
mission of representing the truly needy. . . .”). 
 172. E-mail from Robert Kuehn, Director, Tulane Environmental Law Clinic, to Oliver 
Houck, et al. (Oct. 2, 1998, 09:23 CST) (on file with author) (recounting statements by Chief 
Justice Calogero during the October 1, 1998 campaign debate at Tulane University).  
 173. Louisiana: The State We’re In, supra  note 106 (interviewing Sam A. LeBlanc, III). 
For a different opinion on the work of the Tulane Clinic, see Pamela Coyle, Tulane Law Clinic 
Honored for Work, T IMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), July 5, 2000, at 1B (reporting Tulane 
clinic is the first recipient of the ABA’s Award for Distinguished Achievement in 
Environmental Law and Policy); Joe Gyan Jr., ‘Outlaw’ Leader Leaving La., ADVOCATE  
(Baton Rouge, La.), May 15, 1999, at 1B (noting that Tulane Clinic was named the 
Conservation Organization of the Year by a previous governor and presented a certificate by the 
present Lieutenant Governor for “ground-breaking work in environmental racism and 
outstanding service to the ‘working poor’”); Lawyer of the Year-Runners-Up, NAT’L L.J., Dec. 
28, 1998-Jan. 4, 1999, at A12 (selecting the Tulane Clinic as runner up for its Lawyer of the 
Year Award); Michael Wagner, Fight for Civil Rights Goes On Leader Says,  TIMES-PICAYUNE 
(New Orleans, La.), May 10, 1999, at 3B (reporting that the NAACP recognized the Tulane 
Clinic for its contributions to civil rights). 
 174. Daugherty, supra  note 169 (quoting Tom Honan, Chief Communications Officer, the 
Chamber). 
 175. Fox News (Fox News Channel television broadcast, Sept. 1998) (on file with author) 
(interview with Herschel Abbott, Chairman, Business Council). 
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requires in the highest court of our state is a level playing field on 
which to compete.”176 The request for a “level playing field” was 
followed one week later by the Chief Justice’s release of dramatic 
new restrictions on Louisiana law clinics that effectively prevent a 
repeat of the Tulane Clinic’s representation of community groups in 
the Shintech matter. 
C. The Legal Profession: Access to Justice Yields to Attorney Self-
Interest 
The Louisiana legal profession’s response to this attack on the 
Tulane Clinic was mixed. While some jumped to defend the Clinic, 
most notably the Louisiana Attorney General,177 members of the 
Louisiana bar were behind the efforts to deny legal assistance to the 
individuals and community groups that the Clinic traditionally 
represented. 
 
 176. “Open Letter to Our Fellow Business Men and Women” to 600 Business Leaders 
(June 1998) (on file with author). Signatures included the chairman and two past chairmen of 
the Chamber, the chairman and past chairman of the Business Council, and prominent members 
of LABI. See Pamela Coyle, Court Race May Get Messy; Chief Justice Faces Challenge, 
T IMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), June 14, 1998, at A1; Clancy DuBos, Opening Volley, 
GAMBIT WKLY. (New Orleans, La.), June 16, 1998, at 17 (describing those who signed the 
letter as a “who’s who of local business leaders”); Joe Gyan, Jr., Political Philosophies, 
Affiliations Dominate Race, ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.), Aug. 30, 1998, at 1A; see also 
Kaplan & Davidson, supra note 134, at 14 (identifying Edward Diefenthal, one of the business 
leaders who signed the Calogero support letter, as a prominent LABI member and major 
financial contributor to Louisiana Supreme Court election campaigns); The New Orleans 
Regional Chamber of Commerce, 1998 Board of Directors, at http://chamber.gnofn.org.bod. 
html (last visited Nov. 6, 1999) (identifying Ned Diefenthal as a member of the Chamber’s 
board of directors).  
 LABI similarly defended its heavy financial involvement in Louisiana Supreme Court 
elections as an effort to obtain “a level playing field.” Carl Redman, LABI, Lobbying and the 
Law, ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.), Sept. 27, 1998, at 15B (quoting Ginger Sawyer, Vice-
President for Political Action, LABI). The same “level playing field” justification was used to 
defend the efforts of business groups attempting to deny standing to environmental plaintiffs. 
See Morning Edition: Supreme Court to Take Up Issue of Citizens Suing Companies Over 
Pollution (National Public Radio broadcast, Oct. 12, 1999) (quoting Jan Amenson, National 
Association of Manufacturers).  
 177. See, e.g., Letter from Richard P. Ieyoub, Louisiana Attorney General, to Chief Justice 
and Associate Justices, Supreme Court of Louisiana (Oct. 1, 1998) (on file with author) 
(requesting a stay of new law clinic restrictions and arguing that the restrictions “could 
adversely affect the protection of those public values and interests which clinical practitioners 
most often assert.”); see also  Mark Schleifstein, Ieyoub Asks High Court to Suspend Clinic 
Rules, T IMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), Oct. 7, 1998, at A2. 
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The Louisiana Bar Association’s Board of Governors (Board of 
Governors) was equivocal on the issue. After the new restrictions on 
Louisiana law clinics were first issued, the Board of Governors sent a 
resolution requesting the court to stay the rule changes so the matter 
could be considered at the next meeting of the Bar’s House of 
Delegates.178 The court refused the request and provided the Board of 
Governors only thirty days to respond.179 Although it was not 
publicly reported, after the resolution was submitted to the court and 
widely reported in the press, the Chief Justice of the Louisiana 
Supreme Court expressed his displeasure to the president of the Bar 
Association that the Board of Governors intervened in the law clinic 
dispute.180 The Board of Governors subsequently was unable to 
respond within thirty days and appeared to equivocate its earlier 
resolution by informing the court that it never intended to “take 
sides” or to express a position on the merits of the new restrictions.181 
Meanwhile, no attorney was more vigorous in the attack on the 
Clinic than Governor Foster’s special counsel. In public statements 
about the Clinic, the special counsel repeatedly objected to the 
 
 178. Letter from Patrick S. Ottinger, President, Louisiana State Bar Association, to Chief 
Justice and Associate Justices, Louisiana Supreme Court (Aug. 31, 1998) (on file with author) 
(transmitting the August 29, 1998 Louisiana State Bar Association Board of Governors 
Resolution); see also Mark Ballard, La. Bar Gets Into Law Clinic Fight, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 21, 
1998, at A8; Joe Gyan, Jr., La. Bar Backs Clinics, ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.), Sept. 9, 
1998, at 1A; Mark Schleifstein & Susan Finch, State Bar Wants Court to Suspend Law Clinic 
Rules So It Can Study Them , T IMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), Sept. 9, 1998, at A2 
(quoting David Bienvenu, immediate past president, Louisiana State Bar Association, as 
stating: “The board of governors believes that as the voice of the legal profession, the organized 
bar, it should have the opportunity to express its views on issues affecting the legal profession, 
which includes amendments to Rule XX.”). 
 179. See Letter from Justice Walter F. Marcus, Jr., Associate Justice, Louisiana Supreme 
Court, to Patrick S. Ottinger, President, Louisiana State Bar Association (Sept. 2, 1998) (on file 
with author). 
 180. Interview with Edward Sherman, Dean, Tulane Law School (Oct. 21, 1999) (relating 
the substance of an October, 1998 conversation with Patrick S. Ottinger, President, Louisiana 
State Bar Association). 
 181. Letter from Patrick S. Ottinger, President, Louisiana State Bar Association, to Walter 
F. Marcus, Jr., Associate Justice, Louisiana Supreme Court (Oct. 12, 1998) (on file with 
author). Contrary to these assertions, the Bar’s Access to Justice Committee had taken a 
position that the court ’s new restrictions on law clinics be removed and that the committee 
present this position to the court. The Committee forwarded this recommendation to the Board 
of Governors. Louisiana State Bar Association, Access to Justice Committee Minutes at 
http://www.lsba.org/html/access_minutes_sept.html (last visited Nov. 6, 1999) (minutes from 
Committee’s September 26, 1998 meeting). 
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Clinic’s filing of environmental discrimination charges against the 
state. He argued that the Clinic went “too far” in “trying to blaze new 
territory in the environmental justice arena” and urged Tulane 
University officials and the Louisiana Supreme Court to “require 
accountability” by the Clinic.182 In a private meeting with Tulane 
officials, Governor Foster’s special counsel was sharply critical of 
Clinic professors and pressed the university president and law school 
dean to retreat on the Shintech case.183 When the Louisiana Supreme 
Court agreed to intervene and imposed new restrictions on the state’s 
law clinics, he praised the court’s actions: “[I]ndividuals don’t have a 
constitutional right to have free legal representation in civil cases.”184 
During this time, Governor Foster’s special counsel served as 
chairman and vice-chairman of the Louisiana Bar Association’s 
Environmental Law Section (Environmental Law Section), which 
took no public position on the attack on the Clinic or on efforts to 
amend the student practice rule.185 Unlike the environmental law 
sections of other state bars, the Environmental Law Section has no 
program for providing legal services to those who cannot afford an 
attorney.186 The Environmental Law Section also has taken no steps 
to implement the ABA’s 1993 resolution urging increased delivery of 
legal services to persons and communities raising environmental 
jutice claims and expansion of law school clinical programs to 
 
 182. Coyle, supra  note 109, at 27 (reporting remarks of Terry Ryder). 
 183. Telephone Interview with Dr. Eamon M. Kelly, supra  note 122. 
 184. Morning Edition: Rules on Law School Clinics (National Public Radio broadcast, July 
30, 1998). 
 185. E-mail from Daria Burgess Diaz to Robert Kuehn, Director, Tulane Environmental 
Law Clinic (Oct. 15, 1999, 02:57 CST) (on file with author) (relating that Terry Ryder, 
Governor Foster’s special counsel, was past chairman of the Louisiana State Bar Association 
Environmental Law Section from 1998-99, chairman from 1997-98, and vice-chairman from 
1996-97). See, e.g., Scott Allen, Environmental Lawyers Unite to Help Low-Income 
Communities,  BOSTON GLOBE , Dec. 1, 1994, at 36 (reporting on the Boston Bar Association’s 
Lawyer pro bono environmental law program); B. Suzi Ruhl, Committee on Access to Justice 
Serves Low-Income Citizens, FLA. B. ENVT’L & LAND USE L. SEC. REP., July 1999, at 2 
(explaining the Florida Bar’s Environmental and Law Use Law Section’s program to provide 
pro bono services to disadvantaged communities in Florida). 
 186. E-mail from Daria Burgess Diaz to Robert Kuehn, Former Director, Tulane 
Environmental Law Clinic (Mar. 1, 2000, 09:16 CST) (on file with author); E-mail from Daria 
Burgess Diaz to Robert Kuehn, Director, Tulane Environmental Law Clinic (Oct. 18, 1999, 
10:48 CST) (on file with author). 
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address environmental justice problems.187  
The Environmental Law Section’s only action was to publish an 
article in the Louisiana Bar Journal on the new law clinic rules. The 
article, written by an environmental defense attorney whose firm 
often opposed the Clinic, urged all licensed attorneys to report any 
representation of ineligible clients to the bar ethics committee and 
seek disqualification of the law clinic students and supervising 
attorneys from the case.188 The acting director of the Clinic objected 
that the article violated the Journal’s requirement that such articles 
not take a position that appears to favor one section of the bar.189 The 
acting director requested permission to write a different perspective 
on the new restrictions, but the editorial board denied his request.190 
Attorneys representing businesses that were defeated in 
proceedings by Clinic students played a prominent role in the effort 
to restrict the availability of clinic services. The chairman of the 
Business Council was a Tulane Law School alumnus, member of the 
Tulane University Associate’s Board of Directors and the Chamber’s 
board of directors.191 As Business Council chairman, the attorney 
attacked the Clinic with rhetoric of a level playing field undisturbed 
by unmeritorious lawsuits.192 Interestingly, the chairman is the 
president and former general counsel of BellSouth Corporation in 
Louisiana, whose 1996 plans to demolish a historic building in New 
Orleans were blocked in a case represented by Clinic students.193 
 
 187. See ABA House of Delegates, Resolution on Environmental Justice (Aug. 11, 1993).  
 188. Anne J. Crochet, Supreme Court Changes Rule Governing Law School Clinics, 46 LA. 
B.J. 239, 240-41 (1998). 
 189. See Letter from Christopher Gobert, Acting Director, Tulane Environmental Law 
Clinic, to Larry Feldman, Jr., Editor, Louisiana Bar Journal (Mar. 25, 1999) (on file with 
author) (requesting that editorial board reconsider a decision not to print his article on Rule 
XX). 
 190. Facsimile transmission from Larry Feldman, Jr., Editor, Louisiana Bar Journal, to 
Christopher Gobert, Acting Director, Tulane Environmental Law Clinic (Mar. 29, 1999) (on file 
with author) (denying request to print submission). 
 191. See Associates Announce New Board of Directors,  T ULANIAN, Spring 1999, at 49 
(noting position of Herschel L. Abbott, Jr.); The New Orleans Regional Chamber of Commerce, 
1998 Board of Directors, at http://chamber.gnofn.org/bod.html (last visited Nov. 6, 1999) 
(identifying Hershel L. Abbott, Jr. as a member of board). 
 192. Supra, note 175 and accompanying text. 
 193. See Coleman Warner, Bell South Seeks Approval to Demolish Old Building, TIMES-
PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), Jan. 24, 1996, at B1; Coleman Warner, Bell Won’t Demolish 
Building, T IMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), Mar. 22, 1996, at B1; Coleman Warner, 1917 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol4/iss1/5
p 33 Kuehn.doc  3/22/01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2000]  Denying Access to Legal Representation 73 
 
 
Many of the Chamber’s officers and directors are prominent local 
attorneys.194 Notably, the chairman of the New Orleans chapter was a 
partner and environmental defense attorney with a prominent New 
Orleans law firm, as well as a graduate of Tulane Law School’s 
environmental law program.195 The chairman’s attacks on the Clinic 
were numerous. He supported the court’s denial of access to the 
Clinic’s legal services on the grounds that Clinic lawyers were 
“overzealous and that the Clinic’s actions [showed] how uncertain 
our economic future can be when irresponsible acts are tolerated.”196 
At the time he requested that the court restric t the Clinic’s services, 
he and his law firm were engaged in a protracted legal battle with 
Clinic lawyers over the eligibility of a Louisiana hazardous waste 
incinerator for state tax breaks.197 Those multi-million dollar tax 
breaks were earlier ruled unlawful by a trial judge, and the chairman 
and his firm were unsuccessful in their four-year legal battle to 
preserve the tax exemptions.198 
 
Building to Become Hotel; Landmark Almost Razed, T IMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), Oct. 
8, 1997, at C1; see also T ULANE LAW SCHOOL, ALUMNI DIRECTORY 1993, 1 (1993) 
(identifying Abbott as “Gen. Counsel/Louisiana: South Central Bell Telephone,” the 
predecessor corporation to BellSouth); Chamber Recognizes BellSouth Activism, T IMES-
PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), Aug. 22, 1996, at C1 (noting that Abbott, identified as 
BellSouth president in Louisiana, accepts 1996 Business at Its Best Award from the Chamber 
“for its community participation and for being a role model for business.”). 
 194. See The New Orleans Regional Chamber of Commerce, 1998 Board of Directors 
available at http://chamber.gnofn.org/bod.html (last visited Nov. 6, 1999) (identifying attorneys 
and their respective firms as officers or members of the Board of Directors: Sam A. LeBlanc, 
III, Adams & Reese; Walter J. Leger, Leger & Mestayer; Herschel L. Abbott, Jr., BellSouth; 
Gary Elkins, Elkins, P.L.C.; Richard McMillan, Jones, Walker; and Paul Pastorek, Adams & 
Reese). 
 195. See James Gill, High Court Reins in Lower Class, T IMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, 
La.), June 21, 1998, at B7; 9 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY LA249B (1999) (listing 
Sam A. LeBlanc, III, with the New Orleans law firm of Adams & Reese).  
 196. LeBlanc, supra note 170; see generally Letter from Sam A. LeBlanc, III, et al., to 
Pascal F. Calogero, Jr., Chief Justice, Louisiana Supreme Court (Mar. 12, 1998) (on file with 
author) (arguing why the court should limit the ability of the Clinic to provide representation to 
community organizations). 
 197. See Motion to Vacate and Motion for Continuance, Robinson v. Ieyoub (La. 19th 
Judicial Dist. Ct. Feb. 10, 1995) (No. 412,867) (identifying LeBlanc as counsel for Rollins 
Environmental Services (LA), Inc.). Adams & Reese lists ten petrochemical and waste disposal 
companies among its major representative clients. 9 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY 
LA256B (1999). 
 198. See Robinson v. Ieyoub, 727 So. 2d 579 (La. Ct. App. 1998), writ denied, 747 So. 2d 
1096, 1097 (La. 1999). 
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Attorneys in the Chamber chairman’s firm would go even further 
to rein in the Clinic’s effectiveness. As one senior partner stated, if an 
applicant for a job at the firm had the Tulane Clinic on their resume, 
“they might as well not come through the front door.”199 The attorney 
justified blacklisting Clinic students on grounds that the business 
community would not want to hire firms that employed former Clinic 
students.200 Disturbingly, the remarks came during a meeting of the 
“Inns of Court,” an organization dedicated to promoting the 
professionalism of the bar by making “the legal system more 
accessible” and perfecting the availability of justice in the United 
States.201 The DEQ also was reported to engage in blacklisting, 
allegedly refusing to hire qualified Tulane alumni because of their 
participation in the Clinic during law school.202 In a related, but more 
indirect way, Shintech’s lawyers also supported the attack on the 
Clinic. As one lawyer for Shintech’s New Orleans law firm stated, he 
was a contributing alumnus of Tulane Law School, thus making it 
inappropriate for the Clinic to represent citizens opposed to his 
 
 199. E-mail from Crawford Rose to Robert Kuehn, Director, Tulane Environmental Law 
Clinic (May 16, 1999) (on file with author) (recounting remarks of Henry B. Alsobrook, Jr.). 
Alsobrook is a Tulane University and Tulane Law School graduate, the former chairman of the 
law school’s Dean’s Council, and a former adjunct professor of professional responsibility at 
Tulane Law School. 9 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY LA255B (1999); Interview 
with John Kramer, Former Dean (1986-96), Tulane Law School (Oct. 21, 1999). 
 200. Id. A student who had applied to the Tulane Clinic for the 1999-2000 academic year 
informed the author that she was withdrawing her application because she had been warned by 
a Louisiana attorney that having the Clinic on her resume might scare off potential local 
employers and harm her legal career. Interview with unidentified second-year Tulane Law 
School student (Apr. 1999). Tulane environmental law students who are not even in the Clinic 
have experienced hostility when interviewing for positions, even part -time, with local firms. E-
mail from Oliver Houck, Tulane Law School, to Robert Kuehn, Former Director, Tulane 
Environmental Law Clinic (Feb. 3, 2000) (recounting student’s conversation about the hostility 
experienced when interviewing for a part -time position). 
 201. E-mail from Crawford Rose to Robert Kuehn, supra  note 199; American Inns of 
Court, Professional Creed, at http://www.innsofcourt.org/about/creed.html (last visited Oct. 16, 
1999) (“I will contribute time and resources to public service, charitable activities and pro bono 
work. I will work to make the legal system more accessible, responsive and effective.”); 
American Inns of Court, Mission Statement, at http://www.innsofcourt.org/about/mission.html 
(last visited Oct. 16, 1999). (“The Mission of the American Inns of Court is to foster excellence 
in professionalism . . . in order to perfect the quality, availability, and efficiency of justice in the 
United States.”).  
 202. Telephone Interviews with Malcolm Pipes, Environmental Law Clinic alumnus (Oct. 
23 and 30, 1999) (relating discussion with DEQ official). 
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clients’ projects.203 
D. The Louisiana Supreme Court: A Certain Kind of Access and Only 
for Certain People 
1. The Court’s Changing Politics 
The business groups’ 1997 requests for an investigation into the 
Tulane Clinic’s activities were not the first time the Louisiana 
Supreme Court was asked to investigate the Clinic. In 1993, Kai 
Midboe, then secretary of the DEQ, sent a letter to the Chief Justice 
of the Louisiana Supreme Court, Pascal F. Calogero, Jr., complaining 
about certain Clinic actions and requesting that the court “exercise its 
oversight jurisdiction to determine if the Tulane Environmental Law 
Clinic is complying with the intent and provisions of [the Louisiana 
Law Clinic Student Practice Rule].”204 Midboe’s request was 
triggered by a letter from a Clinic staff attorney to a local newspaper, 
sent in her own name, and by public comments make by the Clinic’s 
director that were critical of the governor’s position on reduction of a 
state hazardous waste tax.205 Midboe’s request, like the later requests 
from the business groups, questioned the appropriateness of the 
Clinic’s alleged use of the law student practice rule “to engage in 
 
 203. E-mail from Sean O’Neill, Tulane Law School student, to Robert Kuehn, Former 
Director, Tulane Environmental Law Clinic (Oct. 21, 1999) (on file with author) (relating 
discussion with a partner at Liskow & Lewis). 
 204. Letter from Kai David Midboe, Secretary, Louisiana Department of Environmental 
Quality, to Pascal F. Calogero, Jr., Chief Justice, Louisiana Supreme Court (Oct. 15, 1993) (on 
file with author). 
 205. See Michael Dehncke, Life in Louisiana, T ULANE LAW SCHOOL DICTA (New Orleans, 
La.), Oct. 25, 1993, at 1; Josh Landis, State and Industries Pressure Environmental Law Clinic, 
T ULANE HULLABALOO (New Orleans, La.), Nov. 19, 1993, at 1. 
 Prior to Midboe filing the complaint, Governor Edwin Edwards called Tulane University 
President Eamon Kelly and demanded that Kelly either “shut [Tulane Clinic director Robert 
Kuehn] up or get rid of him.” Landis, supra . Governor Edwards reportedly threatened to 
withdraw state support for a new downtown basketball arena (of which Tulane was a leading 
proponent and which would be used by the University’s basketball team), cut off “capitation” (a 
state program which partially funds Louisiana students at private schools), and prevent Tulane 
medical students from working in the state’s hospitals unless Kuehn was silenced. Id.; see also 
Coyle, supra  note 109, at 26; Hansen, supra  note 58, at 54. President Kelly, arguing that it was 
an issue of academic freedom, reportedly informed Governor Edwards that he was not going to 
silence an individual solely for their opinions. Landis, supra . 
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political conduct.”206 The court responded to the request to 
investigate the Clinic and prohibit its alleged political conduct with a 
one-page letter sent one month later which stated: “It was the feeling 
of the justices that there is no need to either create an oversight 
committee or to develop standards of conduct different from those 
that are already provided in Supreme Court Rule XX.”207 
Given the brusqueness with which the court disposed of this 1993 
complaint and the obvious political nature of the new, Shintech-
related attacks, one might have thought that the 1997 business 
groups’ complaints would meet with a similar quick denial. However, 
in the intervening four years, the composition and philosophy of the 
court had changed dramatically. 
In 1994, after the Louisiana Supreme Court decided a sales tax 
case in a manner contrary to LABI’s position, LABI launched a 
newsletter to track court decisions and urged businesses to get 
involved in court elections.208 In the first successful flexing of 
LABI’s political muscle, LABI successfully backed the 1994 election 
of Jeffrey P. Victory as the newest justice to the court.209 Two years 
later, LABI again successfully backed the election of two new 
justices, Jeannette Knoll and Chet Traylor, who themselves were 
aided by endorsements and support from Governor Foster.210 Both 
Knoll and Traylor defeated incumbent justices, marking the first time 
in over twenty years that an incumbent justice was defeated in a bid 
for reelection.211 Almost half of Justice Traylor’s campaign 
 
 206. Letter from Kai David Midboe to Pascal F. Calogero, Jr., supra  note 204. 
 207. Letter from Pascal F. Calogero, Jr., Chief Justice, Louisiana Supreme Court, to Kai 
David Midboe, Secretary, Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (Nov. 18, 1993) (on 
file with author).  
 Similarly, an attorney who opposed a lawsuit filed by the University of Oregon Law 
School’s environmental law clinic filed an ethics complaint alleging that clinic professors had 
misled a judge by selectively presenting studies about the declining number of spotted owls; the 
Oregon State Bar’s ethics board dismissed the complaint. Bill Bishop, Ethics Complaint 
Dismissed by Bar, REGISTER-GUARD (Eugene, Or.), May 22, 1990, at 1C.  
 208. Redman, supra note 176 (quoting LABI’s president as saying that LABI would treat 
judicial elections as just another political activity). 
 209. See Ed Anderson, Foster Backs Cusimano for Supreme Court, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New 
Orleans, La.), Oct. 1, 1998, at A4; Joe Gyan, Jr., Court Runoff; Cusimano, Calogero to Meet 
Nov. 3, ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.), Oct. 4, 1998, at 1A. 
 210. Anderson, supra  note 209. 
 211. Id.; Gyan, supra  note 209. 
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contributions came from oil and gas industry executives, their 
lawyers, and LABI, “which spearheaded Traylor’s campaign against 
incumbent [Justice] Joe Bleich.”212 
In 1997, while the complaints of LABI and other business groups 
were pending before the court, two more justices, including Chief 
Justice Calogero, faced reelection. Chief Justice Calogero, in 
particular, was expecting a tough challenge from a pro-business 
conservative. In an early attempt to gather business support, Calogero 
sent a letter of support written by two dozen of the most prominent 
names in the New Orleans business community to 600 business 
leaders.213 As noted previously, the letter of support was signed by 
the chairman and two past chairmen of the Chamber, the chairman 
and past chairman of the Business Council, and prominent members 
of LABI—the leaders of the three business groups whose complaints 
against the Clinic were under consideration by the court.214 
Thus, when the business complaints were filed in 1997 it was a 
very different Louisiana Supreme Court than the court that so quickly 
disposed of the complaint against the Clinic in 1993. Differences 
were apparent in the pro-business composition of court members and 
in the court’s awareness of the political influence of LABI and 
Governor Foster. As one political analyst put it, “[LABI’s] ability to 
elect judges has turned the court around, and the court already has 
become more cognizant of what business likes and does not like.”215 
The Chief Justice later acknowledged that he was sympathetic to 
business complaints about the Clinic.216 
2. Investigating the Tulane Environmental Law Clinic  
Louisiana law schools were first informed of the complaint letters 
from the business groups and of the court’s decision to investigate in 
 
 212. Kaplan & Davidson, supra note 134, at 15. 
 213. Coyle, supra note 176. 
 214. See supra  text accompanying note 176. 
 215. Mark Schleifstein, Election Might Shift Balance on Supreme Court, TIMES-PICAYUNE 
(New Orleans, La.), Sept. 20, 1998, at A1 (quoting Bernie Pinsonat). 
 216. Christine Jenkins, Notes of Meeting-Rule XX with Chief Justice Calogero (Aug. 19, 
1998). 
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a September, 1997 letter from the Chief Justice.217 The letter, sent 
with the complaint letters attached, informed the law school deans 
that information would be sought concerning the operations of all of 
the state’s law clinics. The letter, as well as a follow-up letter seeking 
answers to specific questions about the schools’ law clinics, 
identified the court’s investigators as Timothy Averill and Kim 
Sport.218 
The court claimed that it was simply procuring information for a 
discussion with the law schools about the operations of the clinics 
and not conducting an investigation into their activities.219 However, 
unbeknownst to Tulane, Sport began investigating the Tulane Clinic 
shortly after the court received the complaint letters from the 
Chamber and Business Council. In late July, 1997, Sport called 
Governor Foster’s office seeking information on the Clinic.220 
Governor Foster’s attorney referred Sport to the Louisiana 
Department of Economic Development, which then sent Sport a list 
of companies opposed to the Clinic.221 Although Sport first denied 
investigating the Clinic as early as July, 1997,222 Sport later admitted 
that she had been investigating, but only on behalf of Chief Justice 
Calogero.223 Sport stated that Calogero instructed her to contact the 
 
 217. Letter from Pascal F. Calogero, Jr., Chief Justice, Louisiana Supreme Court, to 
Edward F. Sherman, Dean, Tulane Law School (Sept. 25, 1997) (on file with author). See 
Roxana Hegeman, Supreme Court Opens Inquiry Into Law Clinics,  T IMES-PICAYUNE (New 
Orleans, La.), Oct. 3, 1997, at A3. 
 218. Letter from Timothy F. Averill, Deputy Judicial Administrator—General Counsel, 
Louisiana Supreme Court, to Edward F. Sherman, Dean, Tulane Law School (Oct. 8, 1997) (on 
file with author). 
 219. See Daugherty, supra  note 169. Paulette Holahan, Deputy Judicial Administrator, 
Louisiana Supreme Court, stated her belief that the situation was blown out of proportion 
because the court was not conducting an official investigation, but simply a routine look at how 
law clinics in the state operate. “I think there’s more attention being given to this than it 
warrants,” she said. Id. 
 220. Daugherty, supra note 145. Sport claimed that she contacted Governor Foster’s office 
after acquiring a videotape of an interview with Governor Foster in which he claimed that the 
Tulane Clinic had failed to provide him with requested information. Id. 
 221. Id. See also  E-mail from Harold Price, Louisiana Department of Economic 
Development, to Kim Sport, Louisiana Supreme Court (July 23, 1997, 16:24 CST) (on file with 
author). Sport was advised to contact two lawyers with the Baton Rouge office of Adams & 
Reese, the law firm of Chamber president Sam LeBlanc. 
 222. See Daugherty, supra  note 145. 
 223. Coalition Takes on Supreme Court, GAMBIT WKLY. (New Orleans, La.), Apr. 20, 
1999, at 12.  
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Department of Economic Development to inquire about any 
information or complaints concerning the Clinic.224 
After the issuance of the court’s new law clinic rules, it was 
revealed that Sport was the Chamber’s chairwoman in 1996 and still 
served on the Chamber’s board.225 Sport, who also served as the 
court’s chief spokesperson defending the new clinic restrictions, 
repeatedly denied it was a conflict of interest for a high-ranking 
official with one of the complaining parties to work for the court 
investigating the complaints.226 
While the Clinic investigation was underway, Sport was 
developing a court program entitled “Chamber to Chamber.”227 The 
goal of the program was to bring delegations from the state chambers 
of commerce to have “candid discussions with host judges” about 
how the court system might better serve the community and create 
support for court operations.228 During communications with LABI 
one month after complaints were filed against the Clinic, Sport 
discussed LABI’s possible participation in “Chamber to Chamber” 
and the upcoming reelections of two justices, including Chief Justice 
Calogero.229 Sport asked LABI to apprise her of LABI’s efforts 
regarding judicial elections and informed LABI’s president that she 
shared a copy of LABI’s latest magazine, dealing with judicial 
elections, “with the Chief Justice to demonstrate to him just how 
closely the business community was monitoring issues affecting the 
 
 224. Id. Sport stated that she discovered that the letter which Governor Foster alleged to 
have received from the Tulane Clinic, refusing to provide him with requested information, did 
not exist. Daugherty, supra  note 145. 
 225. Coalition Takes on Supreme Court, supra note 223 (quoting the Chamber’s vice 
president for community development describing Sport as “very involved with the Chamber”); 
Pamela Coyle, Director of Community Relations at Supreme Court Takes Sabbatical, TIMES-
PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), Dec. 18, 1999, at A2; Ronette King, Local Chamber Adopts 
New Name 7-Parish Group Get New Leader, T IMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), Jan. 29, 
1999, at C1. 
 226. Christi Daugherty, Business of the Court, GAMBIT WKLY. (New Orleans, La.), Aug. 3, 
1999, at 9; see generally James Gill, Law Clinic, High Court Face Off, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New 
Orleans, La.), Apr. 28, 1999, at B7. 
 227. Daugherty, supra  note 226. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Letter from Kim Sport, Community Relations Director, Louisiana Supreme Court, to 
Dan Juneau, President, Louisiana Association of Business and Industry (Aug. 11, 1997) (on file 
with author); see also  James Gill, Influencing Louisiana’s Judiciary, T IMES-PICAYUNE (New 
Orleans, La.), Dec. 3, 1999, at B7. 
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judiciary.”230 
The court quickly dispelled any misconceptions concerning the 
purpose of the inquiry when it dispatched two staff persons to the 
state’s law schools. Spending less than a day at Loyola and Southern 
law schools, the court staff spent over two days at Tulane quizzing 
the Clinic’s staff and students about their activities.231 It was clear 
that the Tulane Clinic was the target of the court’s attention and that a 
full-fleged investigation had begun. 
In the fall of 1997, the dean of Tulane Law School sent the Chief 
Justice a copy of a resolution on the agenda of the upcoming meeting 
of the Board of Governors expressing support for clinical education 
and for not changing the student practice rule.232 The dean’s efforts 
were discouraged by the Chief Justice’s representative, who called 
the dean to relay the Chief Justice’s concerns that the resolution 
could contribute to the kind of continuing public debate that the court 
wished to avoid.233 According to the dean, he was assured that if the 
court decided to make any amendment to Rule XX after completing 
its investigation, the court would provide an opportunity for comment 
and discussion on any proposed amendments.234 The dean withdrew 
the resolution out of respect for the court’s desire to reduce the public 
debate. Thereafter, the dean repeatedly informed the Board of 
Governors, as well as three sections of the ABA and other concerned 
individuals and groups, that the court would provide opportunity for 
the public to comment if amendments to Rule XX were proposed.235 
 
 230. Letter from Kim Sport to Dan Juneau, supra  note 229. 
 231. Hansen, supra  note 58, at 57. 
 232. See Letter from Edward F. Sherman, Dean, Tulane Law School, to Walter F. Marcus, 
Jr., Justice, Louisiana Supreme Court (July 16, 1998) (on file with author) (recounting 
telephone conversation with Tim Averill of the Louisiana Supreme Court in October, 1997). 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. While discouraging the law schools from gaining the support of the bar 
association, the court did provide the business groups with copies of the information submitted 
by the law schools and a chance to respond to the law schools’ explanations. See, e.g., Letter 
from Pascal F. Calogero, Jr., Chief Justice, Louisiana Supreme Court, to Daniel L. Juneau, 
President, Louisiana Association of Business and Industry (Jan. 23, 1998) (on file with author). 
The documents were provided to the business entities over the objections of the director of the 
Tulane Clinic who complained that providing the documents would simply trigger another 
round of unsubstantiated accusations against the Clinic. See Letter from Timothy F. Averill, 
Deputy Judicial Administrator—General Counsel, to Robert R. Kuehn, Tulane Environmental 
Law Clinic (Jan. 13, 1998) (on file with author).  
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3. The Original June 1998 Restrictions 
On June 17, 1998, with no advance notice or consultation with the 
state’s law schools, the court issued its response to the complaints of 
the business groups. The amendments to Louisiana Supreme Court 
Rule XX, the Louisiana law clinic student practice rule, were 
effective on July 1, 1998 and included: 
 1) a prohibition on the representation of any community 
organization affiliated with a national organization; 
 2) an eligibility standard for representing “indigent” 
individuals based on the federal poverty guidelines used by the 
Legal Services Corporation; 
 3) a prohibition on representing any non-affiliated 
community organization unless the organization certifies that 
at least 75% of its members are eligible for representation 
under the Legal Services Corporation’s federal poverty 
guidelines; 
 4) a new oath for student practitioners paralleling the oath 
given to practicing attorneys, but notably striking the following 
pledge contained in the Louisiana lawyer’s oath: “I will never 
reject, from any consideration personal to myself, the cause of 
the defenseless or oppressed, or delay any person’s cause for 
lucre or malice”; 
 5) a ban on representation of any indigent person or 
community organization if any clinical program supervising 
lawyer, staff person, or student practitioner initiated contact for 
the purpose of representing the contacted person or 
organization; and 
 6) a ban on representation of any indigent community 
organization if the clinical program, staff person, or student 
practitioner provided legal assistance in forming, creating, or 
incorporating the organization.236 
 
 236. LA. SUP.  CT., R. XX (Limited Participation of Law Students in Trial Work) (as 
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In contrast, federal district courts in Louisiana allow law students 
to represent any person, regardless of income, in any civil matter, 
provided the client has consented in writing and attorney fees are not 
provided in the case.237 In addition, the federal courts in Louisiana, as 
is true of federal and state courts in all other states, do not seek to 
restrict contact between clinics and prospective clients.238 Moreover, 
contrary to suggestions by the Louisiana Supreme Court,239 Legal 
Services Corporation offices are not subject to similar eligibility 
restrictions. The Legal Services Corporation’s income eligibility 
regulations specify that an office is not prohibited from providing 
legal assistance to clients that exceed the maximum annual income 
levels “if the assistance provided the client is supported by funds 
from a source other than the Corporation.”240 
Loyola and Tulane Law Schools immediately criticized the 
Louisiana Supreme Court’s new restrictions on the grounds that the 
rules would restrict local chapters of community organizations from 
access to the courts and violate citizens’ constitutionally-protected 
right to information on available legal remedies.241 The Association 
 
amended June 17, 1998). The amendments also prohibited any student from appearing “in a 
representative capacity before regular or special sessions of state or federal legislatures.” Id. 
 237. E., M. & W. LA. D. UNIF. R. 83.2.13 (Appearances by Law Students) (1999). 
 238. See id.; Letter from Carl C. Monk, Executive Vice President and Executive Director, 
Association of American Law Schools, to M.J. “Mike” Foster, Jr., Governor, State of Louisiana 
(Aug. 21, 1998) (on file with author) (noting that no other law student practice rule seeks to 
restrict or prohibit clinic students from providing information or offers of free legal assistance). 
 239. See, e.g., Hugh M. Collins, High Court Explains Student-Lawyer Rule Change, 
T IMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), June 25, 1998, at B6 (letter to editor from Judicial 
Administrator, Louisiana Supreme Court). 
 240. 45 C.F.R. § 1611.3(e) (1999). In addition, unlike the new Louisiana law student 
practice rule, a party is prohibited during the ongoing proceeding from challenging the authority 
of any Legal Services Corporation office to provide representation to a particular client and 
prohibited from gaining access to information furnished by a client to establish financial 
eligibility. 42 U.S.C. § 2996e(b)(1)(B) (1994); 45 C.F.R. §§ 1618.1, 1611.7(c) (1999); In re 
Reyes, 814 F.2d 168, 170 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1235 (1988); Anderson v. 
Redman, 474 F. Supp. 511, 519-20 (D. Del. 1979).  
 The only restriction that the Internal Revenue Service places on client eligibility for tax 
exempt public interest law firms is that the firm may not undertake a case in which a court-
awarded fee is possible “if the organization believes the litigants have a sufficient commercial 
or financial interest in the outcome of the litigation to justify retention of a private law firm.” 
Rev. Proc. 92-59, 1992-29 I.R.B. 11. 
 241. Chris Gray, Court Reins in Student Lawyers, T IMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), 
June 18, 1998, at A1; Joe Gyan, Jr., Law School Deans Challenge Rules,  ADVOCATE (Baton 
Rouge, La.), June 30, 1998, at 1B; Law Clinics Say Rules Hurt Poor,  ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, 
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of American Law Schools (AALS) called the new Louisiana law 
clinic student practice rule “the most restrictive student practice rule 
in the nation.”242 The president of Tulane University wrote that the 
extraordinarily restrictive regulations originated when “the governor, 
the business community and the courts combin[ed] to deprive the 
working poor of their right to counsel.”243 State newspaper editorials 
blasted the court for caving in to pressure from Governor Foster and 
business groups and for imposing unjustified restrictions on the 
ability of needy persons to obtain essential legal assistance.244 
 
La.), June 18, 1998, at 1A. See also Letter from John Makdisi, Dean, Loyola Law School, to 
Pascal F. Calogero, Jr., Chief Justice, Louisiana Supreme Court (July 23, 1998) (on file with 
author); Letter from John Makdisi, Dean, Loyola Law School, and Edward Sherman, Dean, 
Tulane Law School, to Pascal F. Calogero, Jr., Chief Justice, Louisiana Supreme Court (June 
26, 1998) (on file with author); Letter from Edward F. Sherman, Dean, Tulane Law School, to 
Pascal F. Calogero, Jr., Chief Justice, Louisiana Supreme Court (July 30, 1998) (on file with 
author); Letter from Edward F. Sherman to Walter F. Marcus, Jr., supra  note 232. 
 The chancellor of Southern Law School explained the state-funded school’s silence on the 
adverse impacts of the Rule XX restrictions: “We are a little different from Tulane and Loyola 
because we do not have the financial resources to go out and represent organizations.” Stephen 
F. Chiccarelli & Charles F. Thensted, A Roundtable Discussion With the State’s Law School 
Leaders, 47 LA. B.J. 18, 24 (1999). 
 242. Letter from Carl C. Monk to M.J. “Mike” Foster, Jr., supra  note 238. The AALS 
stated that the Louisiana student practice rule was the most restrictive student practice rule in 
six ways: 1) no other student practice rule limits the representation of organizations to 
community organizations and prohibits the representation of organizations that have any 
affiliation with national organizations; 2) no other rule requires members of an organization to 
reveal their incomes, nor does any other state require that a majority of the organization’s 
members meet some income or poverty restrictions; 3) no other rule requires individual law 
clinic clients to meet federal poverty standards; 4) no other rule seeks to restrict or prohibit 
clinic students from providing information or offers of free legal assistance; 5) no other rule 
prohibits the representation of community organizations where a clinical program has provided 
legal assistance in forming, creating, or incorporating the organization; and 6) no other rule 
prohibits law students from appearing in a representative capacity before the legislature. Id. See 
also  Janet McConnaughey, Official: La. Rules Severe, ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.), June 20, 
1998, at 1A (noting that Monk argues the new rules appear uniquely severe and likely to hurt 
everyone but business).  
 243. Eamon M. Kelly, A Power Play Against Environmental Justice, T IMES-PICAYUNE 
(New Orleans, La.), June 25, 1998, at B6. The Tulane president also argued that the actions of 
Governor Foster, the business community, and the supreme court presented a classic case for 
the need of the federal government to issue regulations on environmental justice and to restrict 
local governments and industries from using their power advantages to impose themselves on 
poor and minority residents. Id. 
 244. See, e.g., Clinic Restrictions May Go Too Far, ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.), June 
21, 1998, at 14B; Kathy Finn, The Face of Business: Not Always a Pretty Picture, NEW 
ORLEANS CITYBUSINESS, June 26, 1998, at 18 (“[W]hen business began swinging its weight 
behind the idea of clamping down on the law students . . . the uglier side of the private sector 
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Governor Foster and the business groups, however, praised the 
decision. The Governor declared that “[t]he court is finally tightening 
up on that bunch of outlaws trying to shut everything down.”245 LABI 
called the court’s ruling “a step in the right direction,” while the 
Chamber praised the denial of legal representation to community 
organizations that have opposed Chamber-sponsored projects.246 
The resolution accompanying the court’s rule offered no 
justification or explanation, other than three concurring justices 
arguing that the court had not gone far enough and that clinics should 
be prohibited from representing all community organizations.247 
When public outcry over the restrictions ensued, the court quickly 
attempted to justify its actions. The court claimed that it was simply 
seeking to clarify its intent behind a 1988 amendment that allowed 
law students to represent community organizations.248 The court 
contended that representation of a local affiliate of a national 
organization was never contemplated as a prospective organization 
that might benefit from clinic representation.249 The court’s attempted 
justification was belied by the court’s subsequent admission that it 
was unable to locate the 1988 request from the deans of Loyola and 
Tulane law schools that led to the referenced amendment.250 In fact, 
the deans’ 1988 request clearly showed their intent to allow student 
 
began to emerge.”); Gill, supra note 195; A Loss for Law Clinics, T IMES-PICAYUNE (New 
Orleans, La.), June 29, 1998, at B6. 
 245. Law Clinics Say Rules Hurt Poor, supra  note 241 (quoting Governor Foster); see also 
Gov. M.J. “Mike” Foster, Jr., Gov. Mike Foster on Law Clinic, ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.), 
June 30, 1998, at 6B (letter to editor) (defending the attack on the Tulane Clinic and supporting 
the court’s new restrictions). 
 246. Press Release, Louisiana Association of Business & Industries, LABI Responds to 
Supreme Court Ruling on Law Clinics (June 18, 1998) (on file with author). 
 247. Resolution Amending Rule XX (La. June 17, 1998) (Marcus, Victory, and Traylor, 
JJ., concurring). 
 248. Collins, supra note 239; Press Release, Chief Justice Pascal F. Calogero, Jr., Press 
Release of Louisiana Supreme Court (June 23, 1998) (on file with author).  
 249. Collins, supra  note 239. 
 250. See Jenkins, supra  note 216 (reflecting that in a private meeting with four community 
groups, Chief Justice Calogero stated the court did not at the time have on file the 1988 request 
from the Tulane and Loyola law schools to add language making it clear that community 
organizations could be represented by the clinics); see also Barry Kohl, Notes of Meeting with 
Justices Catherine Kimball and Harry Lemmon at State Supreme Court, New Orleans, La. 
(Sept. 25, 1998) (on file with author) (reflecting that in a private meeting with six community 
groups, Justice Lemmon stated that the 1988 letter from Tulane and Loyola law schools seeking 
an expansion of the rule to cover community groups did not exist). 
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attorneys to represent any community organization that lacked funds 
to hire an attorney: 
The Clinics would like to represent community organizations 
which cannot afford to retain private counsel. Examples of 
such groups include public housing tenant organizations or 
certain environmental or consumer organizations who consist 
of members who are primarily indigent or who have no funds 
available to hire an attorney.251 
One month after the deans’ request was submitted in 1988, the court 
adopted verbatim the proposed language as an amendment to the law 
clinic student practice rule.252 
When pressed as to why, after more than ten years, the court now 
was narrowly construing the term “indigent” in the rules governing 
eligibility for law clinic representation, the court acted as if the 
Clinic’s organizational clients were a surprise.253 However, in 1993, 
in response to the DEQ secretary’s request for an investigation, 
Tulane Law School informed the court that “[t]he Clinic has 
represented over 90 different community organizations, including 
groups such as the League of Women Voters of Louisiana, the 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference, the Sierra Club, and the 
St. Bernard Sportsmen’s League.”254 Additionally, in the four years 
preceding the business groups’ complaints to the court, the Clinic 
appeared before the court on more than ten occasions on behalf of 
clearly-identified community groups.255 Many of these groups were 
 
 251. Letter from John Kramer, Dean, Tulane Law School, et al., to John A. Dixon, Jr., 
Chief Justice, Louisiana Supreme Court (Oct. 21, 1988) (emphasis added) (on file with author). 
 252. Order on Rule XX (La. Nov. 21, 1988) (on file with author) (“Acting upon the 
suggestion of the Deans of the Loyola and Tulane Law School,” section 3 of Rule XX is 
amended to add the phrase “or community organization” to list of eligible clients). 
 253. See Schleifstein, supra  note 93 (relating Chief Justice Calogero’s defense of the 
court’s ten-year acquiescence to the Clinic’s practices on grounds that nobody complained until 
now). 
 254. Letter from John R. Kramer, Dean, Tulane Law School, to Kim Sport, c/o Pascal F. 
Calogero, Jr., Chief Justice, Louisiana Supreme Court (Oct. 28, 1993) (on file with author). 
 255. See, e.g., Calcasieu League for Envtl. Action Now v. Thompson, 664 So. 2d 459 (La. 
1995); In re Browning-Ferris Indus. Petit Bois Landfill, 663 So. 2d 742 (La. 1995); Mouton v. 
Dep’t of Wildlife and Fisheries, 663 So. 2d 710 (La. 1995); Secure Env’t for Everyone v. 
Midboe, 651 So. 2d 290 (La. 1995); Alliance for Affordable Energy, Inc. v. La. Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n, 650 So. 2d 247 (La. 1995); Mouton v. Dep’t of Wildlife and Fisheries, 649 So. 2d 
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obviously ineligible for clinic assistance under a definition of 
indigency that required at least half of the organization’s members to 
have incomes below the federal poverty level.256 
After the press criticized the new restrictions, the court asserted 
that the strict income limitations on the representation of individuals 
assures that law students will represent the people most in need of 
free legal services.257 However, during the nine-month investigation, 
the court’s investigators never asked if a clinic had ever turned away 
an “indigent” client, under the federal poverty guidelines, in favor of 
a client who could afford to pay an attorney. In fact, the clinics never 
did.258 Moreover, none of the business groups’ complaint letters or 
 
396 (La. 1995); In re Am. Waste and Pollution Control Co., 642 So. 2d 1258 (La. 1994); 
Calcasieu League for Envtl. Action Now v. Thompson, 642 So. 2d 863 (La. 1994); In re 
Campbell Wells Corp., 635 So. 2d 1105 (La. 1994); In re Indus. Pipe, Inc., 629 So. 2d 398 (La. 
1993); In re Recovery I, Inc., 629 So. 2d 383 (La. 1993). 
 256. In Am. Waste and Pollution Control Co ., the court listed community organizations 
appearing in the case. 642 So. 2d at 1261 n.2. The Tulane Clinic represented fourteen of these 
organizations, including the League of Women Voters of Louisiana, the Orleans Audubon 
Society, and the Sierra Club-Delta Chapter. Id. 
 257. See Collins, supra note 239; Kohl, supra  note 250 (quoting Justice Kimball as 
explaining: “Schools stated that they had more clients than they could serve. In some rare 
occasions some non-indigents were represented. By restricting the representation 
(organizations, etc.), indigent individuals could be fully represented because the clinics would 
not be overloaded.”). 
 258. See Letter from John Makdisi, Dean, Loyola Law School, and Edward F. Sherman, 
Dean, Tulane Law School, to Timothy F. Averill, Deputy Judicial Administrator—General 
Counsel, Louisiana Supreme Court (Dec. 31, 1997) (on file with author) (“The clients of all our 
clinics are either indigent individuals or community organizations that could not otherwise 
afford legal representation in the matter.”); Letter from Edward F. Sherman, Dean, Tulane Law 
School, to Pascal F. Calogero, Jr., Chief Justice, Louisiana Supreme Court (Apr. 14, 1998) (on 
file with author) (“Our clinics only represent clients who cannot afford counsel, and a further 
restriction to in forma pauperis status is unnecessary and unduly limiting.”).  
As professor Peter Joy observed: 
If there had been some factual basis demonstrating a need for such an amendment to 
the student practice rule [to redistribute clinic resources to assisting only the poorest of 
the poor], and if the Louisiana Supreme Court had not been solicited to change the rule 
by those seeking to impede the work of the TELC, then such a position would be more 
reasonable. Given the dearth of free or affordable legal services, not only for the 
poorest of the poor but for those not quite so poor, and the lack of evidence that clinics 
were preferring potential clients with the ability to retain private counsel over those 
who could not, it is difficult to see how the amendments to the student practice rule are 
advancing any interests except those of the business groups and politicians who have 
been upset with the work of the TELC.  
Peter A. Joy, Political Interference with Clinical Legal Education: Denying Access to Justice, 
74 T UL. L. REV. 235, 270-71 (1999). 
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subsequent briefs expressed concern that the clinics were 
misdirecting resources that could otherwise be used to provide free 
legal assistance to the most needy. In fact, the business groups were 
seeking just the opposite—to expand the availability of law clinic 
assistance to for-profit businesses in Louisiana.259 
During his reelection campaign, Chief Justice Calogero was 
repeatedly forced to defend the court’s restrictions. Early in the 
campaign, the Chief Justice labeled criticism of the court as 
“hysterical and unfair,”260 perhaps because he claimed that the new 
restrictions would not have much effect on the clinics and their 
clients.261 A few weeks later, he acknowledged that the court’s ruling 
could be “debilitating”262 and that even a family of four with an 
income of $24,000, now barred from Clinic representation, could not 
afford to pay an attorney to handle significant legal problems.263 The 
Chief Justice also conceded that the court found no evidence that any 
of the community organizations previously represented by the Clinic 
could have afforded to hire an attorney to handle their case, nor could 
he identify a single community organization in Louisiana that could 
qualify under the new indigency definition.264 
Candidly, the Chief Justice admitted that politics had played a role 
in the rule change and that he sympathized with business 
complaints.265 This sympathy was reflected in remarks by the Chief 
 
 259. Proposal to Amend and Enforce Rule XX, supra  note 163 (“[T]he educational 
experience of the Clinic would be greatly enhanced if balanced representation of business and 
environmental interests were required under Rule XX.”). 
 260. See Susan Finch, Supreme Court Contest Costly, T IMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, 
La.), Sept. 4, 1998, at B1 (quoting remarks of Chief Justice Calogero during a campaign 
appearance). 
 261. See Jenkins, supra  note 216 (reflecting comments by Chief Justice Calogero in a 
private meeting: “He felt that the Law Clinics were over reacting: Claimed to have asked both 
Tulane and Loyola and they both indicated that a majority of their present clients were indigent. 
The justices therefore did not expect this rule change to have much of an effect on the clinics.”). 
 262. Anand Vaishnav, High Court Hopefuls Trade Shots, T IMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, 
La.), Sept. 22, 1998, at A2 (quoting Chief Justice Calogero during a campaign appearance). 
 263. Mark Schleifstein, Director of Tulane Law Clinic Resigning, T IMES-PICAYUNE (New 
Orleans, La.), Feb. 26, 1999, at A10 (reporting the remarks of the chief justice in an earlier 
interview); E-mail from Robert Kuehn to Oliver Houck, supra  note 172 (recounting statements 
by Chief Justice Calogero during October 1, 1998 campaign debate at Tulane University) . 
 264. E-mail from Robert Kuehn to Oliver Houck, supra  note 172. 
 265. Jenkins, supra  note 216 (reporting comments by Calogero in private meeting: “He did 
admit to politics on the court playing a role in the Rule change and was sympathetic to business 
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Justice during a private meeting with Loyola and Tulane University 
officials. During this meeting, the Chief Justice explained that the 
court did not want litigants with political agendas to “outgun” the 
other side, so, to even the playing field, the decision was made to 
restrict the activities of the Clinic.266 The Chief Justice explained that, 
while it was not the job of the court to intervene in a fight between 
two parties, it was appropriate for the court to take steps to restrict the 
ability of one side to bring a suit.267 An account of a meeting shortly 
after the Chief Justice learned that LABI decided to support his 
opponent in his upcoming reelection bid further demonstrated his 
desire to gain the business groups’ political approval. In the context 
of discussing Rule XX, the Chief Justice reportedly remarked that, 
after he supported LABI and what they wanted, it was unfair for the 
business groups to support his opponent without first contacting 
him.268 
The Chief Justice further justified the restrictions in remarking 
publicly that “widespread advocacy campaigns by professors and 
students are beyond the legal parameters of helping indigent 
people.”269 Justice Kimball similarly relied on the alleged “agenda” 
of the Clinic professors in seeking to justify the new restrictions.270 
 
complaints, although he stated that the Governor had not contacted him.”). 
 266. Telephone Interview with Luz Molina, Loyola Law School (Dec. 7, 1998) (recounting 
statements made by Chief Justice Calogero during a meeting earlier that day). The Chief 
Justice’s sympathy to the business groups is also evidenced by a report revealing that Calogero 
voted the “pro-business” position in environmental cases 80% of the time. See Joe Gyan, Jr., 
Calogero Publicizes ’96 Report, ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.), Sept. 24, 1998, at 3B 
(reporting results of a 1996 study of the voting patterns of Louisiana Supreme Court justices). 
Calogero’s pro-business score on environmental cases was the highest, by far, of his scores on 
seven economic issues and over twice his overall pro-business score of 33%. Id. 
 267. Molina, supra  note 266. 
 268. Interview with John Kramer, Former Dean, Tulane Law School (Oct. 21, 1999) (on 
file with author) (stating that Calogero made the remarks to him during a private meeting on 
September 3, 1998). 
 269. Varney, supra note 3. 
 270. See Kohl, supra  note 250 (quoting Justice Kimball as commenting: “Shintech gave 
rise to reviewing Rule XX. Complaints by business groups were that the clinic was following 
an agenda of the director of the clinic (Kuehn). Kai Midboe had also asked for court to look into 
clinics.”); see also  Gov. M.J. “Mike” Foster, Jr., Governor Weighs in on Law Clinic Rules,  
T IMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), June 26, 1998, at B10 (letter to editor) (alleging that the 
Clinic’s actions in the Shintech matter “seem to be driven by the radical political agenda of its 
professors”). But see R. Paul Tuttle, Governor’s Letter Dubbed Insult, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New 
Orleans, La.), July 5, 1998, at B6 (letter to editor) (reflecting that a former Tulane Clinic 
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However, during the court’s review of the clinics, the law schools 
asserted that such claims were unsubstantiated and false.271 Despite 
repeated requests for evidence supporting their allegations, neither 
the business groups nor Governor Foster produced any evidence to 
support allegations of manipulative law professors with anti-
development agendas.272 
Finally, the court justified its prohibition on contacting 
prospective clients by assuming, contrary to the language in the 
amended rule, that the new restriction was not regulating the 
activities of the law schools or its supervising attorneys, but rather 
only the activities of law clinic students.273 The inclusion of this 
restriction, which exists in no other state’s rules of professional 
conduct or law student practice rules, was not the result of a 
complaint from any court or any prospective or past Clinic client that 
was solicited in an uninvited or offensive manner.274 Instead, the 
restriction resulted from the business groups’ and Governor Foster’s 
repeated and unsupported allegations that the Clinic engaged in some 
form of improper solicitation of clients.275 
Two weeks after issuing the new rules and after the deans of the 
 
student took offense to Governor’s claim that law students are manipulated by “radical law 
professors”). 
 271. Letter from Robert R. Kuehn to Timothy F. Averill, supra note 162 (challenging 
LABI’s claim that the Clinic carries out its own philosophies, rather than the objectives of the 
client, and calling such claims unsubstantiated, false and defamatory). 
 272. Letter from Robert R. Kuehn, Tulane Environmental Law Clinic, to Murphy J. “Mike” 
Foster, Jr., Governor, State of Louisiana (July 2, 1998) (on file with author) (noting Governor 
Foster’s allegation that Tulane Clinic professors were advancing a radical political agenda and 
manipulating students, citizens and community groups and demanding evidence that supports 
such allegations); Letter from M.J. “Mike” Foster, Jr., Governor, State of Louisiana, to 
Professor Robert R. Kuehn, Director, Tulane Environmental Law Clinic (July 6, 1998) (on file 
with author) (responding to a request for evidence of agendas by stating, “They reflected 
opinions only and were not an attempt to recite ‘facts.’ As you can tell, from time to time, I get 
a little passionate about my beliefs.”). 
 273. See Collins, supra  note 239. 
 274. Joy, supra  note 258, at 260 (noting lack of record before the Louisiana Supreme Court 
of any clinic client complaining about any alleged solicitation). 
 275. See, e.g., Supplemental Comments on Proposed Amendments to Law Student Practice 
Rule, attachment to Letter from Daniel L. Juneau, Louisiana Association of Business and 
Industry, et al., to Pascal F. Calogero, Jr., Chief Justice, Louisiana Supreme Court (Mar. 12, 
1998) (on file with author) (“The TELC solicitation creates litigation where none would have or 
should have existed.”); Proposal to Amend and Enforce Rule XX, supra  note 163 (“[T]he 
Clinic engages in activities bordering on solicitation of clients.”). 
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law schools and a local editorial page writer pointed out the 
unconstitutionality under In re Primus276 and NAACP v. Button277 of 
the prohibition on initiating client contact, the court felt compelled to 
suspend the client-contact provision.278 At the same time, the court 
changed the indigency criteria for representation of community 
organizations by lowering the percentage of members that must meet 
the Legal Services Corporation federal poverty level guidelines from 
75% to 51%.279 
The court was mistaken if it believed that these minor changes 
would quell the firestorm of protests over its new restrictions. 
Criticism from affected citizens and the media continued unabated.280 
In response to the protests, the newly-reelected Chief Justice 
promised to revisit the rules.281 However, in the meantime, the court 
 
 276. 436 U.S. 412, 431 (1978) (stating that outreach activities by lawyers to advise citizens 
of their civil rights, to advocate litigation, and to provide legal services “comes within the 
generous zone of First Amendment protection reserved for associational freedoms”). 
 277. 371 U.S. 415, 429-30 (1963) (holding that in the context of advocating for civil rights, 
litigation through “solicitation” is a form of political expression protected by the First 
Amendment). 
 278. Order on Rule XX, Part II (La. June 30, 1998) (on file with author) (suspending 
section 10 of the June 17, 1998 amendments “pending further orders of the Court”); see James 
Gill, High Court Target of Disgust, T IMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), June 28, 1998, at 
B11 (explaining how the court’s justification for forbidding law students from representing 
clients who were the subject of solicitation runs contrary to a 1978 U.S. Supreme Court 
opinion); Letter from John Makdisi and Edward Sherman to Pascal F. Calogero, supra note 241 
(including a seven-page memorandum outlining the reaons for a request for reconsideration and 
stay of ameandments). 
 279. Order on Rule XX, Part I (La. June 30, 1998) (on file with author). 
 280. See, e.g., Khara Coleman, Alexander Vows to Fight Changes in Law Clinic Rules, 
T IMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), July 4, 1998, at B3 (relating that state representative and 
civil rights leader Avery Alexander vows to fight the rules which he calls a “throw-back to Jim 
Crow days”); Christi Daugherty, Clinic Cut-Off: A Working Mom No Longer Can Rely on 
Tulane’s Assistance, GAMBIT WKLY. (New Orleans, La.), Sept. 8, 1998, at 15 (profiling former 
client of the clinic, a full-time working mother with income of approximately $1,200 per month 
complaining that the court’s new rules deny her clinic assistance); Clancy DuBos, On 
Reconsideration, GAMBIT WKLY. (New Orleans, La.), July 7, 1998, at 17 (calling the new rules 
“an abomination”); James Gill, High Court’s Way of Doing Things, T IMES-PICAYUNE (New 
Orleans, La.), July 5, 1998 (“The rules will still achieve the desired effect, and block access to 
the courts for people with no other recourse when industry poses threats to their health and 
welfare.”); Law Clinic Rule is Still Too Strict, ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.), July 5, 1998, at 
B14; Kay Mattelka, League Calls Court Ruling “Chilling,” T IMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, 
La.), July 2, 1998, at B6 (letter to editor) (calling on court to reconsider its new restrictions). 
 281. See Joe Gyan, Jr., Cusimano Quits High Court Race, ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.), 
Oct. 10, 1998, at A1.  
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refused the requests of the law school deans, Louisiana State Bar 
Association, and Louisiana Attorney General to stay the effect of the 
new rules. 
4. The Revised March 1999 Restrictions 
On March 22, 1999, nine months after the original revisions to 
Rule XX and six months after the Chief Justice promised to revisit 
the issue, the court issued another set of amendments to the Louisiana 
law clinic student practice rule. The March, 1999 amendments, 
effective April 15, 1999: 
1) drop the prohibition on representing indigent community 
organizations affiliated with national organizations; 
2) raise the income limit for representation of any individual 
or family to 200% of the federal poverty guidelines; and 
3) prohibit any student from appearing in a representative 
capacity if any clinical program supervising lawyer, staff 
person, or student practitioner initiated contact for the purpose 
of representing the contacted indigent person or community 
organization.282 
In comments accompanying the latest amendments, the court 
again sought to explain its intent behind the 1988 amendments. The 
court claimed it meant only to allow for the representation of 
organizations composed of indigent persons.283 However, the court 
again overlooked the Tulane and Loyola law school deans’ 1988 
request to represent environmental organizations “who have no funds 
available to hire an attorney.”284 Despite repeated requests to review 
the record on which the new restructions were based,285 the court 
 
 282. LA. SUP.  CT. R. XX (Limited Participation of Law Students in Trial Work) (as 
amended Mar. 22, 1999). 
 283. Resolution Amending Rule XX, at 1 (La. Mar. 22, 1999) (Calogero, C.J.), reprinted in 
74 T UL. L. REV. 285, 287 (1999). 
 284. Letter from John Kramer to John A. Dixon, supra  note 251. 
 285. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas W. Milliner, Instructor, and Lisa W. Jordan, Acting 
Director, Tulane Environmental Law Clinic, to Pascal F. Calogero, Jr., Chief Justice, Louisiana 
Supreme Court (Oct. 19, 1999) (on file with author) (requesting access to public records 
relating to the court’s investigation of the Tulane Clinic); Letter from Michael H. Rubin, 
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refused to release the results of its nine-month investigation of the 
Clinic. The court’s librarian reportedly revealed that the court’s 
survey of other law clinics around the country found that the 
practices of other clinics were consistent with those of the Tulane 
Clinic—they represented community organizations including national 
non-profit groups.286 
The business groups and Governor Foster managed to reinstate the 
ban on contacting individuals or community groups, even though the 
Chief Justice previously informed community organizations that the 
court would not likely reinstate the provision.287 The court defended 
the newly-worded ban as necessary to ensure that law students are 
not encouraged to engage in client solicitation and contended that the 
ban’s effect is limited because law clinic professors, but not students, 
can still represent these solicited clients.288 The court never explained 
how a student would be determentally effected if engaged in a 
practice clearly allowed outside of the clinic context under both the 
Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct and U.S. Supreme Court 
precedent.289 The court also failed to explain why its purported 
 
Counsel for Louisiana Supreme Court, to Thomas W. Milliner, Instructor, and Lisa W. Jordan, 
Acting Director, Tulane Environmental Law Clinic (Oct. 27, 1999) (on file with author) 
(denying request to review internal court documents); Letter from Marylee Orr, Louisiana 
Environmental Action Network, et al., to Pascal F. Calogero, Jr., Chief Justice, Louisiana 
Supreme Court (Nov. 10, 1998) (on file with author) (requesting all information collected by 
court staff during its investigation); Letter from Edward F. Sherman to Pascal F. Calogero, Jr., 
supra note 241 (noting that law schools have been denied access to results of investigation and 
other documents and requesting materials be made public). 
 286. See Joy, supra  note 258, at 249. 
 287. See Jenkins, supra  note 216 (reflecting notes of private meeting with Calogero: 
“[Chief Justice Calogero] thought it was not likely the court would reopen [the prohibition on 
students representing people who had been solicited or lobbied by the clinic].”). After the 
solicitation ban was suspended on June 30, 1998, Governor Foster and business groups 
expressed their disagreement with the suspension and continued to argue that the prohibition 
was needed. See, e.g., Joe Gyan Jr., Law Clinics Ruling Softened, ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, 
La.), July 2, 1998, at A1 (reporting that Governor Foster’s press secretary stated the Governor is 
disappointed with the suspension); Letter from Daniel L. Juneau, President, Louisiana 
Association of Business and Industry, to Pascal F. Calogero, Jr., Chief Justice, Louisiana 
Supreme Court (Sept. 18, 1998) (on file with author) (arguing that the solicitation ban is 
constitutional and should be reinstated). 
 288. Resolution Amending Rule XX, supra  note 283, at 2. 
 289. See LA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.2(a) (1999) (“[L]awyer shall not solicit 
professional employment . . . from a prospective client with whom the lawyer has no family or 
prior professional relationship when a significant motive for the lawyer’s doing so is the 
lawyer’s pecuniary gain.”); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 
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concern about students learning bad solicitation habits could not be 
addressed by prohibiting students from initiating contact with 
prospective clients while allowing this practice by the supervising 
attorney and other clinic staff. Nor did the court say why its ban 
should not be limited to contact with persons with whom the Clinic 
lawyer or staff has no prior professional relationship, a limitation 
consistent with the scope of the for-profit, anti-solicitation provision 
in the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct.290 
Justice Johnson’s dissent to the newest amendments noted that the 
complaints were sent to the court while the business entities and the 
Clinic were embroiled in the Shintech controversy.291 Justice Johnson 
argued that the court “should not curtail a program that teaches 
advocacy while giving previously unrepresented groups and 
individuals access to the judicial system in order to satisfy critics who 
are discomforted by successful advocacy.”292 The dissent observed 
that, as the Chief Justice previously admitted, “[a]n exhaustive 
review of all Louisiana law clinics failed to uncover any violations of 
the Law Student Practice Rule,” and that no complaint of unethical 
conduct or practices was received from any court or agency before 
which students practiced.293 Justice Johnson rejected the majority’s 
concern that, without the very strictest limits on the income of the 
clinic’s clients, law clinic resources would be compromised by those 
who have the ability to pay for legal services. She reasoned: “Those 
with the ability to do so, hire the best legal talent available. Those 
without the ability to pay for private counsel use law clinics.”294 
Apparently, the court believed that revising the income 
restrictions slightly for individual clients fashioned a compromise 
that would put the issue behind them.295 However, again, the court 
 
415 (1963); see also  Resolution Amending Rule XX, at 2 (La. Mar. 22, 1999) (Johnson, J., 
dissenting), reprinted in 74 T UL. L. REV. 285, 298 (1999) (“Public interest lawyers may 
provide not only information about substantive rights and remedies, but also about their 
availability to provide legal services.”). 
 290. LA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.2(a) (1999). 
 291. Resolution Amending Rule XX, at 1 (Johnson, J., dissenting) . 
 292. Id. 
 293. Id. 
 294. Id. at 2. 
 295. See Gill, supra note 226 (reporting that court communication director Kim Sport gave 
the impression to newspaper staff during a briefing that the court had fashioned a compromise 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 33 Kuehn.doc  3/22/01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
94 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 4:33 
 
 
did not understand, or did not care to understand, that as long as 
community group eligibility is dependent on a demonstration of the 
indigency of the organization’s individual members, group 
representation by the clinics is effectively eliminated. The presidents 
of Loyola and Tulane Universities explained that by equating the 
ability of an organization to afford an attorney with the income of its 
members the court had “severely limit[ed] the legal avenues open to 
worthy organizations who perhaps cannot otherwise afford legal 
services.”296 The deans of Loyola and Tulane law schools noted: “In 
all other states, a clinic can represent an organization so long as it 
determines that the organization itself cannot afford to hire an 
attorney.”297 
When the court did not respond to requests to revisit Rule XX and 
make the limitations less hostile to community groups, a coalition of 
twenty-one community organizations, law professors, law students, 
student organizations, and a law clinic donor filed suit in federal 
court challenging the restrictions.298 The suit alleged that the supreme 
court’s restrictions on community group representation constituted 
viewpoint discrimination, prohibited by the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments, and interfered with the academic freedom of clinic 
professors and students.299 Furthermore, the suit contended that the 
solicitation ban interferes with the rights of clinic professors, clinic 
students and their clients to free speech and free association.300 
The Louisiana Supreme Court filed a motion to dismiss the 
 
that would put an end to the controversy). 
 296. Scott S. Cowen & Bernard P. Knoth, Revised Rule Concerns University Presidents, 
T IMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), Apr. 8, 1999, at B6 (letter to the editor); see also Rule 
XX: New, Not Improved, T IMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), Apr. 11, 1999, at B6 (arguing 
that the court has put such a heavy burden on organizations by forcing them to keep detailed 
dossiers on “how much money [their members] make, how many children they have, and 
whether they have been divorced or made other changes that affect their finances,” that joining 
the group itself would be intimidating). 
 297. Edward F. Sherman & John Makdisi, Rule on Law Clinics Still Too Restrictive, 
T IMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), Apr. 9, 1999, at B6 (letter to editor). 
 298. See Marcia Coyle, “We Can’t Even Give It Away,” NAT’L L.J., May 3, 1999, at A4; 
Mark Schleifstein, Groups File Suit to  Challenge Limits on Law Clinics, T IMES-PICAYUNE 
(New Orleans, La.), Apr. 17, 1999, at A2. 
 299. Complaint, S. Christian Leadership Conference v. Supreme Court of La., No. 99-1205 
(E.D. La. filed Apr. 16, 1999). 
 300. Id. 
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complaint, and on July 27, 1999, the district court granted the motion 
and dismissed the lawsuit.301 On the issue of viewpoint 
discrimination, the district court held that, because there is no right to 
civil representation, rules that may restrict the availability of civil 
representation cannot give rise to constitutional claims.302 The district 
court refused to address, however, the plaintiffs’ contention that 
regardless of whether or not a right is involved, a state may not 
impose penalties on or withhold benefits from individuals simply 
because they choose to exercise First Amendment freedoms.303 
The district court also found that the U.S. Supreme Court cases of 
In re Primus and NAACP v. Button did not apply because the law 
clinic rules regulate only non-lawyer students.304 In the district 
court’s view, the supervising attorneys are free to do what they like, 
provided that they are not acting in a supervisory capacity over law 
clinic students.305 The district court also held that the Louisiana 
Supreme Court’s purported concern about the resulting harm to law 
students exposed to solicitation was rationally related to a legitimate 
state interest and a proper matter for the supreme court to address.306 
However, the district court did not consider the lack of any record of 
a complaint regarding solicitation or consider that this purported 
concern could have been addressed more narrowly.307 
Finally, the court rejected academic freedom arguments by 
claiming that other academic freedom cases involved situations in 
which the government was requiring schools to affirmatively act.308 
Here, the court argued, the rules merely limited what professors and 
students may do outside the classroom.309 
In a candid acknowledgment of the political motivation behind the 
new restrictions, the district court observed: “in Louisiana, where 
 
 301. S. Christian Leadership Conference v. Supreme Court of La., 61 F. Supp. 2d 499 
(E.D. La. 1999). 
 302. Id. at 507. 
 303. See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss at 5-8, S. 
Christian Leadership Conference v. Supreme Court of La. (E.D. La. 1999) (No. 99-1205). 
 304. S. Christian Leadership Conference, 61 F. Supp. 2d at 507. 
 305. Id. at 509-10. 
 306. Id. at 512-13. 
 307. See supra  note 289-290 and accompanying text. 
 308. S. Christian Leadership Conference, 61 F. Supp. 2d at 509-10. 
 309. Id. 
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state judges are elected, one cannot claim complete surprise when 
political pressure somehow manifests itself within the judiciary.”310 
The district court then advised the plaintiffs, composed in large part 
of minority organizations lacking political and economic power, that 
“[t]heir energies would more properly be focused on the political 
rather than the legal system.”311 Ironically, the district court did not 
recognize that the U.S. Supreme Court made the opposite finding 
over twenty-five years earlier. In stricking down restrictions on the 
ability of the NAACP to offer free legal assistance on challenges to 
segregation practices in the South the Court observed: “Groups which 
find themselves unable to achieve their objectives through the ballot 
frequently turn to the courts . . .. And under the conditions of modern 
government, litigation may well be the sole practicable avenue open 
to a minority to petition for redress of grievances.”312 
On August 17, 1999 the plaintiffs filed an appeal of the district 
court’s decision with the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.313 
III. THE HARM FROM DENYING ACCESS TO LEGAL REPRESENTATION 
Governor Foster, business interests, and the Louisiana Supreme 
Court achieved their desired result—in the first eighteen months after 
the Rule XX amendments went into effect, the Clinic filed only one 
new state court case or agency comment.314 In contrast, just prior to 
the new restrictions, the Clinic accepted over thirty new cases and 
provided over 25,000 hours of free legal assistance annually to 
individuals and community organizations in Louisiana.315 In 
environmental law, aside from one national public interest 
 
 310. Id. at 513. 
 311. Id. 
 312. Button, 371 U.S. at 429-30. 
 313. Notice of Appeal, S. Christian Leadership Conference v. Supreme Court of La. (E.D. 
La. 1999) (No. 99-1205). 
 314. Id.  
 315. Eyewitness News: Special Report (WWL-TV broadcast, Feb. 15, 2000) (on file with 
author) (contrasting the thirty-one cases filed in 1997, the year proceeding the Rule XX 
restrictions, to the one new state case filed since the rules went into effect on July 1, 1998); 
Letter from Robert R. Kuehn, Director, Tulane Environmental Law Clinic, to Monte Mollere, 
Access to Justice Committee, Louisiana Bar Association (Nov. 17, 1998) (on file with author) 
(explaining that from January 1989 to December 1996, the Tulane Clinic represented over 165 
different Louisiana community organizations in over 205 cases). 
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environmental law office and the pro bono services of a few members 
of the private bar, the Clinic is the only source of free environmental 
law representation in Louisiana.316 Therefore, what some dissenting 
members of the court sought all along—the elimination of all 
representation of community organizations—effectively is a 
reality.317 
Community group activism has always been the paramount means 
of advancing environmental interests in Louisiana; well over 95% of 
the Clinic’s clients were, before the new restrictions, such groups.318 
The U.S. Supreme Court recognized that “[e]ffective advocacy of 
both public and private points of view, particularly controversial 
ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association.”319 The Court 
further recognized that for minority groups, “association for litigation 
may be the most effective form of political association.”320 In the 
 
 316. E-mail from Lisa Jordan, Acting Director, Tulane Environmental Law Clinic, to 
Robert Kuehn, Former Director, Tulane Environmental Law Clinic (Feb. 23, 2000) (on file with 
author). 
 317. Resolution Amending Rule XX, at 2 (La. June 17, 1998) (Marcus, Victory, and 
Traylor, JJ., concurring). 
We vote for the changes to Rule XX made by the Court, although we are concerned 
that the Court has not gone far enough to insure that organizations represented by the 
student law clinics are truly indigent. Thus, we favored the elimination of 
representation of organizations altogether, leaving only indigent individuals as clients 
for the clinics, as our rule originally intended.  
Id.  
 One editorial writer speculated that Chief Justice Calogero probably thought he was 
helping the clinics by putting together a majority in favor of allowing clinics to continue 
representing community groups but under much stricter rules. Clancy DuBos, Not Over Yet, 
GAMBIT WKLY. (New Orleans, La.), Mar. 30, 1999. However, the director of the Tulane 
Environmental Law Clinic noted that any supposed compromise by Chief Justice Calogero to 
help the clinics was useless, because the supreme court’s intrusive and burdensome requirement 
for community organizations to prove the indigent status of its individual members effectively 
denies those organizations access to the law clinics and the courts. Id. 
 318. E-mail from Lisa Jordan to Robert Kuehn, supra  note 316. 
 319. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (finding state’s effort to compel 
disclosure of the names and addresses of the NAACP’s members unconstitutional). Alexis De 
Tocqueville observed that in a democracy it is almost impossible for citizens to achieve 
anything by themselves and they must form associations to help one another. II ALEXIS DE 
T OCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 107 (Phillips Bradley ed., Alfred A. Knopf trans., 
1945) (1840). 
 320. Button, 371 U.S. at 431. The deans of Loyola and Tulane Law Schools argued: 
“Organizational litigation has been the most important vehicle for protection of individual 
rights in the last 40 years. A single low-income individual generally lacks the finances and 
ability to withstand pressure and retaliation that is involved in litigation that seeks to protect or 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 33 Kuehn.doc  3/22/01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
98 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 4:33 
 
 
environmental justice movement, group activism plays an especially 
important role.321 
Potential community organization clients very rarely meet the 
court’s new requirement of at least 51% impoverished members322 
and fear that asking their members to share private financial 
information will discourage membership and harm the 
organization.323 The groups, who frequently have no paid staff, also 
face substantial administrative burdens in trying to obtain and update 
financial information from each individual member.324 Some 
community organizations may not operate with identifiable 
memberships and now have no means of gaining eligibility.  
Potential individual clients, even if they are eligible under the 
court’s new poverty restrictions, cannot afford the filing fees and 
other expenses of litigation.325 As one public interest environmental 
 
establish rights for group members.” Sherman & Makdisi, supra note 297. 
 321. Luke W. Cole, Empowerment as the Key to Environmental Protection: The Need for 
Environmental Poverty Law, 19 ECOLOGY L. Q. 619, 663-67 (1992). See generally PEOPLE OF 
COLOR ENVIRONMENTAL GROUPS DIRECTORY (Robert D. Bullard ed., 1994); Dorceta E. 
Taylor, The Rise of the Environmental Justice Paradigm , 43 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 508 
(2000). 
 322. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae, League of Women Voters of Louisiana in Support 
of Reversal at 2, S. Christian Leadership Conference v. Supreme Court of La. (5th Cir. 2000) 
(No. 99-30895) (“The League cannot ask its membership to provide the information required by 
Rule XX, as that request would intrude upon their privacy and drive many valuable members 
from the League.”); Rule XX: New, Not Improved, supra  note 296 (arguing that the heavy 
burden on organizations to keep detailed dossiers on their members would intimidate persons 
from joining the group).  
 323. See Brief of Amicus Curaie, League of Women Voters of Louisiana, supra note 322, 
at 2. 
 324. The total annual budget of the statewide Sierra Club chapter in Louisiana is only 
$17,500 a year; the group receives no financial assistance on litigation from the national 
organization. Barbara Vincent, Sierra Club Chapter Critical of Law Clinic Ruling, T IMES-
PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), July 1, 1998, at B6 (letter to editor by club president). The total 
annual budget of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Louisiana Chapter, is less than 
$2,000. E-mail from Harold Green, Environmental Chair, Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference, Louisiana Chapter, to Robert Kuehn, Former Director, Tulane Environmental Law 
Clinic (Oct. 8, 1999) (on file with author). Were these affiliates of national organizations treated 
under Rule XX as “indigent persons,” rather than as “community organizations,” their annual 
incomes would qualify them for representation by law clinic students.  
 325. Brief of Amicus Curiae James M. Klebba & Edward F. Sherman in support of 
Reversal at 9, S. Christian Leadership Conference v. Supreme Court of La. (5th Cir. 2000) (No. 
99-30895) (“To think that an individual indigent could advance the same causes as a group is 
unrealistic”); Brief of Amicus Curiae League of Women Voters of Louisiana, supra note 322 
(“Indeed, the League can barely afford even pro bono law school clinic representation, since 
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lawyer observed: “Individuals facing environmental problems have 
little chance of solving those problems alone.”326 
Individuals and community organizations are further discouraged 
because they now fear harassment from opposing attorneys. The law 
clinics warned that, by imposing financial disclosure requirements on 
individual group members, the court provided opposing attorneys 
with a weapon to delay clinic lawsuits, drive up the costs of clinic pro 
bono representation, and coerce clinic clients to abandon suits.327 
Louisiana defense lawyers encouraged this tactic by claiming that 
opposing counsel had an ethical obligation to police clinic client 
eligibility.328  
In response to public statements raising these concerns, the Chief 
Justice informed the Tulane Law School dean that if the financial 
eligibility of a clinic client were questioned, the court would review 
the complaint and make such inquiry as it deemed necessary.329 
Although the Chief Justice stated that the court may confidentially 
review any information produced or received by the clinic, the Chief 
Justice did not prohibit opposing parties from seeking such financial 
information from clinic clients.330 The Louisiana Supreme Court has 
not yet adopted this process for handling challenges to financial 
eligibility as a rule. 
In one of only a handful of cases brought by any Louisiana law 
clinic under the new indigency standards, an opposing attorney 
served discovery requests for information concerning the client’s 
income and inability to pay for legal services.331 The clinic objected 
to the discovery requests and filed a motion for protective order. 
Despite correspondence from the Louisiana Supreme Court stating 
 
even that ‘free’ service can often require the client organization to bear the substantial out-of-
pocket costs associated with legal advocacy-court costs, copying, and filing fees”). 
 326. Cole, supra  note 321, at 644-65. 
 327. See Letter from John Makdisi to Pascal F. Calogero, Jr., supra note 241; Letter from 
Dean Edward F. Sherman, Tulane Law School, to Pascal F. Calogero, Jr., Chief Justice, 
Louisiana Supreme Court (Dec. 8, 1998) (on file with author). 
 328. Crochet, supra  note 188. 
 329. Letter from Pascal F. Calogero, Jr., Chief Justice, to Dean Edward F. Sherman, Tulane 
Law School (Apr. 7, 1999) (on file with author). 
 330. Id. 
 331. See Plaintiff-Appellant’s Brief on Writ of Certiorari, Magsino v. Gridiron Constr., Inc. 
(La. 1999) (No. 99-CD-1930). 
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that such inquiries would not be allowed and the fact that the income 
of the client was never an issue in the case, the trial court denied the 
motion for protective order and granted opposing counsel’s motion to 
compel discovery.332 The clinic appealed the denial of the protective 
order to the Louisiana Supreme Court and asked the court to abide by 
its representation to the law clinics that financial information of 
clients would be protected.333 The court denied the appeal, allowing 
the invasive discovery to proceed.334 
The inability of clinics to represent organizational clients has also 
harmed student learning and runs contrary to the stated purpose of 
Rule XX—“to provide clinical instruction in trial work of varying 
kinds.”335 Without access to state court and agency proceedings, 
Clinic students loose valuable opportunities to gain courtroom 
experience. In addition, as the law schools argued: “Representing 
organizations presents distinctly different ethical and practical 
problems from representing individuals.”336 The law school deans 
added: “To the extent that the clinical students have less access to a 
diverse set of clients and legal and ethical issues, their education will 
suffer.”337 Environmental cases, in particular, are primarily pursued 
through community groups. Thus, the inability of law school clinics 
to represent those groups is a loss not only to the community groups 
and their members, but also to the students who would learn 
important skills by acting as student lawyers in the cases. 
The court attempted to discount the harm to the public by arguing 
that clinic professors, rather than students, could now represent the 
disenfranchised community groups, with students acting as the 
professor’s paralegals or law clerks.338 Ironically, the business groups 
argued for just the opposite—requiring students to be the primary 
spokespersons in all court and agency appearances and restricting the 
 
 332. Id.  
 333. Id.  
 334. Magsino v. Gridiron Constr., Inc., 747 So. 2d 34 (La. 1999). 
 335. LA. SUP. CT., R. XX, § 1 (Limited Participation of Law Students in Trial Work) (as 
amended March 22, 1999). 
 336. Letter from Dean John Makdisi to Pascal F. Calogero, Jr., supra note 241. 
 337. Amicus Brief of James M. Klebba and Edward F. Sherman, supra  note 325, at 7. 
 338. See Resolution Amending Rule XX, at 3 (La. Mar. 22, 1999) (Calogero, C.J.), 
reprinted in  74 T UL. L. REV. 285, 288-89 (1999). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol4/iss1/5
p 33 Kuehn.doc  3/22/01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2000]  Denying Access to Legal Representation 101 
 
 
law clinic professors to supervision only.339  
The deans of Loyola and Tulane law schools repeatedly explained 
that the types of hands-on learning through interviewing and 
counseling clients, negotiating with opposing parties, and litigating 
before courts and agencies occurs only when students assume the 
responsibility of the client’s lawyer, and not when students simply act 
as clerks or paralegals.340 Recognizing this crucial aspect of clinical 
education, the ABA recently amended its accreditation standards to 
state that every law school “shall offer live-client or other real-life 
practice experiences.”341 As the AALS argued to the court: “Clinics 
are essential to the education of the next generation of lawyers. 
Clinical education is more than a trial advocacy course or a clerkship 
at a law firm . . . Hence, law school clinics do not simply provide an 
alternative forum for skills instruction . . . .”342 
The AALS also argued that it was not realistic to suggest that law 
professors could handle the cases. Law schools will not support law 
faculty representing clients unless students are able to participate as 
student attorneys in the cases: “Law schools do not fund clinics so 
that law faculty can engage in litigation. Rather, law schools fund 
clinics because training students with real cases is an effective 
method to teach the theory and practice of law, as well as the values 
of the profession.”343 
Therefore, restricting law students to the role of law clerks or 
 
 339. See Letter from Daniel L. Juneau to Pascal F. Calogero, Jr., supra  note 161 
 340. See, e.g., Amicus Brief of James M. Klebba and Edward F. Sherman, supra note 325, 
at 3, 5. 
 341. SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, ABA, STANDARDS FOR 
APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS Standard 302(d) (1998). The ABA’s influential MacCrate Report 
identified fundamental lawyering skills that law students should learn and recommended that 
law schools teach these skills through clinical programs. SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND 
ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, ABA, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT—AN 
EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM (1992).  
 342. Submission of the Association of American Law Schools to the Supreme Court of the 
State of Louisiana Concerning the Review of the Supreme Court’s Student Practice Rule at 7-8, 
reprinted in 4 CLINICAL L. REV. 539, 544-45 (1998). 
 343. Brief for Amici Curiae, the Association of American Law Schools, the American 
Association of University Professors, and the Clinical Legal Education Association in Support 
of Reversal at 4, S. Christian Leadership Conference v. Supreme Court of La. (5th Cir. 2000) 
(No. 99-30895); see also id. at 12 (“Because clinics exist in law schools so that students can 
learn with real cases, faculty cannot represent clients unless the students are able to participate 
in the cases.”). 
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paralegals while law professors litigate cases is not the “clinical 
instruction in trial work” that Rule XX and other law clinic student 
practice rules advocate or that law schools would use their limited 
funds to finance. 
IV. DETERRING DENIALS OF ACCESS TO LEGAL REPRESENTATION 
One reaction to the extraordinary efforts in Louisiana to “de-
lawyer” community organizations and deny access to environmental 
justice is to attribute these events to Louisiana and its reputation for 
corrupt politics. However, politicians and attorneys outside of 
Louisiana likewise strive to prevent law clinics and law professors 
from providing free legal assistance. 
Legislators sought to curtail the activities of law school clinics 
beginning in the late 1960s with the attack on University of 
Mississippi law school faculty, who were providing free legal 
assistance in a school desegregation case, and continued thereafter 
with attacks in Iowa, Colorado, Idaho, and Tennessee.344 Elected 
officials have often singled out law professors and students providing 
free legal assistance on environmental matters. In a well-publicized 
1980s case, the environmental law clinic at the University of Oregon 
was attacked by legislators and timber interests when the clinic 
provided legal assistance to those attempting to protect the 
endangered spotted owl.345 In response to these attacks and a 
legislative proposal to withdraw funding from the University of 
Oregon School of Law, the Oregon clinic incorporated as a separate 
non-profit public interest law office and moved outside the law 
school.346 Though not as well-publicized, politicians and business 
interests attempted to curtail environmental pro bono activities at the 
University of West Virginia,347 the University of Wyoming,348 and 
 
 344. See Peter A. Joy & Charles D. Weisselberg, Access to Justice, Academic Freedom, 
and Political Interference: A Clinical Program Under Siege, 4 CLINICAL L. REV. 531, 532-33 
(1998); ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER & JAMES H. STARK , AALS SECTION ON CLINICAL LEGAL 
EDUCATION 1, 1-3 (1982). 
 345. Joy & Weisselberg, supra note 344, at 534. 
 346. Id. 
 347. Consol Talks to WVU Officials About Law Professor Handling Case Against It, U.P.I. 
(Oct. 15, 1984); West Virginia News in Brief, U.P.I. (June 10, 1987); W.Va. Newspaper 
Editorials,  U.P.I. (June 25, 1987) (reprinting editorial from the Charleston Gazette Newspaper).  
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the University of Pittsburgh349 by arguing that law professors should 
not be allowed to use university resources to support their pro bono 
environmental work. However, none of these public attacks in other 
states, that all involved publicly-funded law schools,350 were fueled 
by a governor, nor did the state’s supreme courts supply politicians 
and business interests with the restrictions on legal representation 
they sought. 
A. Ends, Means, and Will of the People Justifications 
If in hindsight the attack on the Tulane Clinic was predictable, 
given attacks on other law school clinics and the environmental and 
civil rights issues involved, the assault is still indefensible in a society 
that values public participation and access to the judicial system.  
When criticized for his attacks, Governor Foster defended his 
actions by arguing that the Clinic was interfering with his efforts to 
create jobs351 and that the Clinic was blocking the “will of the 
 
 348. See Kerry Drake & Chris Tollefson, Legislator Slams UW, CASPER STAR-TRIBUNE 
(Wyoming), Feb. 27, 1996, at A1; Kerry Drake, UW Clears Squillace of Wrongdoing, CASPER 
STAR-T RIBUNE (Wyoming), July 21, 1995, at A1; Legislators May Question University 
Funding, POWELL T RIBUNE (Wyoming), Oct. 17, 1995, at 7; Mark Lumpkin, Children Protest 
Law Professor Defending Anti-Logging Interests, LARAMIE DAILY BOOMERANG (Wyoming), 
July 19, 1994, at 1. 
 349. See Jim Buck, Pitt Law Prof Argues His Case, BRADFORD ERA (Bradford, Pa.), Apr. 
24, 1998, at 1; Jim Buck, Pitt Sets Guidelines for Law Professors,  BRADFORD ERA (Bradford, 
Pa.) Apr. 22, 1998, at 1; Casey Cobbs, University of Pittsburgh Re-Examines Faculty Work 
Policy, BRADFORD ERA (Bradford, Pa.), Feb. 28, 1996, at 3.  
 Similarly, pro bono consulting services by a Texas environmental law professor to a 
neighborhood group challenging a state air permit were curtailed by a rider in a Texas 
appropriations bill that prohibited any state employee from being retained or serving as an 
expert witness or consultant in litigation against the state. Letter from Frank F. Skillern, 
Professor, Texas Tech University School of Law, to Robert R. Kuehn, Director, Tulane 
University Law Clinic (Mar. 27, 1998) (on file with author). See also Hoover v. Morales, 164 
F.3d 221, 227 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding the appropriation riders unconstitutional). 
 350. See Joy & Weisselberg, supra  note 344, at 535, 536 (calling the attacks on the Tulane 
Clinic “unparalleled attacks on the academic freedom of students and professors at a private law 
school”).  
 351. Gyan, supra note 173; Elie, supra note 27. Governor Foster expressed his ends-
justify-means philosophy and his intolerance of opposing points of view in a private meeting 
with this author. After listening to the Governor express his views on lawyers, the environment, 
and economic development, I suggested that many people who cared as much as the Governor 
did about economic development believed that the best thing that could happen would be for 
Shintech to be defeated. I further explained that this was because the defeat might finally force 
industry to sit down with communities and develop a long-term, comprehensive land use plan 
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people.”352 Forces attacking professors at other law schools also 
sought to justify their attacks on the grounds that the professors’ pro 
bono activities cost jobs and wasted local tax revenues.353 Even if 
true, these arguments still do not justify denying access to legal 
representation to individuals and community groups who cannot 
afford to pay for legal services. 
The argument that denial of access to legal representation is 
warranted because such access interferes with job creation simply 
argues that job-creation ends justify anti-access-to-legal-
representation means. One serious question, at the onset, is how any 
politician could profess to care about improving education or 
economic development while simultaneously seeking to punish 
 
for the chemical corridor. Governor Foster would have none of this conciliatory talk and stated: 
“If Shintech is defeated, I’ll just know that I’ll have to do a bet ter job next time of getting 
people out of the way.” Meeting with Murphy J. “Mike” Foster, Jr., supra note 2.  
 352. Sherry Sapp, Foster Plans Romeville Follow-Up, ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.), 
Aug. 5, 1997, at 1B; Shuler, supra note 110. Ironically, at the same time that Foster was 
arguing that the will of the people should prevail and prevent those with opposing points of 
view from being heard, his liaison on Shintech, Kevin Reilly, was arguing that  “it’s extremely 
important that Louisiana shake its populist image” in order to become more “business-friendly.” 
McMillan, supra note 114. 
 At times, Foster defended his attack through the additional charge that local residents were 
solicited or manipulated by the Clinic’s professors and students. See, e.g., Gyan, supra note 287 
(quoting a spokesperson expressing Governor’s disappointment with suspension of ban on 
solicitation because it “makes the [community] groups subject to manipulation by the political 
agendas of their supervisors.”); Transcript of Interview with Governor Foster for broadcast of 
Louisiana: The State We’re In, supra note 106 (“[I]f you do a good investigative report, you’ll 
find they solicit clients. This is their whole purpose in life.”) (on file with author). However, 
Governor Foster was aware from the beginning of the controversy that local residents came to 
Tulane seeking help. Daugherty, supra  note 99, at 9; Letter from Robert R. Kuehn to Murphy J. 
“Mike” Foster, Jr., supra note 272 (reminding Governor Foster that his special counsel, Terry 
Ryder, called the Tulane Clinic in November 1996 to inquire as to the Clinic’s role in the 
Shintech controversy and was told the Clinic was not yet representing the local residents but 
was reviewing the case and considering their request for help). Governor Foster later conceded 
in a letter that he had no facts to back up his allegations of solicitation or manipulation but 
never publicly corrected or apologized for his groundless charges. See Letter from M.J. “Mike” 
Foster, Jr. to Robert R. Kuehn, supra note 272 (stating allegations against the Tulane Clinic 
students and staff “reflected opinions only and were not an attempt to recite ‘facts’. As you can 
tell, from time to time, I get a little passionate about my beliefs.”). 
 353. See Cobbs, supra note 349 (reporting that a legislator alleges that litigation by 
University of Pittsburgh law professors will result in reduced timber sales, taxes, and wages); 
Consol Talks to WVU About Law Professor Handling Case Against It, supra  note 347 (coal 
company complains that litigation by University of West Virginia law professor has forced it to 
lay off 320 miners); Lumpkin, supra  note 348 (asserting that pro bono activities of University 
of Wyoming law professor will put timber employees out of work). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol4/iss1/5
p 33 Kuehn.doc  3/22/01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2000]  Denying Access to Legal Representation 105 
 
 
financially a national university that is one of the largest private 
employers in the state.354 
Even if attacks on access to law school legal representation are 
motivated solely by an altruistic desire to improve the economic 
welfare of local residents, threatening, intimidating, and interfering 
with a citizen’s ability to petition the government cannot be 
condoned.355 Politicians assert time after time that their vision of 
what is best for society justifies interfering with someone else’s legal 
rights. The internment of innocent Japanese-Americans during World 
War II was justified by the allegedly noble purpose of ensuring that 
any support for Japan, however remote, would not interfere with the 
war effort.356 With McCarthyism in the 1950s and the denial of basic 
 
 354. See Largest Private Sector Employees, NEW ORLEANS CITYBUSINESS, Dec. 27, 1999, 
at 50 (citing statistics that Tulane University’s educational programs employ over 4,000; its 
related healthcare services employ over 3,500); Press Release, Tulane Makes a Billion Dollar 
Difference (Dec. 3, 1998) (on file with author) (reporting that Tulane has more than 8,000 
employees and a payroll of approximately $551 million). “Tulane is one of the only private 
institutions in the country that gives back more to the state, in terms of tax revenue and the 
sharing of educational costs, than it gets from the state.” Id. (quoting Gene D’Amour, Tulane 
Vice President for Government/Agency Affairs and Institutional Program Development). This 
economic impact report did not include benefits derived from Tulane volunteer efforts, such as 
the law clinics, which provide more than $15 million annually in donated time and services to 
New Orleans and the state. Id. As one local paper observed, “If the governor genuinely cares 
about jobs, he should be encouraging businesses to support Tulane, not boycott it.” The 
Governor’s Gripe, GAMBIT WKLY. (New Orleans, La.), July 29, 1997, at 7. 
 355. Governor Foster has not hesitated to use his power to quiet those who disagree with 
him on public policy issues unrelated to Shintech. See, e.g., Jack Wardlaw, Foster Rejects 
Ethics Panelist Who Sought Tough Penalties,  T IMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), Feb. 5, 
2000, at A1 (reporting that Foster refused to reappoint a state board of ethics member who 
urged tougher penalties for Governor Foster’s failure to report the campaign list purchase from 
David Duke); Foster Resorts to Intimidation, ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.), Oct. 13, 1998, at 
8B (stating that Foster has “chosen to play the politics of intimidation with his critics” by 
seeking to pressure a public interest think tank to retract its criticism of the Governor’s road 
construction policies). In addition, Governor Foster’s unrepentant willingness to buy the 
support of David Duke, in the process violating campaign finance laws, demonstrates the means 
he is willing to employ to win a contest. Marsha Shuler, Duke Dealings Show Desire to Win 
Strong, ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.), May 28, 1999, at 13B; see also Hugh Aynesworth, 
Governor Confronts Private Eye, WASH . T IMES, Sept. 30, 1999, at A13 (reporting that in the 
1999 re-election campaign, Foster was accused of trying to intimidate a private detective into 
abandoning an investigation into Foster’s activities) . 
 356. See, e.g., 138 CONG. REC. E2351 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1992) (statement of Rep. Cox) 
(“Some of the most grievous wrongs ever committed in American politics and government were 
justified by noble purposes. The Army-McCarthy hearings, just as the Japanese internment 
during World War II, waived concerns about justice for individuals in order to wage a broader 
war.”). 
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civil rights to those accused of harboring sympathy toward 
communists, the save-America-from-communism end allegedly 
justified the vicious personal attacks employed by politicians to 
expose alleged sympathizers.357 In the 1960s Southern governors and 
Southern courts supported segregation and denied citizens’ civil 
rights in their efforts to preserve the “Southern way of life.”358 When 
President Nixon tried to justify his illegal activities in the 1970s, he 
reasoned that “[i]t’s good for the country if I’m elected; therefore, 
whatever I do to get elected is good for the country.”359 When Oliver 
North and others in the 1980s sought to defend the illegal Iran-Contra 
secret weapons deals, they argued that defense of democracy in Latin 
America justified skirting the law.360 Finally, some suggest that 
illegal campaign fund-raising practices in the 1990s resulted from an 
ends-justify-the-means mentality among political party officials.361  
 
 357. See, e.g., id.; JACK ANDERSON & RONALD W. MAY, MCCARTHY: THE MAN, THE 
SENATOR, T HE “ISM” 408 (quoting Arthur Peterson, Republican State Assemblyman from 
Prescott, Wisconsin: “Joe McCarthy has not fooled the unscrupulous and the self-seeking — his 
pattern of action is too familiar to them; they know to what depths a man will sink to attain his 
own aims and to further his own ambitions.”); id. at 407 (quoting Congressman Charles Kersten 
of Wisconsin: “McCarthy’s campaign [of questioning the loyalties of State Department 
officials] will result in a net substantial good to America.”). 
 Among the victims of McCarthyism’s ends-justify-means mentality were lawyers in 
Louisiana who were arrested and charged with violation of the Louisiana Subversive Activities 
and Communist Control Law because of their membership in organizations providing free legal 
services in civil rights cases. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 492-93 (1965). 
 358. See, e.g., J. Lindsay Almond, Jr., Virginia Gov. Defends Segregation, CRISIS, Mar. 
1959, at 134, 189 (noting speech by Virginia Governor that defended segregation as the right 
and duty of the state to protect the people and to mold the character and promote the welfare of 
their children); Coleman, supra note 280 (reporting that White Citizens Council in Louisiana 
claimed that the NAACP threatened the Southern way of life by promoting integration). 
 359. H. R. Haldeman & Joseph Dimona, The Ends of Power, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 6, 1978, at 
39, 41. On White House tapes, Nixon justified the creation of the “Plumbers,” the secret White 
House unit to investigate leaks to the press: “We’re up against an enemy, a conspiracy. They’re 
using any means. We are going to use any means.  Is that clear?” ABUSE OF POWER, THE NEW 
NIXON T APES, 8 (Stanley I. Kutler ed., 1998) (emphasis in original). When Attorney General 
John Mitchell was chastised for putting the re-election of Nixon above his other public duties, 
he responded: “In my mind the re-election of Richard Nixon, compared to what was on the 
other side, was so important that I put it in exactly that context.” John Mitchell, Convicted in 
Watergate, Dies at 75, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Nov. 10, 1988, at 2A. 
 360. See Christopher Madison, Did Panels Lose a Battle—or a War?, NAT’L J., July 18, 
1987, at 1858. During Senate hearings, Senator Daniel Inouye asked: “Should we, in the 
defense of democracy, adopt and embrace one of the most important tenets of Communism and 
Marxism: The ends justify the means?” Id. 
 361. See Kent Jenkins, Jr. & Julian E. Barnes, What Is Thomson Aiming For? , U.S. NEWS 
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In American jurisprudence, meritorious ends, do not justify 
improper means.362 Justice Brandeis warned that one must be most on 
guard to protect liberties when government officials put forth 
beneficial ends. “Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel 
invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers 
to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by mean of zeal, well-
meaning but without understanding.”363 
Controversies over environmental regulation are all too often 
portrayed as “jobs vs. environment” disputes that use job–creation 
ends to justify sacrificing the voice of those seeking to protect the 
environment. Sincere or meritorous economic ends can only be 
pursued if the means respect the right of affected partners to be heard 
and represented in the decision-making process. Even where efforts 
to deny access are not legal, official approval of such oppressive 
methods ignores the principle of “equal justice under law” engraved 
on the U.S. Supreme Court building. 
The other purported justification for denying access to legal 
representation, that the will of the people justifies suppressing the 
ability of the minority to be represented, is equally insupportable. 
Even if it is the majority’s will to allow a particular activity, this does 
not eliminate the minority’s rights to insist that the majority act 
consistent with democratic principles and the law, to be heard in 
public hearings, and to use available legal processes to enforce their 
rights still exist. The fathers of democracy warned that the tyranny of 
the majority, whether fueled by the supposed mandate that 
accompanies election to public office or by a belief in what the 
majority wants, must not suppress lawful dissent.364 
 
& WORLD REP., July 14, 1997, at 18 (reporting that investigator for Republicans alleged that 
people were told, by actions if not words, that getting Democratic candidates elected in 1996 
justified funneling improper foreign contributions into campaign coffers). 
 362. See WILLIAM DOUGLAS, WE THE JUDGES 354 (1956). 
 363. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 364. See, e.g., I ALEXIS DE T OCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 260 (Phillips Bradley 
ed., Alfred A. Knopf trans., 1945) (1840) (“I think that liberty is endangered when this power 
[of the majority] finds no obstacle which can retard its course and give it time to moderate its 
own vehemence.”); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 4-5 (1869) (warning that precautions are 
as much needed against the tyranny of the majority as against any other abuse of power); THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 51 at 397, 400 (Alexander Hamilton) (John C. Hamilton ed., 1869) (“It is of 
great importance in a republic, not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, 
but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part. . . . If a majority be 
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Attacks on pro bono legal representation, in effect, seek to deny 
the check and balance on governmental abuse that is the traditional 
role of the courts. To Governor Foster, the issue of whether an 
additional chemical plant should be built in Convent was left to the 
legislature: “You have the right to help formulate the policy of the 
state through seeking to influence its legislature. Why don’t you just 
come lobby the legislature to stop certain kinds of expansion. I have 
no problem with that.”365 Of course, it is convenient to advise 
powerless minorities to seek redress solely from a majoritarian-
controlled legislature and to refrain from using non-legislative means, 
even where provided by law. It is inappropriate for elected officials to 
insist that appealing to the legislature is the only means to initiate 
change, as the U.S. Supreme Court already recognized that “litigation 
may well be the sole practicable avenue open to a minority to petition 
for redress of grievances.”366 Redress from the courts is especially 
appropriate where, as in the case of environmental disputes, the law 
explicitly provides for both public participation in executive branch 
decision making and judicial review of those decisions.367 
Access to legal representation and the courts is crucial to advance 
public concerns about the environment. “In no other political and 
social movement has litigation played such an important and 
 
united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure.”). 
 365. Letter from M.J. “Mike” Foster, Jr. to Robert R. Kuehn, supra  note 272; see also 
Shuler, supra  note 110 (“Foster said the clinic is trying to block the will of the St. James Parish 
Police Jury, which supports the plant and the jobs it will create.”). 
 The National Governors’ Association, to which Governor Foster belongs, adopted a 
different view on the right of all members of the public to participate in environmental policy 
disputes. The Association’s Enlibra doctrine includes the principle that “[s]uccessful 
environmental policy implementaion is best accomplished through balanced, open and inclusive 
approaches . . . .” National Governors Association, NR-1 Enlibra: A New Shared Doctrine for 
Environmental Management (1999), at http://www.nga.org/pubs/policies/nr/nr0l.asp (last 
visited Nov. 21, 2000); see also Western Governors’ Association, Principles for Environmental 
Management in the West (1999) (adopting a similar Enlibra principle), available at 
http://www.westgov.org.nga.policy/99/99013.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2000). 
 366. Button, 371 U.S. at 430. “The vital need to hold the government accountable to those 
it serves and the need to provide legal voices for those muted by poverty and political 
impotence cannot be overemphasized.” Township of Mt. Laurel v. Public Advocate, 416 A.2d 
886, 893 (N.J. 1980). 
 367. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(b)(6) (1994) (federal Clean Air Act requirements for 
state-issued air permits include public notice, opportunity for public comment and a hearing, 
and opportunity for judicial review by any person who participated in the public comment 
process). 
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dominant role [as in the environmental movement].”368 Those 
attacking law school representation know that, when you deny 
citizens representation in environmental matters, you significantly 
weaken their voice and their ability to restrain unlawful government 
actions.369 
Regardless of the majority’s will and the possibility of a 
legislative solution, the minority, at a minimum, has the right to be 
heard and to insist upon compliance with laws. “Under our 
constitutional system, courts stand against any winds that blow as 
havens of refuge for those who might otherwise suffer because they 
are helpless, weak, outnumbered, or because they are non-
conforming victims of prejudice and public excitement.”370 Without 
alternative means of legal representation, the effect of denying 
judicial access to those with opposing points of view is to leave the 
actions of the executive branch unchecked. 
1. Addressing Attacks by Politicians on Legal Representation 
Deterring attacks by politicians on the efforts of law schools to 
provide legal assistance to controversial clients or causes will not be 
easy. In some situations, efforts to deny law schools the ability to 
provide assistance may be illegal. The U.S. Supreme Court has 
repeatedly found that government actions motivated by an intent to 
suppress disfavored viewpoints violate the First Amendment.371 This 
 
 368. David Sive, The Litigation Process in the Development of Environmental Law, 13 
PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 3 (1995) (defending his earlier quote reprinted in PETER BORELLI, 
ENVIRONMENTAL PRIORITIES FOR THE FUTURE 58 (1988)). The executive director of the Sierra 
Club Legal Defense Fund observed: “Litigation is the most important thing the environmental 
movement has done over the past 15 years.” Tom Turner, The Legal Eagles, AMICUS J., Winter 
1988, at 25, 27 (quoting Rick Sutherland). 
 369. The president of League of Women Voters of Louisiana argued that sometimes legal 
recourse is the only way to ensure that individuals and community organizations can access 
government decision making and hold government accountable. Malinda Hills-Holmes, 
Supreme Court and Law Clinics, ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.), Sept. 10, 1998, at 10B. 
Professor Pepper argues: “[F]irst -class citizenship is dependent on access to the law . . . . Our 
law is usually not simple, usually not self executing. For most people most of the time, 
meaningful access to the law requires the assistance of a lawyer . . . The lawyer is the means to 
first-class citizenship.” Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer’s Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, A 
Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613, 617. 
 370. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940). 
 371. See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (holding unconstitutional the 
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strict prohibition applies even where the action is denial of a privilege 
that the government is not obligated to extend.372 Government efforts 
to restrict advocacy are also subject to equal protection challenges 
where they seek to impose restrictions on some, but not all, state-
funded employees based on the nature of the employee’s legal 
work.373 
In the area of environmental justice, efforts to interfere with a 
complaint of racial discrimination may violate federal civil rights 
laws. Regulations implementing the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provide 
that no person shall intimidate, threaten, coerce, or discriminate 
against any individual or group because that person or group has filed 
a civil rights complaint, participated in an investigation into such 
complaint, or opposed any practice made unlawful by the act.374 
Despite repeated requests that the EPA investigate Governor Foster’s 
intimidation and threats against the Clinic for filing a civil rights 
complaint in the Shintech case, the EPA has failed to take any 
 
denial of renewal of a state junior college professor’s teaching contract because of his criticism 
of college administration); see also Hoover v. Morales, 164 F.3d 221, 227 (5th Cir. 1998) 
(holding as unconstitutional Texas university policy and legislative appropriations riders 
prohibiting state employees from acting as consultants or expert witnesses on behalf of parties 
opposing state in litigation). Even where the government denies that its action is motivated by 
an attempt to suppress a particular disfavored idea, “those justifications cannot save an 
exclusion that is in fact based on the desire to suppress a particular point of view.” Cornelius v. 
NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 812 (1985).  
 The New Jersey Supreme Court has upheld, against charges that the professors violated 
state government ethics rules, the right of law clinic faculty at Rutgers University School of 
Law to handle cases where the state may have opposing interests. In re Determination of 
Executive Comm. on Ethical Standards re: Appearance of Rutgers Attorneys, 561 A.2d 542 
(N.J. 1989). 
 372. See, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 185-86 (1972) (“[T]he Court has consistently 
disapproved government action . . . denying rights and privileges solely because of a citizen’s 
association with an unpopular organization”); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) 
(invalidating effort to deny property-tax exemptions to veterans who refused to take an oath 
disavowing advocacy of the overthrow of the government by force or violence). 
 373. See Trister v. Univ. of Miss., 420 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1969) (holding that the 
University of Mississippi’s attempt to prohibit clinical law professors from working on a school 
desegregation lawsuit violated the equal protection clause because the university imposed 
restrictions on clinical professors that are more onerous than those imposed on other law school 
professors). But cf. Buck, supra  note 349 (responding to criticism of law professors’ pro bono 
work on behalf on environmental organizations, the University adopted a new policy requiring 
professors who collect legal fees awarded by a court to donate the money to the University but 
does not require professors who are paid consultant fees to donate their fees to the University). 
 374. Nondiscrimination in Programs Receiving Federal Assistance from the Environmental 
Protection Agency, 40 C.F.R. § 7.100 (1999). 
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action.375 
In many situations, however, efforts of elected officials to deny 
access to legal representation are not illegal. In such cases, public 
condemnation and the power of the ballot box may be the only way 
to address such efforts. The attacks on Tulane were denounced by the 
media and the public.376 Over time, Governor Foster was forced to 
moderate his public criticism and efforts to restrict the Clinic.377 It is 
also likely that Governor Foster’s attacks, and the perception that the 
DEQ was not addressing the concerns of local residents, influenced 
the EPA’s unprecedented decision to veto Shintech’s state air 
permits. 
Unfortunately, while voting politicians out of office is an effective 
means of expressing public displeasure, it is difficult to achieve. 
Often, the cause is unpopular and the clients lack political power. In 
addition, those opposing law clinic representation in environmental 
disputes usually are politically powerful. The reelections of Governor 
Foster and the Chief Justice of the Louisiana Supreme Court show 
how difficult it can be to translate public outrage over denial of 
access to legal representation into election-day victories. At a 
minimum, public criticism should make elected officials hesitate 
before seeking to deny access to justice. 
B. The Rhetoric and Reality of the New “Green” Business Ethic 
Some business interests perceive law clinics as impeding what is 
otherwise the inexpensive and quick regulatory approval of 
environmentally-threatening projects. To an amoral firm intent only 
on maximizing profits, it makes good business sense to eliminate or 
 
 375. See Letter from Lisa W. Lavie & Robert R. Kuehn, Tulane Environmental Law Clinic, 
to Michael Mattheisen, et al., Environmental Protection Agency (Dec. 9, 1997) (on file with 
author) (documenting efforts of Governor Foster and his staff to intimidate and threaten the 
Tulane Clinic and its clients); Letter from Elizabeth Teel, Tulane Environmental Law Clinic, to 
Ann E. Goode, Director, Office of Civil Rights, Environmental Protection Agency (Aug. 10, 
1999) (on file with author) (detailing further efforts by the state to threaten, intimidate and 
discriminate against complainants and their attorneys and protesting the failure of the EPA to 
take action on the complaint). 
 376. See Gray, supra  note 41 (finding through a newspaper poll that Convent residents 
favored the involvement of the Tulane Clinic in the Shintech dispute by a 54% to 22% margin). 
 377. See Hansen, supra  note 58, at 56. 
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restrict legal representation on behalf of environmental groups. 
Without legal representation, environmentally-concerned citizens are 
less able to participate in the regulatory approval process, oversight 
agencies have fewer reasons to delay or deny permits, and firms save 
time and money in developing and operating projects. 
However, maximizing profits need not be the only goal or 
responsibility of business, though some contend the opposite.378 
Many business philosophers argue that a corporation should strive to 
make a profit while avoiding injury to others and respecting 
individual rights.379 At least thirty-nine states allow corporate officers 
and boards of directors to make decisions based on criteria other than 
maximizing profits, including the concerns of communities most 
impacted by the corporation’s activities.380 These “other 
constituency” laws authorize, but do not require, corporate officials 
to consider the impact of their decisions on constituencies other than 
shareholders.381 
Many major corporations now subscribe to voluntary 
environmental codes of conduct, or “green codes,” based on this 
theory of social responsibility. Among Standard & Poor’s five-
hundred largest companies, approximately 98% have adopted a 
corporate environmental policy and almost 40% subscribe to one or 
more voluntary environmental codes of conduct.382  
Almost all of the business interests that have attacked the pro 
 
 378. See, e.g., Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase its 
Profits, N.Y. T IMES, Sept. 13, 1970, (Magazine) at 33 (calling efforts to instill social 
responsibility in businesses in areas such as safety and pollution “pure and unadulterated 
socialism”). 
 379. See, e.g., Norman Bowie, New Directions in Corporate Social Responsibility, BUS. 
HORIZONS, July/August 1991, at 56 (describing this as the “neoclassical view of corporate 
responsibility”). 
 380. Rorie Sherman, Ethicists: Gurus of the ‘90s, NAT’L L.J., Jan. 24, 1994, at 1. The chief 
proponent of the “stakeholder theory,” R. Edward Freeman, argues that the manager’s task is to 
protect and promote the rights of various corporate stakeholders, including stockholders, 
employees, customers, suppliers, and the local community. Bowie, supra  note 379, at 56; see 
also  R. Edward Freeman, The Politics of Stakeholder Theory: Some Future Directions, 4 BUS. 
ETHICS Q. 409, 417 (1994) (“Corporations shall be managed in the interests of its stakeholders, 
defined as employees, financiers, customers, employees, and communities.”). 
 381. John R. Boatright, Fiduciary Duties and the Shareholder-Management Relation: Or, 
What’s So Special About Shareholders? , 4 BUS. ETHICS Q. 393, 402 & n.27 (1994). 
 382. INVESTOR RESPONSIBILITY RESEARCH CENTER,  CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROFILES DIRECTORY 1998 (EXECUTIVE SUMMARY) 62-63 (1998). 
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bono environmental efforts of law school professors and clinics either 
have their own code of conduct or belong to trade associations with 
such codes. Without exception, these business codes reflect the need 
to respect the concerns of citizens and local communities and to 
dialogue with the public about potentially harmful operations. No 
codes advocate profit maximization as the only goal of the 
organization and none supports strategies of silencing concerned 
citizens or critics. For example, the International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC) “represents chambers of commerce in all parts of 
the world.”383 The ICC’s “Business Charter for Sustainable 
Development” directs individual corporations and business 
organizations “to foster openness and dialogue with employees and 
the public, anticipating and responding to their concerns about the 
potential hazards and impacts of operations, products, wastes or 
services.”384 The ICC repeatedly states the need for dialogue with 
public interest groups: 
All sectors of society, including government, business, public 
interest groups and consumers have a role to play in 
contributing to sustainable development and business 
recognizes that these sectors need to work in partnership, 
bringing their values and experience to bear on the 
challenge . . . . Public interest groups and individual consumers 
exert pressure through their behavior and attitudes. Therefore, 
industry appreciates the need to seek out these concerns and to 
include them in its development of policy.385 
The New Orleans Chamber surpasses the ICC’s principles of 
openness, dialogue, and respect for the concerns of public interest 
 
 383. International Bureau of Chambers of Commerce, at http://www.iccwbo.org/home/ 
menu_ibcc.asp (last visited Oct. 27, 1999). 
 384. International Bureau of Chambers of Commerce, Principles for Environmental 
Management, at http://www.iccwbo.org/home/environment.charter.asp (last visited Oct. 27, 
1999). 
 385. International Bureau of Chambers of Commerce, Responsible Entrepreneurship , at 
http://www.iccwbo.org/home/statements_rules/statements/1998/final_responsible.asp (last 
visited Oct. 27, 1999). The U.S. Chamber of Commerce has no comparable green code and 
boasts that it “leads the opposition” to the environmental justice movement. See U.S. Chamber 
of Commerce, Environmental and Regulatory Reform , at http://www.uschamber.com/policy/6-
environment/content.html (last visited Feb. 29, 2000).  
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groups by proclaiming itself “an association of over 2,100 business 
firms . . . working to unify the community.”386 
LABI also advocates the need for communication and dialogue 
with affected communities, although it does not publish a code of 
conduct. LABI’s president was urging its members to do a better job 
of discussing environmental issues with affected communities at the 
same time that he was pressing the Louisiana Supreme Court to 
restrain the Clinic.387 Likewise, LABI’s public affairs expert advised 
“that businesses encourage public participation and work with 
environmental and community groups.”388 
Petrochemical companies belong to the Chemical Manufacturing 
Association (CMA), which describes its green code, “Responsible 
Care,” as “the chemical industry’s premier voluntary environmental, 
health and safety performance improvement initiative.”389 The CMA 
requires its members to adopt and practice the Responsible Care 
principles as a condition of membership. One of Responsible Care’s 
guiding principles is “to seek and incorporate public input regarding 
our products and operations.”390 Members are required “to recognize 
and respond to community concerns” about chemical industry 
operations and to develop community outreach programs that include 
“[a] continuing dialogue with local citizens to respond to questions 
and concerns about safety, health, and the environment.”391 One Dow 
 
 386. T he New Orleans Regional Chamber of Commerce, at http://chamber.gofn.org/ 
membersh.html (last visited Nov. 6, 1999). 
 387. See Carl Redman, LABI Tells Industry to Explain Environmental Issues Better,  
ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.), Jan. 16, 1998, at 1B (reporting speech by Dan Juneau, 
President, LABI). 
 388. Id. (reporting remarks of Lawrence Hurst, regional director for communication and 
public affairs with Motorola). 
 389. Chemical Manufacturers Association, Responsible Care, at http://www.cmahq.com/ 
responsiblecare.nsf/pages/about (last visited Oct. 27, 1999). 
 390. Id. 
 391. Id. The chairman and chief executive officer of Union Carbide Corporation explained 
the focus on dialogue with the public: “We [in industry] welcome your involvement. We want 
you to tell us when you mistrust something we’re doing. We want to listen to you and work 
with you.” Robert D. Kennedy, Achieving Environmental Excellence: Ten Tools for CEOs,  
PRISM (Third Quarter 1991), at 79. 
 A number of officials with petrochemical facilities in Louisiana also were part of the 
“Enterprise for the Environment” (E4E) initiative. See Enterprise for the Environment, at 
http://webu6102.ntx.net/e4e/particip.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2000) (identifying Monsanto 
Corporation, Amoco Corporation, BP America, Dow Chemical Company, Novartis Corporation 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol4/iss1/5
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Chemical plant manager offered a less altruistic explanation of the 
chemical industry’s focus on dialogue: “It became pretty clear that if 
we were going to survive in Louisiana we had to create a dialogue 
with people who disagreed with us. There was really nowhere else to 
go.”392 
Similarly, oil and gas exploration and production companies 
belong to the American Petroleum Institute (API).393 The API 
members adopted the “Environmental Mission and Guiding 
Environmental Principles,”394 and pledged to “recognize and to 
respond to community concerns about our raw materials, products 
and operations,” “[to] be a good corporate citizen wherever it 
operates,” “build community dialogue,” and “address community 
concerns” about environmental, health and safety issues.395 
The environmental code of the American Forest and Paper 
Association (AF&PA), whose members and supporters lead attacks 
on environmental law clinics and professors outside of Louisiana, 
 
and DuPont Company officials as participants). The E4E’s consensus vision of an improved 
environmental system includes the objective to “create decision processes that meaningfully 
involve affected stakeholders and engage all citizens in protecting the environment.” William 
D. Ruckelshaus, Stepping Stones, ENVTL. FORUM, Mar./Apr. 1998, at 30, 32 (setting forth the 
twelve elements of the consensus “Vision for the Future”). 
 392. Peter Fairley, Louisiana Plants Find Pride in Performance, CHEM. WEEK, July 1/8, 
1998, at 46 (quoting Larry Adcock, former plant manager for Dow Chemical’s Plaquemine, 
Louisiana, petrochemical complex). At the time Adcock made this remark, the Louisiana 
Supreme Court was granting business’s request that law clinics stop representing local 
community groups with interests contrary to those of the Louisiana chemical industry. 
 393. American Petroleum Institute, Protecting the Environment, at http://www.api.org/ 
ehs/PTE/protectintro.html (last visited Oct. 27, 1999). Louisiana oil and gas exploration and 
production companies have long sought to silence the Tulane Clinic. See, e.g., Letter from B.A. 
“Red” Adams, Sr., Chairman of the Board, Oil & Gas Rental Services, Inc., to Eamon Kelly, 
President, Tulane University (July 25, 1997) (objecting to Tulane’s role in the Shintech 
controversy and threatening to withdraw financial support for University) (on file with author); 
Letter from David K. McGowan, McGowan Working Partners, to Robert Kuehn, Director, 
Tulane Environmental Law Clinic (Sept. 21, 1992) (objecting to the Tulane Clinic’s 
involvement in a dispute over permitting of company’s oilfield waste disposal well) (on file 
with author).  
 394. AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE , PROMOTING PARTNERSHIPS: COOPERATION 
BETWEEN THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY AND ENVIRONMENTAL, EDUCATIONAL AND COMMUNITY 
GROUPS (Sept. 1996) (reprinting the principles in the inside front cover). 
 395. Id.; American Petroleum Institute, Protecting the Environment, at http://www.api.org/ 
ehs/PTE/protectcommunity.html (last visited Oct. 27, 1999); American Petroleum Institute, 
Protecting the Environment, at http://www.api.org/pasp/step/step/html (last visited Oct. 27, 
1999). 
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likewise encourages dialogue. AF&PA members publicly pledge to 
“seek out interested parties regularly and communicate on industry 
activities and performance” and to “work with others to address 
concerns and to reach consensus on important issues” of 
environment, health, and safety.396 Similarly, the National 
Association of Manufacturers’ “Business Network for Environmental 
Justice” pledges to “work cooperatively with all environmental 
justice stakeholders in addressing issues and concerns.”397 
None of the business groups attacking the Tulane Clinic or other 
law schools respected these principles of dialogue and respect for the 
concerns of community organizations. In Louisiana, no business 
entity acknowledged the existence of these codes or the need for 
dialogue with the Clinic and its clients. Rather, businesses focused 
solely on their own pecuniary interests.398 And while business 
interests in Louisiana sought to strip Clinic clients of representation, 
they provided legal representation and financial support to those 
residents who favored industry projects.399 Of course, those opposing 
 
 396. American Forest & Paper Association, Environmental, Health & Safety Principles, at 
http://www.afandpa.org/iinfo/Environment/principles.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2000). AF&PA 
members account for ninety percent of industrial forest land in the United States. Id. 
 397. Business Network for Environmental Justice (BNEJ), at http://www.nam.org/ 
rer/bnej.html (last visited May 26, 2000). 
 398. The New Orleans Chamber did make the argument that society loses when it tolerates 
one segment of the community, through representation from the law clinics, blocking 
development projects favored by business interests. See LeBlanc, supra  note 170. Given the 
large number of opponents in Tulane Clinic cases that held official positions in the business 
groups, it is more likely that the groups’ true justification for going after the Clinic was that 
they lose when law clinic representation interferes with a member’s ability to engage in 
business as it sees fit. See, e.g., supra notes 191-98 and accompanying text (describing how 
chairmen of both the Chamber and Business Council were defeated in proceedings handled by 
Tulane Clinic students); King, supra note 225 (identifying a Cytec (formerly American 
Cyanamid) plant manager as the Chamber’s West Bank Council chairman); Id. (identifying 
Paul Pastorek, a partner in the law firm of Adams & Reese, as the Chamber’s New Orleans 
Council chairman and the recipient of the Joseph W. Simon Memorial Award); Id. (identifying 
Daniel Packer of Entergy corporation as a Chamber official); Id. (noting that Kennett Stewart, 
owner of Industrial Pipe, received the Chamber’s “Chairman’s Award”); Business People, 
T IMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, La.), Feb. 21, 1998, at F3 (identifying Kennett Stewart of 
Industrial Pipe, Inc., as the Chamber’s Plaquemines Council chairman). American Cyanamid, 
Entergy, and Industrial Pipe have been opposing parties in proceedings handled by the Tulane 
Clinic; Adams & Reese represented opposing parties in proceedings handled by the Clinic. 
 399. See supra  text accompanying notes 153-54. While industrial interests in Louisiana 
were advocating that a community organization’s eligibility for law clinic representation should 
be determined by examining the incomes of individual members, their trade association, the 
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law clinics continue to have access to the best legal representation 
money can buy.400  
The lobbying efforts of these companies reveal this same 
inconsistency—the rhetoric of public dialogue along with blatant 
efforts to silence public opposition. The chemical industry, in 
particular, repeatedly attempts to weaken federal and state 
environmental laws while preaching the Responsible Care mantra of 
concern for the health and safety of the public.401 
Business interests have the right to reject notions of social 
responsibility and to be guided solely by an amoral desire to 
maximize profits and avoid illegality. However, if, as the green codes 
themselves claim, business has a social responsibility and “want[s] 
. . . [the public] to track [them], not trust [them],”402 then attacks on 
law school professors and clinics expose these principles of dialogue 
and respect as self-serving rhetoric. Suppression of opposing points 
of view is inconsistent with any theory of a socially- responsible 
corporation. It is, however, consistent with a one-way public relations 
effort and a philosophy that the concerns of some are not worthy of 
being heard or respected.403 This philosophy is especially evident 
 
National Association of Manufacturers, successfully argued in federal court that to determine if 
a client is a “small entity” eligible for an award of attorneys fees under the Equal Access to 
Justice Act, the court should look to the net worth of the association, rather than to the net 
worth of its members. See EAJA’s Net Worth, Employment Ceilings Apply to Association Itself, 
Not Its Members,  67 U.S.L.W. 1286 [Summary & Analysis] (Nov. 17, 1998). 
 400. Clancy DuBos, Losing a Friend, GAMBIT WKLY. (New Orleans, La.), Mar. 9, 1999, at 
19 (“LABI, not satisfied with having the best and highest -paid law firms to argue its cause, 
wants to crush even the most rag-tag opposition to Louisiana’s ‘open door’ policy toward 
polluters by restricting their access to the courts.”). 
 401. Karen Heller, Ads, Advocacy, Outreach, Activists, CHEMICAL WEEK, June 17, 1992, at 
19. 
 402. Kennedy, supra  note 391. Peter M. Sandman, director of the environmental 
communication research program at Rutgers University, is credited with coining the buzz 
phrase among adherents to the CMA’s Responsible Care program: Tell people “to track us, not 
trust us. Over the long haul, we hope to earn your trust.” Karen Heller, Listening to—and 
Taking On—the Skeptics, CHEMICAL WEEK, July 17, 1991, at 85 (quoting from a 1990 
presentation by Sandman). 
 403. See Elizabeth Kirschner & Allison Lucas, Community Advisory Panels Convert the 
Neighbors,  CHEMICAL WEEK, Dec. 8, 1993, at 29. In 1993, the CMA developed an $8.5 million 
Responsible Care advertising campaign “to get the public to feel that we listen and are valuable 
to them.” Ronald Begley, Selling Responsible Care to a Critical Public, CHEMICAL WEEK, Dec. 
8, 1993, at 23. The president of the Louisiana Chemical Association stated that the primary 
challenge for Louisiana’s chemical industry is to make sure the public is aware of the progress 
made by the industry to reduce pollution. See Fairley, supra  note 392 (comments of Dan 
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when those concerns are inconsistent with business notions of what is 
best for society or may interfere with profit-maximization ends. 
When business interests attack law students and professors, they 
demonstrate not just the “dark” and “uglier side” of the private 
sector,404 but also the hypocritical side. If, conversely, someone 
proposed a rule prohibiting the legal representation of businesses in 
regulatory matters, business interests would vigorously protest the 
unfair silencing of their voices, and rightfully so. The mantra that 
representation by law clinics and professors is “bad for business” 
does not justify denying others access to legal representation. 
Businesses deviate from significant aspects of their own green codes 
by actively working to deny access while simultaneously preaching 
the rhetoric of dialogue and tolerance. 
1. Obtaining Compliance With Green Codes 
The dilemma is how to move beyond rhetoric and achieve 
compliance with the codes. Self-policing of these codes by either the 
associations or their members is rare.405 Consequently, many critics 
dismiss corporate ethics codes as mere public relations 
smokescreens.406 Professors Sabel, Fung, and Karkkainen suggest 
that green codes depend on consensus, and, for that reason, sanctions 
by the association may threaten a member’s individual interests to the 
point that consensus is lost.407 They believe that greater familiarity 
with the codes and public accountability may overcome this problem 
 
Borne). 
 404. Finn, supra  note 244 (criticizing business for “swinging its weight behind the idea of 
clamping down on the law students, to the point of silencing their voice.”). 
 405. One empirical study suggests that “there is little relationship between codes of 
conduct and corporate violations, contrary to the expectation that the codes serve as an effective 
form of self-regulation.” M. CASH MATHEWS, STRATEGIC INTERVENTION IN ORGANIZATIONS 
76 (1998) (surveying 212 codes from companies with annual sales in excess of $100 million). 
 406. See Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Minimizing Corporate Civil and 
Criminal Liability: A Second Look at Corporate Codes of Conduct, 78 GEO. L.J. 1559, 1630-31 
n.422 (1990). The overall effect of Responsible Care, which includes commitments to reduce 
pollution and accidents, in improving environmental protection was described as “difficult to 
measure.” Daniel J. McConville, Responsible Care Gains Respect, ASAP, Jan. 1992, at 52. 
 407. Charles Sabel, et al., Beyond Backyard Environmentalism , 24 BOSTON REV. 4 
(Oct./Nov. 1999). 
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and lead to increased efforts to self-police.408 Requiring and 
publishing independent evaluations of green code compliance may be 
one way to increase accountability.409 
However, unless knowledge of noncompliance with green codes 
leads to public pressure on members of the association to conform, 
there is little motivation to change, especially where there may be 
some economic advantage to silencing opposing points of view. For 
some management officials, public condemnation may motivate them 
to take action to ensure compliance. Where, however, a company is 
driven primarily by economic concerns, it must also be subject to 
public condemnation in the form of economic pressure. For example, 
a combination of economic and social pressures successfully induced 
American corporations operating in South Africa during apartheid to 
adopt and comply with the Sullivan principles.410 Some 
commentators suggest that similar pressures could be employed to 
induce corporations to adopt and comply with environmental codes 
that go beyond the minimum standards set by environmental 
statutes.411 
Successfully applying social and economic pressure will require 
significant efforts to publicize non-compliance and organize 
economic action. The repeated, yet unaddressed, criticisms of the 
failure of CMA members to live up to the principles of Responsible 
Care412 demonstrate the difficulty of organizing an effort to force 
 
 408. Id.  
 409. See Heller, supra  note 401. 
 410. The Sullivan principles are a corporate code designed in 1977 by Reverend Sullivan, a 
West Virginia minister then a member of the General Motors Board of Directors, to help 
eliminate apartheid by obligating American corporate signatories to eliminate racial inequities 
within their South African operations. See DAVID HAUCK ET AL., T WO DECADES OF DEBATE: 
T HE CONTROVERSY OVER U.S. COMPANIES IN SOUTH AFRICA 155-58 (1983); JONATHAN 
LEAPE ET AL., BUSINESS IN THE SHADOW OF APARTHEID: U.S. FIRMS IN SOUTH AFRICA 217-18 
(1985). 
 411. See, e.g., Valerie Ann Zondorak, A New Face in Corporate Environmental 
Responsibility: The Valdez Principles, 18 B. C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 457, 479-84 (1991) 
(discussing the virtues of the Valdez principles, a voluntary code promulgated by the Coalition 
for Environmentally Responsible Economics in the wake of the Exxon Valdez disaster). 
 With CMA seeking to sell Responsible Care to Wall Street, another way to put economic 
pressure on offending firms would be to inform potential investors of instances of 
noncompliance. See McConville, supra  note 406 (noting efforts of the CMA’s Outreach 
Committee Stakeholder Task Force to inform the financial community of Responsible Care). 
 412. See, e.g., Heller, supra  note 401 (criticizing the lobbying practices of industry 
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companies to turn their green code rhetoric into reality. 
C. The Legal Profession’s Readiness to Ignore its Responsibility to 
Ensure Access to Legal Representation 
Self-interest overrode long-standing fundamentals of professional 
conduct in the case of the members of the Louisiana bar who worked 
to deprive Clinic clients of representation as well as in cases of other 
lawyers in other states involved in attacks on law students and 
professors providing free legal assistance in environmental matters.413 
Forty-four states, including Louisiana and the District of 
Columbia, adopted some form of the ABA’s Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct (Model Rules), and five other states base their 
lawyer ethic rules on both the ABA’s Model Rules and the ABA’s 
Model Code of Professional Responsibility (Model Code).414 Rule 6.1 
of the Model Rules establishes every lawyer’s responsibility to 
provide pro bono publico legal services.415 The preamble to the 
Model Rules reminds all lawyers to be mindful “of the fact that the 
poor, and sometimes persons who are not poor, cannot afford 
adequate legal assistance, and should therefore devote professional 
 
representatives as not matching the spirit of Responsible Care). 
 413. See supra  notes 182-203, 345-50 and accompanying text; Lumpkin, supra note 348 
(noting that alumnus of the University of Wyoming’s College of Law lead the attack on law 
professor’s pro bono work on behalf of environmental groups); Alan Pittman, UO 
Environmental Law Clinic Funding Axed, WHAT’S HAPPENING (Eugene, Or.), Sept. 2, 1993, at 
1 (reporting that two local timber industry lawyers who have been advocating de-funding the 
Oregon Environmental Law Clinic are pleased that the university has severed funding for the 
clinic); E-mail From Patrick McGinley, West Virginia University College of Law, to Robert 
Kuehn, Former Director, Tulane Environmental Law Clinic (April 5, 2000) (noting lawyers for 
coal companies lead public and behind-the-scenes attacks on law professor’s pro bono 
activities) (on file with author); E-mail from William Luneburg, University of Pittsburgh 
School of Law, to Robert Kuehn, Former Director, Tulane Environmental Law Clinic (Feb. 10, 
2000, 16:57:31 EST) (noting that a lawyer for the U.S. Forest Service started an attack by 
circulating a document identifying the role of University of Pittsburgh law professors) (on file 
with author); E-mail from Michael Axline, University of Oregon School of Law, to Robert 
Kuehn, Former Director, Tulane Environmental Law Clinic (Feb. 10, 2000, 14:13:13 PST) 
(explaining that lawyers for the forestry industry were heavily involved in the attack on the 
Oregon clinic and lead the charge in many instances) (on file with author). 
 414. RICHARD A. ZITRIN & CAROL M. LANGFORD , LEGAL ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF 
LAW 7 (1995). 
 415. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 6.1 (1999). The Ethical Considerations to the 
Model Code express a similar responsibility to render pro bono services. MODEL CODE OF 
PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-25, 8-3 (1980). 
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time and civic influence on their behalf.”416 The version of the Model 
Rules adopted by the Louisiana Supreme Court states that “a lawyer 
may discharge this responsibility by providing professional services 
at no fee or a reduced fee to persons of limited means or to public 
service or charitable groups or organizations.”417 The Model Rules 
explain that every lawyer should financially support programs that 
provide free legal services to persons of limited means, such as law 
clinics, and either provide direct pro bono services or make financial 
contributions when actual pro bono service is not feasible.418 
One primary goal of law clinics is to assist the bench and bar in 
fulfilling its responsibility to provide “competent legal services for all 
persons, including those unable to pay for these services.”419 Indeed, 
Louisiana’s law clinics, like those in other states, provide a 
significant portion of the pro bono legal services available in the 
state.420 
Attorneys leading the attack on the Tulane Clinic never 
demonstrated that any Clinic client could have afforded the services 
of the private bar or explained how former clients of the Clinic would 
find representation if law students were disqualified.421 Rather, they 
 
 416. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble cmt. 5. This professional responsibility 
does not originate in the Sixth Amendment right to representation in a criminal case and, 
therefore, applies even to those seeking legal assistance on civil matters. Therefore, efforts of an 
attorney to deny legal assistance to certain unrepresented clients cannot be just ified on the 
grounds that there is no constitutional right to free legal representation in civil cases. See 
Morning Edition, supra  note 184 and accompanying text (quoting Governor Foster’s special 
counsel as stating that he supports new law clinic restrictions because “individuals don’t have a 
constitutional right to have free legal representation in civil cases”). 
 417. LA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 6.1 (1999). A recent amendment by the ABA to 
Model Rule 6.1 sets a goal for every lawyer of fifty hours of pro bono publico legal services per 
year and identifies activities on which a substantial majority of the fifty hours should be spent. 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 6.1 & cmt. 5 (1999). 
 418. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 6.1 & cmt. 10. 
 419. LA. SUP. CT., RULE XX sec. 1 (as amended Mar. 22, 1999). The other stated goal of 
law clinics in Louisiana is “to provide clinical instruction in trial work of varying kinds.” Id. 
 420. See supra  note 11. 
 421. T he attorney who chaired Chief Justice Calogero’s re-election campaign expressed no 
concern that former Tulane Clinic clients were now going unrepresented but criticized 
opponents of the new restrictions for creating negative publicity in the national media regarding 
the court’s action. Eyewitness News: Special Report, supra note 315 (comments of state 
representative Mitch Landrieu).  
 Addressing the responsibility of members of the bar to raise funds and handle matters that 
can no longer be handled because of new funding limitations on a legal services office, the 
ABA noted: “If these traditional principles of our profession [to ensure the availability of legal 
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suggested that Louisiana clinics should cease representing individuals 
and community organizations that cannot afford attorneys and instead 
begin representing businesses.422 Surely, none of the lawyers 
attacking the Clinic, or their law firms, stepped forward to volunteer 
their time or financial resources to represent the former clients of the 
clinics.423 Similary, those lawyers leading or supporting attacks in 
other states never proposed or provided an alternative source of legal 
representation for the clients aided by the law schools.424 
 
services for those unable to pay] are to be accepted as more than hollow rhetoric, lawyers in 
every jurisdiction acting through the organized bar should take all necessary actions to prevent 
the abandonment of indigent clients.” ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal 
Op. 347 (1981).   
 422. See supra note 259 and accompanying text (noting that attorneys LeBlanc and Abbott 
requested a requirement that law clinics represent for-profit businesses). 
 423. These firms’ commitment to providing pro bono legal services is questionable. While 
the law firm of the chairman of the Chamber boasts of its community involvement, its public 
service program “is not related to business or the law.” See Adams & Reese L.L.P., Community 
Service, at http://www.arlaw.com/html/communityservice-main.html (last visited Nov. 6, 
1999); Adams & Reese, L.L.P., National Association of Law Placement Form (n.d.) (indicating 
that Adams & Reese’s pro bono activities are “community service” to “United Way; Covenant 
House; American Cancer Society; Points of Light Foundation, etc.”) (on file with author). 
Inexplicably, the only two firms in Louisiana that participate in the ABA’s Law Firm Pro Bono 
Project, whose principles commit the firm to encourage and support efforts to provide access to 
the justice system for persons otherwise unable to afford it, had attorneys who supported 
denying legal representation to the clients of the Tulane Clinic. See The Law Firm Pro Bono 
Project, Member List 1999-2000, at http://www.probonoinst.org/members/ (last visited Feb. 10, 
2000) (identifying New Orleans law firms of Adams & Reese and Jones, Walker, Waechter, 
Poitevent, Carrere & Denegre as members); PROFESSIONALISM COMMITTEE, SECTION OF 
LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, TEACHING 
AND LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM app. D (1996) (reprinting “Law Firm Pro Bono Challenge 
Statement of Principles”); supra  notes 195, 196 and accompanying text (identifying activities of 
members of Adams & Reese and Jones, Walker in attack on Tulane).  
424. See electronic mail from Patrick McGinley, supra  note 389 (critics of University of 
West Virginia law professor’s pro bono activities knew that, without the law professors’ free 
legal assistance, the clients could not have found other qualified counsel); E-mail from William 
Luneburg, supra  note 411 (noting that no one who questioned the propriety of University of 
Pittsburgh law professors and students providing free legal assistance identified any alternative 
source of legal representation for the clients); E-mail from Michael Axline to Robert Kuehn, 
supra  note 413; E-mail from Mark S. Squillace, University of Wyoming College of Law, to 
Robert Kuehn, Former Director, Tulane Environmental Law Clinic (Feb. 11, 2000) (stating that 
no discussion of how the client groups might find other legal assistance took place during the 
attack on Wyoming law professor’s pro bono environmental activities) (on file with author). 
 Attorneys attacking law professors at publicly-funded universities have sought to justify 
their actions on the ground that state money should not be used to support political advocacy or 
oppose economic development activities. See, e.g., Katherine Bishop, Oregon Law Clinic 
Battles the Timber Industry, N.Y. T IMES, Aug. 5, 1988, at B5; Lumpkin, supra  note 348. 
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In seeking to ration justice to business interests and others with 
means to afford private attorneys,425 the lawyers attacking law school 
clinics and professors ignored not only their responsibility to provide 
alternative means of legal representation, but also their duty not to 
deny legal representation to parties with controversial causes. 
Comment Three to Model Rule 1.2 states that “legal representation 
should not be denied to people who are unable to afford legal 
services, or whose cause is controversial or the subject of popular 
disapproval.”426 Some lawyer oaths, given upon admission to the bar, 
similarly state: “I will never reject, from any consideration personal 
to myself, the cause of the defenseless or oppressed, or delay any 
person’s cause for lucre or malice.”427 
A number of ABA opinions reinforce the responsibility not to 
deny legal services to persons advancing unpopular causes. ABA 
Formal Opinion 324 holds that an attorney on a legal aid society’s 
board of directors “is under a similar obligation not to reject certain 
types of clients or particula r kinds of cases merely because of their 
controversial nature, anticipated adverse community reaction, or 
because of a desire to avoid alignment against public officials, 
government agencies, or influential members of the community.”428 
A later ethics opinion, addressing threats to cut financial assistance to 
 
 425. See Lash, supra  note 4, at 501 & n.39 (quoting from a February 16, 1951 address by 
Judge Learned Hand before the Legal Aid Society of New York: “Thou shalt not ration 
justice.”). 
 426. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 3 (1999). See also MODEL RULES OF 
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT R. 6.2 cmt. 1 (“An individual lawyer fulfills this [pro bono] 
responsibility by accepting a fair share of unpopular matters or indigent or unpopular clients.”). 
Although the comments to the Model Rules have not been explicitly adopted in Louisiana, the 
Louisiana Supreme Court relies on the comments in interpreting and applying the Louisiana 
Rules of Professional Conduct. See, e.g., Farrington v. Law Firm of Sessions, Fishman, 687 So. 
2d 997, 999 (La. 1997); see also  Schmidt v. Gregorio, 705 So. 2d 742, 743 (La. App. Ct. 1993) 
(relying on ABA ethical opinion interpreting Model Rule of Professional Conduct). 
 The Model Code similarly directs that a person should not be denied representation 
because the client or the cause is unpopular or community reaction is adverse, but couches that 
obligation in terms of the lawyer’s duty not to decline such unattractive representation. See 
MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-26, 2-27, 2-28 (1980). 
 427. See, e.g., Louisiana State Bar Association, The Lawyers Oath, at http://www.lsba.org/ 
newsite/html/lawyers_oath.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2000); MI. STATE BAR R. 15, § 3 
(Procedure for Admission; Oath of Office) (1999). In an unexplained yet revealing act, the 
Louisiana Supreme Court struck this sentence from the new law student practice rule oath. See 
supra  note 236 and accompanying text. 
 428. ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 324 (1970). 
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a law school clinic, extended the obligation to encourage the 
acceptance of controversial clients and cases to attorneys involved in 
the oversight of law school clinics.429 The ABA’s Committee on 
Ethics and Professional Responsibility clarified that this duty applies 
to all attorneys: “We stress that all lawyers should use their best 
efforts to avoid the imposition of any unreasonable and unjustified 
restraints upon the rendition of legal services by legal services offices 
for the benefit of the indigent and should seek to remove such 
restraints where they exist.”430 
Again, the attorneys attacking the the availability of law school 
legal assistance ignored these ethical considerations and attempted to 
restrict the availability of legal services. The attorneys’ efforts were 
motivated primarily by the controversial nature of the clients and 
disagreement with their causes. For example, the attorney leading the 
Chamber sought to justify the organization’s actions by arguing that 
the projects that Tulane Clinic clients sought to block were beneficial 
to the community and should not be opposed by anyone.431 In a 
similar situation, the attorney who organized the effort to prohibit a 
University of Wyoming law professor from providing pro bono legal 
services complained of the radical, economically-damaging positions 
taken by the law professor’s clients.432 The attorneys heading up the 
Chamber and the Business Council argued that representation of 
community organizations that might object to certain large-scale 
development projects amounted to political activism and that clinics 
should be prohibited from handling such “politically motivated 
cases.”433 
 
 429. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 1208 (1972). 
 430. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 334 (1974). See also 
Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.P.A. 1159, 1217 (1958) 
(reporting that “No member of the Bar should indulge in public criticism of another lawyer 
because he has undertaken the representation of causes in general disfavor. Every member of 
the profession should, on the contrary, do what [they] can to promote a public understanding of 
the service rendered by the advocate . . .”). 
 431. See LeBlanc, supra  note 170. 
 432. Drake, supra  note 348; Lumpkin, supra  note 348. 
 433. See Supplemental Comments on Proposed Amendments to Law Student Practice 
Rule, supra  note 275 (including signature of attorneys LeBlanc and Abbott). The attorney 
chairman of The Chamber argued that certain types of law clinics, “particularly in the area of 
domestic relations, financial problems, criminal matters, and others,” pursue “legitimate goals” 
but that others, such as environmental law clinics, are “social programs and can even have 
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Representation of community groups is not “radical”— Louisiana 
is the only state that seeks to prohibit law schools from representing 
such entities. Nor is representation of community groups 
“political”—business associations are groups that have cadres of 
lawyers to represent them on environmental matters.434 When 
community groups sue for compliance with environmental laws, it is 
no more political than when businesses or business associations sue 
to avoid environmental restrictions.435 Business’ attacks on access to 
legal representation are simply a case of some lawyers believing that 
certain clients and their causes do not belong on the legal system’s 
playing field, to borrow the business interests’ own metaphor.436 
Attorneys in Louisiana sought to restrict not just the clients and 
cases that law clinics may volunteer to assist, but also their methods 
of lawyering. They argued that Tulane Clinic attorneys were overly 
zealous and had “gone too far” in raising the issue of environmental 
discrimination.437 The Chief Justice of the Louisiana Supreme Court 
contended that certain types of legal advocacy were “beyond the 
parameters of representing indigent people.”438 Again, these 
comments do not argue for a level playing field—they seek to restrict 
 
political agendas.” Sam A. LeBlanc, III, Debate Over the Law Clinic Practice Rule: Redux, 74 
T UL. L. REV. 219, 234 (1999). 
 By suggesting that law clinic clients are not capable of generating their own positions on 
environmental issues, these attorneys not only patronize those with less economic and political 
power, but also insinuate that clinic supervising attorneys are breaching their fiduciary duty to 
the client. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) & cmt. 1 (1999) (mandating that 
the client has the ultimate authority to determine the purposes to be served by legal 
representation); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-7 (1980). By pleading that 
potential clients be kept ignorant of their legal rights and remedies, the attorneys also ignore the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s observation that “we cannot accept the notion that it is always better for a 
person to suffer a wrong silently than to redress it by legal action.” Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 
350, 376 (1977). 
 434. I am indebted to Professor Oliver Houck for this observation. See also  Letter from 
Luz Molina, Acting Director, Loyola Law Clinic, and Jane Johnson, Director, Tulane Civil Law 
Clinic, to Pascal F. Calogero, Jr., Chief Justice, Louisiana Supreme Court (Dec. 15, 1998) (on 
file with author). 
 435. Id. 
 436. As one observer noted: “This is the equivalent of selectively disbarring attorneys who 
have won on controversial matters.” Frank H. Wu, A Lesson in Power Politics, NAT’L L.J., May 
3, 1999, at A21. 
 437. See LeBlanc, supra  note 170 and accompanying text; Coyle, supra  note 109 and 
accompanying text.  
 438. Varney, supra  note 3 and accompanying text. 
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how law school professors and students advocate so that their clients 
receive second-class lawyering.439 
Limiting the advocacy that certain clients and causes may receive 
is contrary to the rules of professional responsibility. Ethics rules 
mandate the duty of all attorneys “to use legal procedure for the 
fullest benefit of the client’s cause” and to zealously assert the 
client’s position under the rules of the adversary system.440 
Moreover, the assertion that certain people should receive 
different, and less, advocacy is repugnant to notions of fair play and 
due process. As Supreme Court Justice Lewis Powell argued, “[i]t is 
fundamental that justice should be the same, in substance and 
availability, without regard to economic status.”441 There is nothing 
unique about law clinics that makes certain types of advocacy 
inappropriate; once a clinic agrees to represent the client, clinic 
attorneys are ethically bound, like all lawyers, to use the legal system 
to their client’s fullest advantage. 
Attempts by attorneys to get university officials to intervene 
against law school professors and students are particularly 
disturbing.442 Model Rule 5.4(c) provides that “[a] lawyer shall not 
permit a person who recommends, employs, or pays the lawyer to 
render legal services for another to direct or regulate the lawyer’s 
professional judgment in rendering such advice.”443 Efforts of an 
attorney to get law professors to provide something less than diligent, 
 
 439. See Interview with Archibald Cox, Professor, Harvard Law School, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REP., Aug. 3, 1981, at 33 (quoting Cox as arguing that to ensure persons represented by 
legal service attorneys do not get second-class coverage, legal services attorneys must be able to 
do all the things that privately -retained attorneys do for their clients). See also Valazquez v. 
Legal Services Corporation, 164 F.3d 757, 769-72 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding restrictions on Legal 
Services Corporation lawyer’s ability to amend or challenge existing laws unconstitional), cert. 
granted, 120 S.Ct. 1553 (2000). 
 440. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 cmt.1 (1999); Id., at Preamble cmt. 2 
(1999). The Model Code reads: “A Lawyer Should Represent a Client Zealously Within the 
Bounds of the Law.” MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1980). 
 441. M. Catherine Richardson, Legal Services for the Poor Should Be Maintained, 
N.Y.L.J., May 1, 1997, at S1 & n.3 (reprinting quote by Justice Powell in Francis J. Larkin, The 
Legal Services Corporation Must Be Saved, JUDGES J., Winter 1995, at 1).  
 442. See supra  notes 183-84 and accompanying text (noting efforts of Governor Foster’s 
special counsel to get Tulane officials to intervene). 
 443. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4(c) (1999). The Model Code contains an 
almost identical provision. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-107(B) (1980) 
(“Avoiding Influence by Others Than the Client”). 
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zealous representation can be viewed as attempts to induce other 
attorneys to violate ethical rules and commit professional 
misconduct.444 
The blacklisting of clinic students in hiring practices445 also raises 
significant ethical concerns. While the Model Rules prohibit a lawyer 
from entering into an agreement that restricts another lawyer’s right 
to practice law, the rules do not explicitly addresses discriminatory 
hiring practices.446 It is professional misconduct to “engage in 
conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.”447 
However, this prohibition refers to bias or prejudice based on race, 
sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation, or 
socioeconomic status, and only if that bias or prejudice was 
manifested in the course of representing a client.448  
Although no rule might explicitly prohibit blacklisting, the 
comments to the Model Rules state that “representing a client does 
not constitute approval of the client’s views or activities.”449 
Additionally, there are ethical provisions, noted above, establishing 
the responsibilities of an attorney to ensure that legal representation is 
available to those whose cause is controversial or unpopular. 
Moreover, the emerging professionalism movement and its emphasis 
on civility and the accessibility of the legal system to all persons 
dictates that no law student or law school should be punished simply 
for providing legal assistance to an unpopular client or cause. 
Attacks on the availability of legal representation cannot be 
justified as simply a case of following the directives of an elected 
official, carrying out the decisions of a business association, or doing 
the bidding of the attorney’s client. These attacks have not occurred 
in the attorneys’ capacity as paid advocates for their clients’ interests, 
 
 444. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(a) (1999) (stating it is professional 
misconduct for a lawyer to knowingly assist or induce another to violate or attempt to violate 
the Rules of Professional Conduct). 
 445. See supra  text accompanying notes 199-202. If the hiring boycott of Tulane students 
by chemical companies were lead by employees who are attorneys, then those discriminatory 
hiring practices would raise the same ethical issues for those attorneys. See supra notes 136-39 
and accompanying text. 
 446. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.6 (1999).  
 447. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(d). 
 448. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(a) cmt. 2. 
 449. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 3. 
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but outside the law firm employment context. In the disbarment 
proceedings against former Vice-President Spiro T. Agnew, the court 
rejected the argument that the ethical rules do not apply to an attorney 
when working for an elected official or when engaged in some 
activity other than the practice of law: 
The professional ethical obligations of an attorney, as long as 
he remains a member of the bar, are not affected by a decision 
to pursue his livelihood by practicing law, entering the 
business world, becoming a public servant, or embarking upon 
any other endeavor. . . . [A] lawyer who enters public life does 
not leave behind the canons of legal ethics.450 
Furthermore, Model Rules 6.3 and 6.4, and similar provisions in 
the Model Code, clarify that a lawyer may serve as a director, officer, 
or member of a service organization, including legal services or law 
reform organizations, even if that organization may serve persons or 
advance interests adverse to the lawyer’s client.451 Thus, whatever 
moral insulation is afforded when the attorney acts pursuant to the 
client’s direction is generally unavailable when the attorney is acting 
outside the context of the attorney-client relationship. Consistent with 
other ethical obligations to clients who may want a law clinic or law 
professor silenced, an attorney may support, or at a minimum remain 
neutral toward, the legal service efforts of a law school. An attorney 
cannot justify attacks as a means to aid clients who have not retained 
the attorney for the purpose of attacking the law school program. 
This critique is not offered to single out certain attorneys for 
criticism. Rather it is offered to show how easily the public service 
provisions of the rules of professional responsibility are ignored 
when attorneys perceive them to be contrary to their own, or their 
 
 450. Md. State Bar Ass’n Inc. v. Agnew, 318 A.2d 811, 815 (Md. Ct. App. 1974). An 
ethical violation by a lawyer who also is a public official “makes his offense a more serious one 
than a singular violation of the disciplinary rules by an individual attorney.” Office of 
Disciplinary Counsel v. Eilberg, 441 A.2d 1193, 1197 (Pa. 1982). 
 451. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 6.4, 6.5 (1999); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L 
RESPONSIBILITY Canon 8, EC 8-1 (1980). The Model Rules’ endorsement of uncompensated 
public service notwithstanding the client’s interests is tempered by the comment that “[i]n 
determining the nature and scope of participation in such activities, a lawyer should be mindful 
of obligations to clients under other Rules, particularly Rule 1.7 [conflicts of interest].” MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 6.4 cmt. 1 (1999). 
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client’s, interests. Attorneys seeking to deny pro bono legal 
representation by law schools obviously failed to consider whether 
their efforts are inconsistent with ethical responsibilities.452  
The apparent ease with which attorneys ethically disengage from 
one of the defining characteristics of the legal profession is troubling. 
How can one explain prominent attorneys leading attacks on other 
attorneys seeking to ensure that legal representation is available to all 
citizens? How is it possible that at an Inns of Court meeting on 
professionalism an attorney proclaims that firms should discriminate 
in hiring decisions against students who participate in clinic 
programs? 
One answer to these questions is the intense economic pressures 
attorneys encounter and the win-at-all-costs attitude that results.453 By 
working to deny legal assistance to opposing clients and causes, 
lawyers, although not retained to make such attacks, may perceive 
that they are increasing their economic rewards through future 
business from pleased clients or easier wins in future cases.454 
 
 452. See, e.g., LeBlanc, supra  note 170, at 234 (arguing that concern over new law clinic 
restrictions are much ado about nothing and contending that new restrictions will achieve 
“justice for all under law,” but failing to propose any alternative source of legal assistance for 
those now unable to obtain the assistance of the state’s law clinics); Morning Edition, supra 
note 184 and accompanying text (quoting Governor Foster’s special counsel defending the 
denial of legal assistance by arguing that “individuals don’t have a constitutional right to have 
free legal assistance in civil cases”). 
 453. See generally Orrin K. Ames, III, Duty to the Client: The Need for Perspective and 
Balance, FLA. BAR NEWS, Oct. 1, 1999, at 24; Professionalism in Practice, ABA J., August 
1998, at 48, 52-56 (reprinting a panel discussion on economic pressures that contribute to 
unprofessional or unethical behavior); Terry Carter, “Inns of Court” Movement Taming 
“Rambo” Lawyers, NAT’L L.J., June 5, 1989, at 8 (stating that the emphasis on the bottom line 
has skewed some perceptions of the ethical lines not to be crossed). 
 454. Norman Spaulding has noted that “paying clients (in many instances without even 
speaking a word on the subject) have a great deal of authority to determine which public 
interest causes and pro bono clients [of firms] are legitimate. Paying clients thus help define the 
line between popular and unpopular clients of limited means.” Norman W. Spaulding, The 
Prophet and the Bureaucrat: Positional Conflicts in Service Pro Bono Publico, 50 STAN. L. 
REV. 1395, 1420 (1998). Professor Laurence Tribe observed that “[t]oo many lawyers use their 
poorer and less powerful clients, and let themselves get used by their richer and more powerful 
clients.” Michael S. Serrill, A Prophet’s Unlikely Defender, T IME , Jan. 23, 1984, at 34 (quoting 
from comment by Tribe about the role lawyers play in American society). 
 Regardless of an influential client’s perceived wishes, an attorney’s effort to delay or deny 
access to legal representation motivated by a desire for financial gain is contrary to the lawyer’s 
oath to never “delay any person’s cause for lucre or malice.” See Louisiana Bar Association, 
supra  note 427 and accompanying text.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 33 Kuehn.doc  3/22/01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
130 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 4:33 
 
 
Another explanation may be the failure of ethical rules to condemn 
clearly behavior that is intended to deny legal representation to 
others. By not making this responsibility explicit, a lawyer may 
rationalize that this obligation is less important than the explicit 
ethical rules, such as the obligation to zealously represent the 
client.455 
1. Reinforcing the Duty of Non-Interference With Legal 
Representation of Unpopular Causes 
The lack of respect for professional obligations demonstrates the 
need for a number of reforms. First, the AALS should explicitly 
prohibit law firms from discriminating against law schools and clinic 
students in their hiring practices. The AALS already bars a legal 
employer from recruiting at law schools if the firm discriminates on 
the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age, disability, 
or sexual orientation.456 A similar rule is needed to prohibit 
employers from discriminating on the basis of a law student’s 
participation in a law school course or program or on the basis of a 
law school’s offering of a particular course or program.457 
 
 455. See generally David Fagelson, Rights and Duties: The Ethical Obligations to Serve 
the Poor, 17 LAW & INEQ. 171, 172 (1999) (arguing that failure to make explicit the ethical 
principles that impose an obligation to serve the poor has lead to skepticism about the existence 
of such an obligation). 
 456. AALS, EXECUTIVE COMM. REG. 6.19 (1999) (stating that each member school shall, 
as a condition of obtaining any form of placement assistance, require employers to provide an 
assurance of the employer’s willingness to observe the principles of equal opportunity stated in 
Bylaw 6-4(b)). Bylaw 6-4(b) reads, in part: “A member school shall pursue a policy of 
providing its students and graduates with equal opportunity to obtain employment without 
discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age, 
handicap or disability, or sexual orientation.” AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF LAW SCHOOLS, 
BYLAW SEC. 6-4(b) (1999). 
 457. Employers have the right to interview and hire students based on what class or 
program they have participated in or, conversely, to exclude students based on what class or 
program they have not participated in where such decisions are related to bona fide 
qualifications for the job. However, excluding students from interviews or employment based 
on what class or program they have participated in is not linked to bona fide qualifications for 
employment. E-mail from Peter Joy, Professor, Washington University School of Law, to 
Antionette Lopez, Professor, University of New Mexico School of Law (May 3, 2000) (on file 
with author) (including recommendation from the Political Interference Group of the AALS 
Section on Clinical Legal Education that AALS adopt a rule prohibiting prospective employers 
from discriminating against students on the grounds of their participation in law school courses 
or programs). 
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Further, to ensure that attorneys do not interfere with legal 
representation of persons or organizations who lack funds or whose 
cause is unpopular, ethics rules should adopt an explicit responsibility 
not to interfere. An attorney could interpret the present rule to mean 
that an attorney cannot reject a person or cause who seeks that 
particular attorney’s assistance.458 While the explicit responsibility to 
ensure that those unable to afford an attorney are represented implies 
an equal duty not to interfere with such representation, the ethical 
rules are silent on this countervailing obligation of non-
interference.459 
The rules of professional responsibility need to state that a 
lawyer’s duty not to deny legal services based on a person’s views or 
activities also means that an attorney should not seek to interfere with 
the efforts of other attorneys to provide representation to these 
persons.460 Moreover, this duty should be adopted as a mandatory 
rule, not simply as an interpretory comment.461 Absent the authority 
and prominence of a rule, an attorney could claim ignorance or read 
 
 458. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 3 (1999); MODEL CODE OF 
PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 2, EC 2-26, 2-27, 2-28 (1980). But see ABA Comm. on Ethics 
and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 334 (1974) (stating “all lawyers” should seek to avoid 
imposing restraints on the availability of legal services for indigents and should seek to remove 
such restraints where they exist). 
 459. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 6.1 (1999); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L 
RESPONSIBILITY Canon 2, EC 2-25, 8-3 (1980). 
 460. Surprisingly, very little has been written on the notion that attorneys have a duty not to 
interfere with the efforts of other attorneys to provide legal services to those unable to pay or 
whose cause is unpopular. Timothy Terrell and James Wildman argue that a lawyer’s 
responsibility to assist and enable those in the profession who desire to distribute legal services 
to those unable to pay means that “lawyers at the very least should not interfere with the efforts 
of other lawyers who seek to provide this wide distribution.” Timothy P. Terrell & James H. 
Wildman, Rethinking “Professionalism,” 41 EMORY L.J. 403, 430-31 (1992). However, they 
rely on concepts of professionalism, not rules of professional conduct, as the basis for this 
responsibility not to interfere with the pro bono efforts of others. See E. Wayne Thode, The 
Ethical Standard for the Advocate, 34 T EXAS L. REV. 575, 592, 596-97 (1961) (proposing the 
following oath: “I recognize that it is sometimes difficult for clients with unpopular causes to 
obtain proper legal representation. I will do all that I can to assure that the client with the 
unpopular cause is properly represented and that the lawyer representing such a client receives 
credit from and support of the bar for handling such a matter.”). 
 461. The text of the rules of professional responsibility are authoritative and create duties, 
while the comments are intended as guides to interpreting the rules. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT Preamble cmts. 13, 21 (1999). Many states that follow the Model Rules have not 
explicitly adopted the comments, although they do use the comments to interpret and apply 
their state rules of professional responsibility. See supra  note 426.  
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the duty as less important than the explicit provisions in the ethical 
rules.462 Without a strong statement that interference with efforts to 
ensure that all persons have access to legal representation will not be 
tolerated, attacks by attorneys on law school professors and clinics 
will continue. 
D. Judicial Integrity and Independence Lost 
To observers, the conduct of the Louisiana Supreme Court 
regarding the Tulane Clinic was about politics—the politics of a 
popular governor determined to get his way or to punish those who 
interfered; the politics of business organizations willing to use their 
influence to elect judges that would vote favorably for their interests; 
and the politics of judges worried about being reelected.463 Clearly, 
what the conduct of the court did not reflect was strict adherence to 
ideals of appropriate judicial conduct, an independent judiciary, or 
 
 462. Even if this responsibility of non-interference were made explicit, there is still the 
problem that it is prefaced with the language that legal representation “should not,” rather than 
“shall not,” be denied. Consequently, noncompliance would not give rise to a disciplinary 
action. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble cmt. 13 (1999) (casting imperatives 
in “shall not” defines proper conduct for purposes of professional discipline; others, such as 
“may,” are permissive and define areas in which the lawyer has professional discretion); Id. at 
R. 6.1 cmt. 11 (explaining that the responsibility to render pro bono publico service is not 
intended to be enforced through disciplinary process).  
 Potential First Amendment problems may argue against a mandatory prohibition on efforts 
to restrict the availability of legal services to those unable to pay or whose cause is 
controversial. See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Intersection of Free Speech and the 
Legal Profession: Constraints on Lawyers’ First Amendment Rights, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 569, 
587 (1998) (“When speaking in clearly public capacities . . . lawyers receive relatively robust 
free speech protection . . .. [W]hen speaking in capacities that might adversely implicate the 
administration of justice or perception of administration of justice by the government, the Court 
has regarded the government as freer to place conditions on its sponsorship”). 
 463. See, e.g., Frontline: Justice for Sale (PBS television broadcast, Nov. 23, 1999) (on file 
with author) (reporting that the actions of the Chief Justice were influenced by a desire to 
secure business support for a reelection campaign); Gill, supra note 279 (“[I]t is an impossible 
chore to put an acceptable gloss on rules that sacrifice the public interest, and the noblest goals 
of the legal profession, to sordid legal expediency. The real reason for the new rules . . . is 
obvious to everyone. The court has caved in to demands from the captions of industry.”); 
DuBos, supra  note 280 (“Bowing to pressure from well-heeled business interests that are more 
interested in economics than the environment . . .”); Siobhan Roth, State Ruling Chills Legal 
Clinicians, LEGAL T IMES, Sept. 7, 1998, at S39 (reporting that the Tulane Law School dean 
notes that a request for change to the student practice rule arose in an election year in which two 
justices were up for reelection and in which the influence of the business groups over the 
justices had grown). 
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equal justice for all. 
Ethics rules expressly require that judicial decision making 
exclude political concerns. The Model Code of Judicial Conduct, as 
well as the Louisiana judicial code, state that “a judge shall uphold 
the integrity and independence of the judiciary” and “shall avoid 
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.”464 
The codes require a judge to “act at all times in a manner that 
promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the 
judiciary,” and prohibit a judge from allowing “political or other 
relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment.”465 An 
appearance of impropriety results when “the conduct would create in 
reasonable minds a perception that the judge’s ability to carry out 
judicial responsibilities with integrity, impartiality and competence is 
impaired.”466 
The Louisiana Supreme Court’s investigation of the Tulane Clinic 
appeared improper and lacked integrity, independence, and 
impartiality. The Chief Justice reportedly admitted that politics on the 
court influenced the court’s decision.467 The federal judge reviewing 
the constitutionality of the new restrictions condoned the court’s 
restrictions and stated that political decisions by Louisiana’s elected 
judiciary are to be expected.468 As set forth in Part II, the manner in 
which the court conducted its investigation of the Tulane Clinic 
furthered the appearance of impropriety. Examples abound: refusing 
requests to provide an opportunity for the parties most affected by the 
new restrictions to be heard yet inviting comments from business 
interests; denying requests of the law school deans, bar association 
and state attorney general for public hearings and a stay of the new 
 
 464. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1, 2 (1999); LA. CODE OF JUDICIAL 
CONDUCT Canon 1, 2 (1999). 
 465. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2A, 2B (1999); LA. CODE OF JUDICIAL 
CONDUCT Canon 2A, 2B (1997); see also  MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3B 
(1997) (mandating that in the performance of administrative responsibilities, judges shall 
discharge their responsibilities without bias or prejudice); LA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
Canon 3B (1999) (same). 
 466. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2A (1997). 
 467. See supra  notes 265-68 and accompanying text. In public, the Chief Justice denied 
that politics had anything to do with the court’s law clinic decision. Schleifstein, supra note 93 
(newspaper interview with Chief Justice Calogero). 
 468. See S. Christian Leadership Conference, 61 F. Supp. at 507. 
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restrictions; discouraging participation by the bar association and 
other lawyer groups in the Clinic review; failing to abide by its 
promise that the law schools would be notified and allowed an 
opportunity to comment in advance of any change to the student 
practice rule; assigning an official from the business groups to 
investigate the law clinics and serve as the court’s chief spokesperson 
on the new restrictions; refusing to require business groups to support 
their allegations with facts; ignoring numerous requests from the law 
schools and the affected community organizations to discuss the new 
restrictions; and refusing to provide the public and the law schools 
access to the information on which the new restrictions were based.  
Any one of these actions would support a claim that the court 
acted in a manner that created the appearance of impropriety and lack 
of judicial independence.469 Collectively, however, they suggest that 
the court abandoned any effort to ensure that the review process was 
fair, impartial, and competent. When, in the midst of the court’s 
review, the business groups dropped the pretext of concern over the 
operation of all of the state’s law clinics and focused their complaints 
and requests for restrictions exclusively on the Tulane Clinic, the 
AALS argued that this became an economically and politically-
motivated effort to restrict a specific clinic and that the business 
groups claims of unethical or illegal activity should be reviewed by 
the appropriate state ethics committee and not by the court.470 Even 
though the court later acknowledged that it was investigating claims 
of “unethical” conduct and even though one justice subsequently 
maintained that the Clinic violated the existing student practice rule, 
the court did not accede to the request for appropriate disciplinary 
proceeding safeguards.471 If it had agreed to the request for 
 
 469. Professor Graham Strong argues that the court’s cozy relationship with business 
interests “is, in itself, an ethical concern for the court because they have the responsibility to 
make the public feel . . . they are getting an impartial judiciary.” Daugherty, supra note 224, at 
9. Chief Judge Joseph F. Murphy, Jr. of the Maryland Court of Special Appeals observed that, 
“[t]he criticism that this is judicial meddling in a legislative function is not totally without 
merit.” Nancy Kercheval, Louisiana Style Crackdown on Legal Clinics Not Expected at 
Maryland’s Law Schools, DAILY REC. (Baltimore, Md.), Nov. 28, 1998, at 1C.  
 470. Letter from Carl C. Monk, Executive Director, Association of American Law Schools, 
to Pascal F. Calogero, Jr., Chief Justice, Louisiana Supreme Court (Apr. 3, 1998) (on file with 
author).  
 471. See Kohl, supra  note 250 (indicating from the notes of a private meeting with Justices 
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safeguards, the court would have been required to provide the law 
schools with the due process rights afforded all attorneys who are 
alleged to have violated the rules of professional conduct.472 
In addition to the code of judicial conduct, judges are also subject 
to the rules of professional responsibility, including the duties to 
provide pro bono service and not to deny legal assistance to those 
unable to afford legal services or with controversial or unpopular 
causes. Thus, the same concerns about the actions by lawyers in the 
attack on the Tulane Clinic apply equally to judges. Like the 
attorneys attacking the Tulane Clinic, at no time did the justices of 
the Louisiana Supreme Court express concern that the Clinic’s clients 
would now be without legal representation, with the exception of the 
one justice who dissented from the new clinic restrictions. Moreover, 
the court was not troubled that the attack was motivated by 
disagreement with the economic and political positions of clinic 
clients. The court sought to justify its failure to address the lack of 
necessary legal services to lower-income individuals and 
organizations by asserting that access to legal representation is a 
“social program” that the court is not charged with instituting.473 This 
justification may explain why the court struck the provision from the 
student attorney oath that pledged to never reject the cause of the 
defenseless or oppressed.474 
Asserting that a state supreme court lacks the authority to address 
the unavailability of legal services abdicates the court’s responsibility 
to ensure that lawyers practic ing under its supervision respect the 
rules of professional conduct. While a court may hesitate to institute 
mandatory pro bono reporting or service programs or to determine 
 
Kimball and Lemmon that the court was reviewing charges against Tulane Clinic which, “if 
true, would be ‘unethical’”); Resolution Amending Rule XX, at 1, 2 (La. Mar. 22, 1999) 
(Lemmon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) reprinted in  74 TUL. L. REV. 285, 292-
93 (1999). The Louisiana Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement provide that it is the 
disciplinary counsel, not the supreme court, who shall initially evaluate and investigate 
allegations of lawyer misconduct. LA. SUP. CT. R. XIX sec. 11(F) (2000). 
 472. See LA. SUP. CT. R. XIX secs. 11, 18 (2000) (guaranteeing that if an action on a 
complaint of misconduct results in other than dismissal by disciplinary counsel, respondent 
shall be afforded the procedural protections set forth in the code of civil procedure and code of 
evidence). 
 473. Resolution Amending Rule XX, at 2 (La. Mar. 22, 1999) (Calogero, C.J.), reprinted in 
74 T UL. L. REV. 285, 288 (1999). 
 474. See supra  note 236 and accompanying text. 
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ways to increase the availability of law clinic services to needy 
citizens, it cannot contend that it lacks the authority to address the 
problem. After all, the Louisiana Supreme Court claimed to have 
“exclusive and plenary power to define and regulate all facets of the 
practice of law, including . . . the professional responsibility and 
conduct of lawyers.”475 Whatever the true motivation for refusing to 
address the legal needs of the Clinics’ former clients, by all 
appearances the Louisiana Supreme Court was simply looking for a 
way to address the business organizations’ requests that the playing 
field be “evened” by running off Clinic lawyers and their clients.476 
The absence of any rule governing how the court adopts or 
amends court rules of practice may also explain the apparent ease 
with which the Louisiana Supreme Court denied procedural rights to 
the law clinics and the public. The applicability of legislated rule-
 
 475. Memorandum of the Louisiana Supreme Court in Support of Its Motion to Dismiss 
This Action for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted and For Lack of 
Standing at 11, S. Christian Leadership Conference v. Supreme Court of La., 61 F. Supp. 2d 
499 (E.D. La. 1999) (No. 99-1205). 
 On a prior occasion, the Louisiana Supreme Court argued that nothing in its authority can 
or should be used to deprive a person who cannot afford an attorney from gaining access to the 
court. La. State Bar Ass’n. v. Edwins, 329 So. 2d 437, 446 (La. 1976) (“We do not believe any 
bar disciplinary rule can or should contemplate depriving poor people from access to the court 
so as effectively to assert their claim.”). The court further noted that a court -adopted rule that 
places an unreasonable burden upon an individual’s right to enforce claims allowed by law 
“might be deemed violative of the access to the courts guaranteed to all our people by our state 
constitution.” Id. (citing LA. CONST. art. 1, § 22). 
 476. See supra  notes 266-67 and accompanying text (reporting that Chief Justice Calogero 
justifies restrictions as effort to even-up the playing field by preventing Tulane Clinic from 
outgunning the other side). This same justification for the special restrictions on clinic clients is 
reflected in the Chief Justice’s opinion: “[N]or may the Court take executive or legislative 
positions either in favor of or against legal partisans.” Resolution Amending Rule XX, at 2 (La. 
Mar. 22, 1999) (Calogero, C.J.), reprinted in 74 T UL. L. REV. 285, 288 (1999). 
 Reflecting a view different from the Louisiana Supreme Court, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court has recognized the importance of ensuring that public interest advocates are heard: “The 
practice of public interest law is a much needed catalyst in our legal system. It helps to create a 
balance of economic and social interests and to assure that  all interests have a fair chance to be 
heard with the help of an attorney.” Township of Mt. Laurel v. Pub. Advocate, 416 A.2d 886, 
893 (N.J. 1980). Law professor and former Watergate Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox also 
proposes to deal with conflicting interests without restricting one side’s access to legal 
representation: “provide counsel for both, and the courts decide who’s right.” See Interview 
With Archibald Cox, supra  note 439. Likewise, the ABA has urged greater availability of law 
clinic services to those raising environmental justice claims. ABA House of Delegates, supra 
note 187. 
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making procedures to the judicial branch is unclear.477 Moreover, 
when courts adopt or amend court rules, the courts act in a legislative 
capacity that does not implicate the same procedural rights as 
adjudicative or administrative proceedings.478 
The federal rules of procedure require that rules governing court 
practice shall only be adopted or amended after public notice and an 
opportunity for public comment.479 A number of state supreme courts 
have adopted similar notice and comment requirements for court 
rulemaking; some also require that proposals for rules be reviewed by 
advisory committees.480 These requirements ensure that courts will 
hear from the bar and those most affected by new rules prior to 
imposing any restriction on access to legal representation. 
On the same day that the Louisiana Supreme Court issued the new 
restrictions on the law clinics, it released the results of a public 
opinion poll showing that 91% of the state’s residents believe that 
politically-connected individuals are treated differently by state 
courts; eighty-two percent believe that the wealthy and poor are 
treated dissimilarly by the state’s judicial system.481 When the 
pollsters asked what role, if any, politics played in court dealings, the 
 
 477. See, e.g., La. Consumers’ League, Inc. v. La. Pub. Service Comm’n, 351 So. 2d 128, 
132-33 (La. 1977) (imposing a requirement of reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard 
upon independent public service commission; Chief Justice Calogero would go further and 
apply the state administrative procedure act even though the commission is a constitutionally-
created state agency). 
 478. See, e.g., Lewis v. La. State Bar Ass’n, 792 F.2d 493, 497 (5th Cir. 1986). This is not 
to suggest that those with liberty or property interests affected by judicial rule making have no 
due process rights. See, e.g., Schware v. Bd. Bar Exam’rs, 353 U.S. 232 (1957) (holding that 
state supreme court denied due process where record did not support refusal to grant admission 
to bar); Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 249-50 (1980) (holding that due process 
requires impartial decision maker). 
 479. FED. R. CIV. P. 83(a)(1) (1999); FED. R. CR. P. 57; see also  28 U.S.C. § 2071(b) 
(1999) (mandating that any rule proscribed by a federal court, other than the Supreme Court, 
shall only be adopted after giving pubic notice and an opportunity to comment). At least one 
court has suggested that such judicial rule making conform with the requirements of the federal 
administrative procedure act. See Baylson v. Disciplinary Bd. of Supreme Court of Pa., 764 F. 
Supp. 328, 334 (E.D. Pa. 1991), aff’d on other grounds, 975 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. 
denied, 507 U.S. 984 (1993). 
 480. See, e.g., IL. SUP. CT. R. 3 (2000); IL. SUP. CT., ADMIN. ORDER, MR. NOS. 10549, 
3140 (1997); OH. SUP. CT. R. 5(A) (1999); UT. SUP. CT. R. PROF. PRACTICE 11-101 (2000). 
Each federal court, except the Supreme Court, is required to appoint an advisory committee for 
the study of the court’s rules of practice. 28 U.S.C. § 2077(b) (1999). 
 481. See Joe Gyan, Jr., Survey: Treatment in Court Unequal, ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, 
La.), June 17, 1998, at 1A. 
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standard response was laughter and comments questioning the 
seriousness of the researcher’s inquiry.482 Similar polls in other states 
found that voters, by large margins, believed that judicial decisions 
are influenced by campaign contributions483 and that attorneys and 
judges agreed that campaign donations influence judicial decisions.484 
The mere perception that the judiciary may be selling its 
independence caused Justice Anthony Kennedy to warn: 
This [figure showing the public’s belief that judges are 
influenced by money] is serious because the law commands 
allegiance only if it commands respect. It commands respect 
only if the public thinks the judges are neutral. And when you 
have figures like that, the judicial system is in real trouble.485 
Given that polls show that public confidence in the integrity and 
impartiality of the judiciary is already extremely low, one might 
expect courts to be more attentive to the manner in which they treat 
law clinics and their clients.486 One explanation, albeit a cynical one, 
 
 482. Pamela Coyle, Does Politics Influence Courts? Funny Question, T IMES-PICAYUNE 
(New Orleans, La.), June 17, 1998, at B1. 
 483. Erwin Chemerinsky, Preserving an Independent Judiciary: The Need for Contribution 
and Expenditure Limitations in Judicial Elections, 74 CHI-KENT L. REV. 133, 138 & n.26 
(1998) (finding in an Ohio poll that 81% of residents believed that judges’ decisions are 
influenced some or most of the time by campaign contributions); Sheila Kaplan, The Very Best 
Judges That Money Can Buy, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 29, 1999, at 35, 36 (finding in a 
Texas State Supreme Court and Texas State Bar Association poll that 83% of the public think 
judges are unduly influenced by campaign contributions); Michelle Millhollon, Poll: Funds 
Can Sway La. Judges, ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.), Jan. 10, 2000, at 1A (reflecting that by a 
56% to 33% margin, East Baton Rouge Parish voters believe that campaign contributions 
influence judges’ decisions and 66% of college graduates believe that contributions influence 
decisions). 
 484. In a Texas poll, almost half of the judges considered campaign donations to be fairly 
or very influential in affecting judges’ decisions and 79% of lawyers also believed contributions 
affected judges’ decisions. See Joy, supra  note 258, at 274 & nn.200-21 (citing poll by Texas 
State Supreme Court and Texas State Bar Association); see also Kaplan, supra note 483, at 36 
(citing same poll). 
 485. Frontline: Justice for Sale, supra note 463 (interviewing Justices Anthony Kennedy 
and Stephen Breyer about the effect of political donations on state judgeship races); see also 
Kaplan, supra  note 483, at 36. 
 486. Upon reelection, Chief Justice Calogero stated that improving public perception of the 
performance of the state’s judicial system was his “top priority.” Gyan, supra note 281, at 1A. 
Similarly, in his 1999 State of the Judiciary speech, Chief Justice Calogero acknowledged the 
strong public perception of court bias based on wealth and political connections and stated that 
his “objective is to devote the remaining 8 years of [his] term of office to continuing 
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for the Louisiana Supreme Court’s blind eye to the unfairness of the 
process and the public perception it created is that the public opinion 
polls are right—the political and economic power of politicians and 
business interests is so great that the court dared not refuse their 
demands to rein in law clinics. Another explanation could be that the 
court was blinded by its own claim of unbridled power to regulate 
student attorneys and who they can represent.487 Apparently, the court 
took this power to include the ability to conduct an investigation that, 
by all appearances, failed to comport with judicial standards of 
integrity, impartiality, and due process. 
1. Increasing Judicial Integrity and Independence in Overseeing 
Access to Legal Representation 
The conduct of the Louisiana Supreme Court supports the need 
for procedures to help restore public trust in courts and reduce the 
influence of politics and campaign contributions on access to legal 
representation. 
One lesson garnered from the way in which the “discussion” of 
the operation of all the Louisiana’s law clinics turned into an 
investigation of a particular law clinic is that couching misconduct in 
the form of a request for new regulations on lawyer conduct should 
not nullify the procedural rights of an attorney under the state’s 
disciplinary process. If a person relies on an allegation of misconduct 
to justify a request for new regulations on an attorney’s conduct, then 
a court should refer the allegation to the disciplinary process, or 
 
improvement of the administration of the Judicial Branch as a whole, as well as its image.” 
Press Release, Louisiana Supreme Court (Mar. 30, 1999) (on file with author) (containing the 
chief justice’s speech). 
 487. See, e.g., Memorandum of the Louisiana Supreme Court in Support of Its Motion to 
Dismiss, supra  note 475, at 8-11 (arguing that the court has exclusive and plenary power to 
define and regulate all facets of the practice of law; rules it establishes limiting the parties that 
non-lawyers may represent are uniquely within its constitutional, statutory, and inherent 
authority). 
 The Louisiana Supreme Court used this same assertion of unbridled authority to justify its 
refusal to supply applicants who fail the bar exam with access to their graded exam (which is 
immediately destroyed), sample best answers, or model answers used by bar examiners. See 
Gary R. Robert, Criticism of Louisiana’s Chief Justice is Justified, T IMES-PICAYUNE (New 
Orleans, La.), Jan. 14, 2000, at 6B (letter to editor) (criticizing manner in which court oversees 
the bar admissions process). 
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instruct the complainant to do so, and delay any consideration of the 
request for new rules pending the outcome of that process.488 
In addition, the experience of the Tulane Clinic confirms the need 
for courts to adopt written notice and comment procedures governing 
the adoption and amendment of rules of practice. It is insupportable 
that courts, charged with ensuring that citizens are afforded due 
process rights when executive branch agencies engage in rule 
making, should not provide equivalent rights when they adopt or 
amend rules. Court rules have the same ability to harm the property 
or liberty interests of attorneys or the public. 
The actions of the Louisiana Supreme Court support the 
observation that judicial elections impede the independence of the 
courts and threaten “the most essential safeguard of a free society.”489 
Judges are elected in some form in thirty-nine states.490 Many legal 
scholars have commented on the problems associated with an elected 
judiciary and proposed reforms such as judicial appointments, 
limitations on campaign contributions and expenditures, and 
publicly-financed judicial campaigns.491 Organizations in Louisiana 
 
 488. I am indebted to Professor Peter Joy for this proposal. When an earlier complaint was 
made against the Tulane Clinic and the court was asked to exercise its oversight of Rule XX to 
determine if action by the court was needed, the Louisiana Supreme Court refused to take any 
action and referred the complaining party to the rules of professional conduct. Letter from 
Pascal F. Calogero, Jr., to Kai David Midboe, supra  note 204; see also supra notes 204-06 and 
accompanying text. 
 489. William S. Sessions, Professional Obligations, ABA J., Aug. 1998, at 62, 64 (quoting 
a 1970 statement by Senator Sam J. Erwin, Jr.). The president of the ABA has argued: “When 
the independence of judges is threatened, we risk our democratic institutions of separation of 
powers, checks and balances, and judicial protection of constitutional liberties.” Jerome J. 
Shestack, With Professionalism Movement Under Way, It is Time for Lawyers to Address 
Justice Issues, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 3, 1998, at C1, C15. 
 490. Kaplan, supra note 483, at 35. 
 491. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Judicial Independence and Democratic Accountability 
in Highest State Courts, 61 LAW & CONTEMP . PROBS. 79, 113-25 (Summer 1998) (reviewing 
and critiquing proposals for addressing problems with judicial elections); John J. Hill, Jr., 
Taking Texas Judges Out of Politics: An Argument for Merit Election, 40 BAYLOR L. REV. 339 
(1988) (presenting argument by former chief justice of Texas Supreme Court for merit selection 
of judges); Peter A. Joy, Insulation Needed for Elected Judges, NAT’L L.J., Jan 10, 2000, at 
A19 (arguing for stronger recusal rules and low campaign contribution limits); Thomas R. 
Phillips, Comment, 61 LAW & CONTEMP . PROBS. 127, 138 (Summer 1998) (presenting proposal 
by chief justice of Texas Supreme Court for a comprehensive system of public funding of 
judicial elections); see also  REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASS’N 
T ASK FORCE ON LAWYERS’ POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS (July 1998) (recommending six steps 
to address judicial campaign problems, including limits on contributions and recusal of judges 
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are using the court’s attack on the Tulane Clinic as a prime example 
for why the state should appoint, rather than elect, judges.492 
The heavy dependence of the Louisiana Supreme Court on 
support from business groups merits a reexamination of the wisdom 
of an elected judiciary.493 Professor Peter Joy argues that in the 
context of an elected judiciary, and particula rly in light of the large 
sums of money contributed by the business interests in Louisiana and 
the aggressive efforts by justices to capture their support in reelection 
bids, a reasonable person would have expected the justices to 
disqualify themselves from the investigation of the law clinics.494 
Yet, he notes that judicial codes of ethics do not require 
disqualification in such circumstances and there are no indications 
that justices of the Louisiana Supreme Court were ever troubled by 
this apparent conflic t or the appearance of impropriety it created.495 
Professor Joy argues for adoption of the ABA’s recent amendment 
to the Model Code of Judicial Conduct that provides for 
disqualification where a party or a party’s lawyer made contributions 
to the judge in excess of a certain amount.496 These rules, however, 
only apply to a “proceeding” in which the judge’s impartiality might 
be reasonably questioned. Joy wisely recommends that the campaign 
contribution recusal rule be extended explicitly to apply whenever a 
 
who accept campaign contributions above a certain limit from parties or their attorneys). 
 492. Lanny Keller, Judicial Campaigns Undermine Respect, ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, 
La.), Jan. 13, 2000, at 9B (reporting that the Louisiana Organization for Judicial Excellence is 
working to enact some system of merit selection of judges). 
 493. The ability of LABI, the chief complaining business group, to influence Louisiana 
Supreme Court elections was evidenced by their success during the previous three years in 
putting three new pro-business justices on the court. See supra  notes 209-12 and accompanying 
text. Almost half of the campaign contributions to one of the justices who most vehemently 
attacked the Tulane Clinic came from business interests seeking the restrictions; LABI had 
“spearheaded” his election to the court less than two years earlier. See supra  note 212 and 
accompanying text. Two other justices, including the chief justice, faced imminent reelection 
campaigns and courting the complaining business interests for support. See supra notes 209-12 
and accompanying text. 
 494. See Joy, supra  note 258, at 281. 
 495. The chief justice claimed that a new rule requiring that all campaign contributions be 
made to committees supporting the candidates, instead of directly to the candidates themselves, 
removed him and the other justices from the political process. Schleifstein, supra  note 93. 
 496. Joy, supra note 258, at 283; MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(E)(1)(e) 
(as amended in August 1999), reprinted in  LAWS. MAN. ON PROF. CONDUCT (ABA/BNA) 
01:3001, 3011 (1999). 
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judge is acting in any official capacity, including rulemaking.497 
The conduct of the Louisiana Supreme Court reveals a potential 
weakness of the recusal rule—the rule does not cover instances where 
the campaign contributions are from an organization that is not itself 
a party. In many instances, the party or lawyer may be a member of 
that organization, and the issue before the judge may be one that the 
organization publicly promoted. For example, a trade association 
might vigorously mount a campaign for tort reform, and one of its 
prominent members might be before the judge on an issue relating to 
tort reform. In that instance, although the lawyer himself did not 
personally contribute to the judge’s campaign, a campaign 
contribution from the affiliated association to the judge might create 
the appearance of partiality. The judicial code does not explicitly 
address this situation and recusal would be difficult to obtain. 
Therefore, disclosure by lawyers and parties of membership in or 
contributions to organizations that made significant contributions to a 
judge would promote public confidence and help avoid the 
appearance of impropriety, but would raise First Amendment 
freedom of association problems.498 
The attack on the Tulane Clinic suggests that when there is an 
elected judiciary, judges become politicians, first and foremost, and 
are vulnerable to the corrupting influence of campaign contributions. 
While meritorious selection of judges is one solution, the role of 
Governor Foster in the Tulane Clinic situation cautions that any 
system for appointing judges must ensure that such appointments are, 
to the greatest extent possible, based on merit and not on politics. 
Transferring the selection process from the public to a politician may 
not solve the problem of judges that are willing to favor that 
politician’s interest and deny legal representation to views out of 
 
 497. Joy, supra  note 258, at 283. 
 498. Carrington, supra note 491, at 115-16 (arguing that disclosure of membership in 
organizations, as a way to address issue advocates not before the court, might raise First 
Amendment problems). Professor Erwin Chemerinsky notes that disclosure requirements could 
create problems since they ensure that judges will know which lawyers and parties contributed 
to their judicial campaigns and how much they donated. Chemerinsky, supra note 483, at 145. 
He argues, however, that eliminating disclosure requirements would create even worse 
problems by hiding the problem from the public. Id. at 145-46. Instead, he proposes limits on 
both campaign contributions and expenditures. Id. at 139-49. 
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favor with that politician.499  
The conduct of the Louisiana Supreme Court does, however, 
support greater restrictions on campaign contributions. Likewise, it 
evidences a need for stronger disqualification rules for judges and a 
system of judicial appointments that ensures that candidates are 
chosen on merit. 
2. Anti Civil Rights Redux 
As a final observation, the Louisiana Supreme Court is the only 
court that has sought to curtail its law student practice rule to reduce 
the ability of law students to assist needy individuals or community 
groups.500 Moreover, a review of published cases reveals that not 
since 1974 in In re Primus501 has any court attempted to restric t the 
ability of a lawyer to offer free legal assistance.502 
 
 499. See M. H. Gertler, Leave Judicial Choices to Voters, T IMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans, 
La.), Jan. 20, 2000, at B6 (warning of the consequences of allowing Governor Foster to interject 
politics into the appointment of judges). 
 500. Joan Wallman Kuruc & Rachael A. Brown, Student Practice Rules in the United 
States, 63 BAR EXAMINER, Aug. 1994, at 40, 46 (“States that have amended their rules since the 
middle 1970s have attempted to respond to a changing legal environment . . . These amended 
rules allow practical exposure to a greater variety of clients, legal activities and substantive 
bodies of law . . ..”); E-mail from David F. Chavkin, Professor, Washington College of Law, 
American University, to Robert Kuehn, Former Director, Tulane Environmental Law Clinic 
(Feb. 20, 2000, 10:43:47 EST) (law clinic scholar does not recall any effort by a state to narrow 
the clients who could be represented by law clinic students) (on file with author); E-mail from 
Peter Joy, Professor, Washington University School of Law, to Robert Kuehn, Former Director, 
Tulane Environmental Law Clinic (Feb. 18, 2000, 14:54:28 CST) (on file with author) (law 
clinic scholar and former chair of the AALS Section on Clinical Legal Education also knows of 
no effort to narrow the clients that law clinic students may represent). 
 501. The 1974 action of the South Carolina Supreme Court sought to prohibit attorneys 
from offering free legal representation to pregnant mothers who had been sterilized by the state 
as a condition of continued receipt of Medicaid assistance. 436 U.S. 412 (1978). 
 502. A search of cases relying on In re Primus and NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 328 (1963), 
turned up no later instance of a state seeking to restrict the not-for-profit solicitation activities of 
an attorney. Likewise, the briefs of the plaintiffs and Louisiana Supreme Court in the federal 
court challenge to Rule XX do not identify any case since In re Primus where a state sought to 
restrict an attorney’s pro bono activities. See Brief of Appellants, S. Christian Leadership 
Conference v. Supreme Court of La. (5th Cir. 2000) (No. 99-30895); Plaintiffs’ Memorandum 
of Law in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, S. Christian Leadership Conference v. Supreme 
Court of La., at 21, 61 F. Supp. 2d 499, 560-01 (E.D. La. 1999) (No. 99-1205); Brief of 
Louisiana Supreme Court, Appellee, S. Christian Leadership Conference v. Supreme Court of 
La. (5th Cir. 2000) (No. 99-30895); Memorandum of the Louisiana Supreme Court in Support 
of Its Motion to Dismiss, supra  note 475. In Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., 619 F.2d 459, 472-73 (5th 
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The Louisiana Supreme Court’s conduct also appears to be the 
first government attack on lawyers providing free legal assistance on 
civil rights claims since the concerted efforts of the South in the 
1960s to run off civil rights lawyers.503 Like the attack on the Tulane 
Clinic, those leading the 1960s attacks thought the civil rights 
lawyers were stirring up trouble among the economically and 
politically weak masses.504 Civil rights opponents sought to punish 
lawyers communicating offers of free legal assistance and sought to 
compel community organizations to disclose membership lists.505 
Those opponents also sought to discourage legal assistance by 
accusing civil rights attorneys of representing clients without proper 
authorization and violating ethics rules.506 
These attacks took place, in part, in Louisiana. In Dombrowski v. 
Pfister,507 the U.S. Supreme Court intervened to protect civil rights 
lawyers in Louisiana from prosecution by the state for failing to 
register as members of the National Lawyers Guild. Another federal 
court protected Richard Sobol, a lawyer who moved to Louisiana in 
1966 to represent African-Americans in civil rights litigation, from 
criminal charges of practicing law without a license.508 The Louisiana 
 
Cir. 1980), the Fifth Circuit struck down a court order, entered at the request of Gulf Oil, 
prohibiting attorneys in a class action from communicating with any potential or actual class 
member not a formal party to the suit where the attorneys attested that they neither received nor 
expect to receive from class members any compensation for their services.  
 503. See JACK GREENBERG , CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS 217-22 (1994) (detailing efforts of 
virtually every Southern state to pass laws and start legislative investigations, criminal 
prosecutions, suits for injunctions, and disbarment proceedings to run the NAACP and the 
NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund (LDF) out of the South). 
 504. Id. at 217 (stating that the South saw the NAACP and LDF as the masterminds behind 
the desegregation efforts). 
 505. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 328 (1963) (finding a Virginia law prohibiting 
attorneys from contacting persons and offering free legal assistance unconstitutional); NAACP 
v. Patterson, 357 U.S.  449 (1958) (holding an effort of Alabama attorney general to compel the 
NAACP to disclose its membership lists unconstitutional). 
 506. See GREENBERG , supra  note 503; In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978) (finding the 
effort of the South Carolina Supreme Court to sanction an attorney for advising a lay person of 
legal rights and offering free legal assistance unconstitutional); Sobol v. Perez, 289 F. Supp. 
392 (E.D. La. 1968) (involving a civil rights attorney criminally charged with the unauthorized 
practice of law). 
 507. 380 U.S. 479 (1965). The Court ordered the district court to enjoin prosecution of the 
attorneys and of the Louisiana Subversive Activities and Communist Control Law. Id. at 497. 
 508. See Sobol v. Perez, 289 F. Supp. 392 (E.D. La. 1968). The federal court observed that 
the state’s criminal prosecution was meant to serve as a warning to civil rights lawyers and 
potential clients who might consider retaining lawyers to advance their rights to equal 
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State Bar Association and the Louisiana Attorney General intervened 
in support of efforts to prosecute Sobol.509 
A number of prominent persons have noted similarities between 
the Louisiana Supreme Court’s restrictions on the Tulane Clinic and 
these earlier attempts to suppress legal assistance on civil rights 
matters. A veteran Louisiana civil rights leader called the court’s 
restrictions “a throwback to Jim Crow days” and characterized the 
changes as “the most vicious attack on the rights of working people 
to organize since 1956,” when the state tried to force the NAACP to 
reveal its membership lists.510 In a letter sent to a local newspaper 
shortly after issuance of the new law clinic restrictions, the president 
of Tulane University argued that “[t]he action of the Governor, the 
business community and the State Supreme Court present a classic 
case for the need of such regulations [on environmental 
discrimination] to deter such racially insensitive behavior.”511 
It may be that the business interests and the court did not act 
against the Tulane Clinic because of racial animus. However, the 
statement by the chairman of the Chamber that the Shintech 
controversy over environmental justice was “the defining event, the 
proximate cause” of the court’s action512 and the observation that the 
Tulane Clinic’s assertion of environmental discrimination motivated 
Governor Foster to act513 give support to the belief that this was yet 
another instance of a Southern court imposing restrictions on lawyers 
raising civil rights claims. If the Shintech case was the environmental 
justice movement’s Brown v. Board of Education,514 then the result of 
 
protection. Id. at 402. 
 509. Id. at 394. The Louisiana State Bar Association fully supported the district attorney’s 
position that Sobol violated the Louisiana unauthorized practice of law statute, that the statute 
was constitutional, and that the prosecution should proceed; the attorney general did not take a 
position on whether or not Sobol violated the law but did argue that the statute was 
constitutional. E-mail from Richard Sobol to Robert Kuehn, Former Director, Tulane 
Environmental Law Clinic (Mar. 1, 2000, 10:01:06 PST) (on file with author). 
 510. Coleman, supra note 280 (quoting state Representative Avery Alexander). 
 511. Letter from Eamon M. Kelly, President, Tulane University, to Jim Amos, Editor, 
T IMES-PICAYUNE (June 24, 1998) (on file with author). The Times-Picayune ran the letter but 
redacted the final phrase “to deter such racially insensitive behavior.” Kelly, supra note 243. 
 512. LeBlanc, supra  note 170, at 224. 
 513. Schleifstein, supra  note 93 (observing that nothing angered Governor Foster more 
than claims made by the Tulane Clinic under the rubric of environmental justice). 
 514. Gray, supra  note 74. 
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the Louisiana Supreme Court’s action is separate and unequal access 
to justice in Louisiana. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The constitutionality of the new restrictions on Louisiana’s law 
clinics will ultimately be determined by the federal courts. But as the 
Louisiana Supreme Court’s own lawyer acknowledged, it is 
important to know the difference between having the right to do 
something and doing the right thing.515 
Whether it is illegal to do so or not, politicians do not do the right 
thing when they deny citizens the ability to obtain legal 
representation. Business interests likewise do not do the right thing 
when they proclaim a belief in dialogue with and tolerance of diverse 
viewpoints of citizens while at the same time vigorously working to 
suppress the ability of some citizens to be heard. 
It is not only not the right thing, but also inconsistent with rules of 
professional responsibility and canons of judicial ethics, for judges 
and members of the bar to put their own political or economic 
interests above their professional duties and deny access to legal 
representation. If the legal profession’s statements about the necessity 
to ensure that all persons have access to legal representation even if 
their causes are unpopular are to have any meaning, then attacks on 
the ability of law students and law professors to provide free legal 
assistance must be condemned by members of the profession and 
explicitly prohibited by the rules of professional conduct. 
With a history of similar attacks on law professors and law clinics 
outside of Louisiana, the attack on Tulane is not likely to be the last 
attempt to deny access to justice or to interfere with the ability of law 
schools to provide legal representation to those in need. Although no 
other state has yet sought to narrow its student practice rule to 
exclude certain community organizations or points of view, one 
 
 515. Michael H. Rubin & Judge Brady M. Fitzsimmons, Simply Complying With the Rules 
of Ethics Doesn’t Make You an Ethical Lawyer, in IN OUR OWN WORDS: REFLECTIONS ON 
PROFESSIONALISM IN TH E LAW 95 & n.1 (Roger A. Stetter ed., 1998) (repeating a comment by 
Justice Potter Stewart in Columbia University Seminars on Media and Society, Ethics in 
America—Preface to Ethics: An Introduction to Ethical Reasoning (Corporation for Public 
Broadcasting 1988)). 
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conservative legal organization has embraced the new Louisiana 
restrictions as a justified response to liberal activism by law school 
clinics.516 Even in the absence of specific steps to limit clinic 
representation, the attack on the Tulane Clinic may discourage 
university or law school officials elsewhere from taking on 
controversial cases, especially where those cases may displease 
politicians, alumni, or businesses with political or financial influence 
over the university.517 
Promoting tolerance of law clinic and law professor representation 
of unpopular causes will require not just greater exposure and 
criticism of attempts to deny such representation, but also a 
recommitment of the legal profession to its pro bono ideals. Without 
such efforts, the promise of equal justice for all is, in the reality of 
law schools and their clinics, hollow. 
 
 516. See Roth, supra  note 463 (quoting the Washington Legal Foundation’s objection that 
clinics are “repositories for activist professors” and noting a dislike of clinic representation of 
community groups “since not all members of a group may share that organization’s goals”). See 
also  A One-Sided Paper Chase, N.Y. T IMES, Feb. 28, 2000 (National Edition), at A23 
(including an editorial page advertisement by the Washington Legal Foundation contending that 
law clinics lack academic integrity and arguing for a “level playing field” in which clinical 
programs defend property rights and advance the interests of private enterprise); Brief of Amici 
Curiae of the Washington Legal Foundation and Economic Freedom Law Clinic in Support of 
Defendant-Appellant and In Support of Affirmance, S. Christian Leadership Conference v. 
Supreme Court of La. (5th Cir. 2000) (No. 99-30895) (arguing that actions of the Louisiana 
Supreme Court do not implicate any federal right or interest). 
 517. See Frank Askin, A Law School Where Students Don’t Just Learn the Law; They Help 
Make the Law, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 855, 857 (1999) (“the recent experience of the Tulane 
environmental law clinic counsels some measure of caution by public law faculties using 
inistitional resources for advocacy purposes”); Janet McConnaughey, Nation’s Law Clinics 
Fear La. Rules Poison Legal Environment, ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.), Nov. 13, 1998, at 
6B (quoting Stanford Law School clinic professor’s concerns that the attack is “reinforcing 
conservative views in lots of law schools that they want to keep out of controversial things . . . ” 
although there have not been any obvious attempts to replicate Louisiana’s restrictions); David 
E. Rovella, Law Schools Urged to Take Death Cases, NAT’L L.J., Dec. 7, 1998, at A9 (citing 
the attack on the Tulane Clinic, the dean of Northwestern University School of Law expressed 
concern about a backlash if law school clinics agree to take on appeals of death row inmates); 
Roth, supra  note 463 (explaining that AALS officials fear that rules will discourage law 
professors from trying to obtain cases that provide the best learning experiences for their 
students). 
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